Syrian Rebels’ Surprise Offensive Highlights Assad Regime’s Weakness

Critical Questions by Natasha Hall

Published December 2, 2024

On November 27, Syrian opposition-armed groups launched a surprise offensive. With Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the lead, rebels in northwest Syria quickly swept through the western Aleppo countryside. With little to no resistance from the Syrian regime and their allies, rebels were able to capture Syria's second-largest city, Aleppo, within a day. By the evening of November 30, the rebels had taken over 100 kilometers of the strategic M5 highway linking Aleppo and Damascus. This is the first rebel offensive and a major shift in frontlines in years. The last significant change was in early 2020 when the regime displaced nearly a million people into Idlib from other parts of the province and Hama province.

Q1: What led to the surprise rebel offensive?

A1: Prior to this offensive, the frontlines in Syria's long-running war had been relatively frozen for four years. To maintain those frontlines, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah protected the Assad regime, while Turkey preserved the opposition-held northern parts of the country, and the United States maintained forces in northeastern and eastern Syria.

That fragile stasis collapsed as Assad's allies, Iran and Hezbollah, have been significantly weakened. In recent months, Israel decimated Hezbollah leadership and rank and file and penetrated highly secure locations in Iran. Hours before the offensive in Syria, Hezbollah struck a ceasefire deal with Israel, in which Israeli forces vowed to prevent weapon transfers to Hezbollah, and they have continued to strike arms shipments in Syria and Lebanon.

Russia has been bogged down in Ukraine and unrest in Georgia. However, the Kremlin has been pushing for normalization between Ankara and Damascus and has been frustrated by Assad's intransigence. In the face of Assad's refusal to reconcile, Turkey may have allowed for a rebel offensive for the first time in years to encourage the regime to reconsider.

Within this context, the Syrian regime had been bombarding the northwest for weeks to deter rebels from exploiting their moment of weakness. Though the opposition had been planning the offensive for months, these attacks likely increased the momentum of the rebel push.

Q2: How significant are these rebel gains? What does it reveal about the regime's strength?

A2: This lightning-fast offensive is a monumental shift in the Syrian conflict and highlights the regime's inherent weakness. Only after years of siege and heavy bombardment, with the help of Iran and Russia, was the regime able to capture all of Aleppo city in 2016. Within a day, rebels were able to take the city with little resistance. Rebels even captured affluent western parts of the city that had remained in regime control throughout the war.

The push south along the M5 highway, however, interferes with the main interests of the regime's allies. Iran and Hezbollah use Syria as a supply route for arms and materiel. Russia has a naval and air base in Tartous and Latakia, respectively. These essential nodes of Russian power on the Mediterranean lie just over 100 kilometers from where the rebels have advanced.

However, despite the weakness of the Syrian regime and its allies, there are few proponents of HTS overthrowing Assad. International and regional stakeholders have long decided that Assad's survival is preferable to an uncertain alternative. The United States and Israel may benefit from limited rebel gains to disrupt Iranian and Hezbollah supply networks, but they are displeased with HTS' significant advances. Without governments committed to seriously threatening Assad's power in Damascus, the opposition's unprecedented gains may be lost as Assad's allies recoup and launch a counterattack.

Q3:Who are the rebels behind this offensive, and what are their objectives?

A3: HTS, the most powerful and disciplined of the armed opposition groups, has led the current offensive. Its leader, Abu Mohammad al Jolani, was once the commander of Jubhat al Nusra-an Al Qaeda offshoot. While Nusra renounced Al Qaeda and rebranded as HTS, Turkey and the United States still designate HTS as a terrorist organization. HTS has maintained power in Idlib for years by controlling most economic sectors and their potency on the battlefield. Since taking Aleppo, they have tried to reassure residents, including minorities, that they will not harm them.

The other main umbrella group is the Syrian National Army, composed of Turkish-backed armed groups. They were less prominent in the initial offensive against the regime but have been fighting the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces and captured Tel Rifaat.

These clashes point to how the rebels are hemmed in by outside interests, especially Turkey. While these groups would want to push towards Damascus and overthrow Assad, Ankara is more interested in forcing a compromise on Damascus and eliminating the threat it sees from Kurdish groups in Syria. Likely, as a result of these limitations, the rebels stopped short of Hama city. They may have chosen to solidify their wins and avoid further antagonizing foreign interests.

Q4: How has the United States responded, and what should its strategy be?

A4: The U.S. response has been largely muted, aside from a statement from the White House released on Saturday, emphasizing that it was not involved in the offensive and their concern that the offensive was HTS led.

While the lame-duck Biden administration is unlikely to become deeply involved, failing to take advantage of this unprecedented moment would be a significant loss for U.S. interests. The window to shift dynamics in Syria is also short as the regime's allies come to the rescue. Engaging in this unprecedented moment could be an opportunity to curb the regime's repressive behavior and destabilizing activities and encourage refugee returns.

In the near term, the United States should work with Turkey to protect opposition-controlled areas and their supply routes from attacks, which could involve chemical weapons. The United States could use this moment to secure a deal that is acceptable to Russia and Turkey, that forces the regime to release detainees and protect returnees, and pressures the rebels to moderate. Failing to engage constructively allows adversaries to shape Syria according to their interests, to the detriment of the United States and the Syrian people.

Natasha Hall is a senior fellow with the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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