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12/02/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 12/02/2024 15:05

What Does India’s Hypersonic Missile Test Mean

What Does India's Hypersonic Missile Test Mean?

Photo: Egor Chernyakov/Wirestock Creators via Adobe Stock

Critical Questions by Diya Ashtakala

Published December 2, 2024

On November 16, India announced the successful test launch of its first long-range hypersonic missile. The missile, developed by India's Defense and Research Organization (DRDO), was intended to carry "various payloads for ranges greater than 1,500 km for the Armed Forces." The test makes it one of the few nuclear-armed countries to develop these missiles, including the United States, China, Russia, and North Korea. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh on X (formerly Twitter) termed it a "historic moment" for India, putting in a "group of select nations having capabilities of such critical and advanced military technologies." The missile test occurred only days after China showcased a new hypersonic glide vehicle, the GDF-600, at its flagship Zhuhai air show.

India's test highlights the intensifying global race for hypersonic, including India's growing maturity in developing hypersonic systems, which it has invested in since the 2000s. It warrants further analysis of what this means for regional stability, particularly India's precarious relationships with China and Pakistan. Recent developments also indicate bilateral and regional approaches for the next U.S. administration to consider in an intensifying global race for hypersonic weapons.

Q1: Why is India testing its hypersonic missile now?

A1: The recent test represents a public culmination of India's multi-decade research into hypersonic systems. India's hypersonic ambitions began far before 2007 when it first took delivery of its BrahMos missile, a joint venture with Russia. In 2004, India first publicized its indigenous development of the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle, demonstrating its scramjet engine in a 2020 flight test.

The timing of India's test comes alongside rapid developments in the global hypersonic arsenals. The test occurred days after China showcased the GDF-600. India finds itself in a global environment marked by rapid developments in the hypersonic space. Most recently, the United States tested its hypersonic missile in the Pacific as part of its Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon program. Over the past year, Russia loaded its Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with nuclear-capable Avangard HGV and was alleged to have used its Zicron hypersonic missile in its ongoing war in Ukraine. North Korean state media reported a test of the Hwasong 16B hypersonic missile, described by President Kim Jong Un as a "key piece of the nuclear deterrent."

India's attention is on China, a neighbor with whom it shares a long history of border crisis and security concerns. Touted as the leader in hypersonic technology, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) officials state that China surpasses Russia and the United States in the development and advancement of conventional and nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons. A recent intelligence leak revealed that the People's Liberation Army 2023 successfully tested its DF-27 intermediate-range ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle in 2023, allowing it to easily penetrate missile defense systems. As per the 2023 China Military Power Report, the DF-17 HGV-armed medium-range ballistic missile "will transform the PLA's missile force." While the DF-17 is meant for conventional missions, it can equip nuclear warheads.

Q2: How does this development shape India's strategic capabilities amid competition with China?

A2: Former commander of the U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has emphasized that hypersonic technology gives a country "response, long-range, strike options against distant, defended and/or time critical threats when other forces are unavailable." Hypersonic weapons offer India a capability combining extreme speed, maneuverability, and low-altitude flight, making them harder to track and detect. India's test launch indicates its move towards diversifying its strategic capabilities and strengthening its deterrent by enhancing traditional warfighting advantages.DRDO states that the missile carries "various payloads," prompting several questions on the specifications, such as its speed and the hypersonic delivery systems within the missile.

Q3: What is the response from China and Pakistan on the missile test?

A3: China and Pakistan are yet to provide an official response to India's hypersonic missile test. China is unlikely to respond, an approach that it has maintained in the past. However, China has responded to military developments, including the unprecedented deployment of a
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)-capable ICBM. The most recent response was to the Agni-V MIRV capable ICBM, showcasing its capability of reaching targets in China. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian cited UN resolution 1172, which condemns India and Pakistan's respective nuclear tests in 1998, stating that "maintaining peace, security and stability in South Asia meets the common interests of all."

Given India's expanding capabilities, this may tempt Pakistan to respond by ramping up its hypersonic developments and potential reliance on China for hypersonic technology in the coming days. While Pakistan does not have an indigenous hypersonic program, the Pakistan Air Force recently claimed the development of a hypersonic-capable missile as part of a larger modernization effort to "counter evolving threats." A video released by the Pakistan Air Force featured a CM-400AKG anti-ship missile, a China-manufactured missile that allegedly travels at hypersonic speeds.

Q4: What are the broader implications of India's test on the ongoing missile race in South Asia?

A4: The recent test adds new urgency to India, China, and Pakistan's missile race. India's clear ambition to strengthen its hypersonic program and Pakistan's desire to pursue this capability, coupled with China's influence on the region, raise concerns about potential escalation risks. Hypersonic weapons can maneuver to different targets and present little warning time for defenders, complicating a tense nuclear balance. Moreover, the challenge of facing two nuclear peers-considered an emergent problem among U.S. strategists-represents India's current status quo. Hypersonic proliferation in the region will demand a deeper reckoning.

India's test launch also comes amid a complicated relationship with China. The test not only coincides with China's showcasing of new hypersonic missiles but comes weeks after India and China reached a new military patrol pact along the Line of Actual Control, four years after its deadly border clash began in 2020. The pact divides Indian experts on whether this is a strategic shift or more of a tactical move, and the implications of this new pact are yet to be seen, especially between two countries with a history of deep mistrust and border contentions. Tracking advancements in technological processes is critical moving forward for the India-China relationship.

Q5: How can the next U.S. administration shape India-China dynamics in the ongoing hypersonic weapons race?

A5: India's missile test highlights how quickly it can advance its capability. This adds a sense of urgency for the United States, which is lagging on its hypersonic developments. The incoming U.S. administration will need to consider the emerging challenges from the hypersonic developments from China and Russia as well as the rising capabilities of North Korea. Former commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Admiral John Aquilino stated that the DOD lags behind China on hypersonic weapons and systems required to defend them. Former U.S. DOD officials have also highlighted that the United States has ways to go in terms of capability and capacity.

The growing competition also offers a preview of what the United States may face in its own two-peer nuclear challenge. As the new administration considers its approach to regional stability, it will be critical to deepen engagements with India, deriving learnings from its two-peer challenges. Through two prior administrations, India and the United States have strengthened defense and military ties, forming the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the Quad) to counter regional competitors.

There are two approaches that the United States can take. On a bilateral level, the Trump administration should use the next 2+2 Intersessional and Ministerial Dialogues to discuss developments in India's hypersonic program, potential challenges faced by China, and how to strengthen information sharing between the two countries. These dialogues allow the United States and India to discuss shared priorities across a range of issues, including defense cooperation.

On a broader Indo-Pacific level, the United States should leverage its partnership with India through the Quad, which includes Australia and Japan, to strengthen information sharing with its Indo-Pacific allies. Most recently, the U.S. DOD announced a new agreement as part of AUKUS to enhance testing of hypersonic vehicles and implementation of related technologies, seen as an effort to counter China's dominance. The United States also recently formalized an agreement with Japan on hypersonic missile defense. The next Quad meeting in India serves as a good platform for the incoming administration to foster dialogue with Quad members on China's growing dominance in the hypersonic race and its impact on Indo-Pacific security going forward.

Diya Ashtakala is a research associate with the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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Research Associate, Project on Nuclear Issues