Do Leaders Want Gaza Negotiations to Succeed

Commentary by Jon B. Alterman

Published August 9, 2024

For most of the last month, reports have circulated that a Gaza ceasefire is close. The war has imposed difficult costs on Israel and unleashed destruction on Gaza. Even more urgently, the suffering of the hostages that Hamas holds and the hunger and disease that threatens almost all Palestinians argue for a swift end to hostilities in order to preserve human lives. Negotiators believe that they have arrived at bridgeable positions, and the principal mediators-the United States, Qatar, and Egypt-have called for the parties to gather on Thursday, August 15, to reach an agreement.

While the meeting may take place, there is no good public evidence that either leadership believes it is done fighting.

It is important to start with a caveat. The mediators may know something that is that is not yet public. They also may have intelligence about the Israeli and Hamas leaderships that gives them optimism. But to an outside observer, it certainly feels like the two leaders who matter here-Binyamin Netanyahu and Yahya Sinwar-think there is more to be gained by fighting than settling right now.

Let's start with Netanyahu. He believes that Israeli forces are degrading Hamas in Gaza and that Sinwar's popularity is diminishing as the war drags on. His daring assassinations of Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut and Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran elicited amazement at Israeli capabilities and confusion in Tehran about how to respond. He believes that U.S. efforts to prevent an all-out regional war will help protect Israel from retribution, and that the Biden administration has little appetite to constrain the resupply of Israeli munitions.

Politically, his popularity in Israel is falling, but no alternative is emerging. More importantly to him, the right-wing allies necessary to his ruling coalition are remaining in line while continually warning of their imminent defections if he makes concessions. Pressure is growing on Netanyahu to negotiate the release of hostages, but Netanyahu has resisted such pressure before. When Hamas kidnapped Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit in 2006, he remained in captivity for more than five years while Netanyahu negotiated his release. One of the more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners released in exchange for Shalit's freedom was Yahya Sinwar, which surely weighs heavily on Netanyahu.

Interestingly, Netanyahu did not use his recent visit to the United States to strike new agreements or advance new ideas. Instead, he reinforced his positions-partly for a domestic audience in Israel-and sensed whether U.S. support was fragile. There are few signs that he came away concerned. If anything, he may have concluded that President Joe Biden's deep emotional support for Israeli security is stronger than that of either of Biden's potential successors, providing Israel with a window to continue operations.

But equally important is Netanyahu's conviction that war is often necessary and that now is such a time. He never bought into the idea put forward by his political opponents that a "New Middle East" was in reach, or that "Land for Peace" represented a solution to Israel's security challenges. Much as the United States saw its 45-year Cold War with the Soviet Union, or as it now sees global competition with China, he sees Israel as condemned to a future of enduring contestation. Further, he believes that U.S. officials are profoundly misguided in seeking to apply the counterinsurgency lessons of two decades of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to what Israel is doing in Gaza. Instead, it is the effective U.S. degradation of al Qaeda's capabilities-including the assassinations of both Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri as well as the targeted killings of dozens of other leaders and operatives-that should guide Israeli actions.

To judge from outward appearances, then, Netanyahu is seeking to take advantage of a window to continue fighting and degrading Hamas. Netanyahu will continue to kill Hamas fighters, and he will embed Israel further on the Egypt-Gaza border. A low-grade war in which he enjoys U.S. protection and which allows him to inflict damage on any Iranian forces or proxies that threaten Israel will reinforce perceptions of Israeli strength and capabilities and, in the near and medium term, reinforce Israeli deterrence.

Yahya Sinwar seems equally committed to fighting. Part of his goal in attacking Israel on October 7 was to isolate Israel both in the region and in the world, and that isolation is increasing. What had been seen as Israel's inevitable integration with Arab states has completely stalled and is likely to be slowed by future frustrations over Gaza's reconstruction, whenever that happens.

But even more importantly, Sinwar sees Gaza's current destruction as purposive. Rather than seeing the tens of thousands of dead Palestinians as victims of Israeli aggression, he sees them as martyrs to the Palestinian cause. Sinwar spent more than two decades in Israeli prisons, where he learned good Hebrew and worked to understand Israeli society. But he also seems to have grown more committed to the necessity of struggle, strongly opposing the very agreement that won his freedom in 2011. Sinwar seems to embrace the idea that he will die a martyr's death, killed at some point by Israel. His goals before then are twofold: (1) to kill as many Israelis as possible, and (2) to be remembered as the one who catalyzed the changes that will, perhaps over decades, expel Jews from historic Palestine and reinstate Arab sovereignty over Jerusalem.

As a practical matter, the assassination of Haniyeh (who was often a negotiator), and the elevation of Sinwar in his place, makes it less likely that Hamas will agree to a halt in fighting right now. Haniyeh was a willing negotiator, while Sinwar is a fighter. Who will negotiate in Haniyeh's absence, and how that negotiator will win the confidence of his successor, Sinwar-who ultimately commands the fighting forces in Gaza-remains unclear, especially a week after Haniyeh's death. In addition, the region remains on tenterhooks as it waits for an Iranian response to the Haniyeh assassination in Tehran, and the Israeli counter-response.

It remains possible that this could all work out. Netanyahu can conclude that he has demonstrated sufficient strength through two assassinations. Sinwar is keen to maintain Palestinian support, and he may be confident that Hamas can melt into the broader Palestinian national movement and rebuild itself on the seeds of Gaza's reconstruction. Certainly, the families of more than a hundred Israeli hostages are desperate for progress, and millions of Palestinians cry out for relief. But it remains hard to get over the perception that Netanyahu and Sinwar believe that they are fighting for their people's survival, that they are winning the long game, and that now is not the time to flinch.

Jon B. Alterman is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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