Somaliland: A Change of Leadership in the Context of Regional Developments and its Quest for Recognition

• Commentary Africa
  by Aleksi Ylönen

On November 13, 2024, Somaliland conducted its fourth direct presidential election amid regional tensions involving its incumbent leadership. The election, in which more than a million of the population of over six million cast their votes, was another example of a remarkably peaceful democratic exercise in the Horn of Africa's otherwise authoritarian and politically volatile context. The University College London's International Election Observation Mission did not observe any serious irregularities or electoral malpractice and the Brenthurst Foundation, which also monitored the elections, characterised them as free, fair, and credible.

In a rematch from 2017, the three presidential candidates, incumbent Muse Bihi Abdi (from the Kulmiye, Peace, Unity and Development Party), the main opposition candidate Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi "Cirro" (Waddani Party), and Faysal Ali "Warabe" (Justice and Welfare Party, UCID) ran with similar agendas. The challenges of Somaliland's economy, including inflation and high unemployment, especially among the youth, along with access to foreign finance and development, were among the main domestic political issues. In foreign policy, achieving international recognition after over three decades of self-declared independence, which is widely seen as a cure to Somaliland's most domestic challenges, topped all three candidates' agendas.

On November 19 it was officially announced that main opposition candidate Abdirahman "Cirro" had won by a convincing margin, with 63.92% of the total vote. The outgoing president Abdi collected 34.81% while Faysal Ali "Warabe" obtained less than 1% of the vote. A peaceful transfer of power followed the elections, demonstrating Somaliland's functioning democracy. Djibouti's president Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, who has remained in power since 1999, immediately congratulated Abdirahman for his victory and Somaliland for its political maturity, while Somalia's leadership expressed their hope for improved relations with Somaliland.

President Muse Bihi Abdi's Contested Legacy

Abdirahman's victory can be seen as Somalilanders' resounding no to the outgoing President Abdi's policies. Abdi's presidential term which was to end in 2022 was extended twice by the Somaliland parliament from five to seven years, in part due to financial constraints, something that opposition leaders considered undemocratic. Abdi has also been heavily criticised for his approach to the ongoing Las Anod conflict in eastern Somaliland where the separatist SSC-Khatumo took up arms in early 2023, largely due to perpetual political and economic marginalisation and repressive administration from Hargeisa. In August 2023, following a devastating shelling campaign by the Somaliland military, SSC-Khatumo forced it to withdraw and was successively endorsed, in October, as a new federal member state by the government of Somalia in Mogadishu.

Abdi's hardline approach and subsequent defeat in Las Anod were considered an important blunder in Hargeisa. He sought to mitigate the damage by promising retaliatory military action against SSC-Khatumo and shifting the attention to Somaliland's international affairs. Immediately following a meeting with the Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Djibouti at the end of 2023, Abdi flew to Addis Ababa where he signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali, claiming that Ethiopia would be the first UN member state to recognise Somaliland in exchange for being allowed to rent 20 square kilometers of Somaliland coastline for a naval base. This would grant landlocked Ethiopia direct access to the sea near the Dubai Ports World-managed Berbera port, which complements Djibouti as Ethiopia's import-export lifeline. The MoU got a mixed reception in Somaliland and was not enough to carry Abdi to a second presidential term largely because it was accompanied by the apparent failure of his policy in Las Anod.

The MoU led to significant tension in the Horn of Africa because Mogadishu considered it as Ethiopia's violation of Somalia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, expelled the Ethiopian ambassador, and later on claimed that Ethiopia would be not allowed to participate in the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which is scheduled to succeed the current African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) in January 2025. It then entered into a bilateral defence treaty with Egypt, which disputes Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam megaproject on the Blue Nile and defies its ambition to regain sea access, and closed ranks with Eritrea, which has grown disaffected due to Addis Ababa's handling of the aftermath of the Tigray conflict (2020-2022) and its disinterest in eliminating Asmara's archrival, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF).

What to expect from the Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi administration?

Although Abdirahman's election in Somaliland is likely not to alter these regional dynamics significantly, it may have a moderating effect on them. While his party has criticised the secrecy surrounding the MoU with Ethiopia and questioned its economic benefits for Somaliland, Abdirahman has promised to reinvigorate the largely paralysed dialogue with Somalia, despite Mogadishu's uncompromising stand on territorial unity.

However, above all, the Abdirahman administration will continue to pursue Somaliland's international recognition because it is a longstanding aspiration of the people of Somaliland. It is likely to continue to base its hopes on Ethiopia delivering on its promises. But it will also bet on the incoming Trump administration in the United States, where officials of the previous Trump presidency already expressed interest in recognising Somaliland.

Meanwhile, Somaliland's internal challenges remain daunting and reflect on its external affairs. The Las Anod conflict, which continues to affect a large part of eastern Somaliland, remains unresolved and has resulted in the loss of territorial control in the area. Given the military realities, the Abdirahman administration will have to seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict, but this will be seen as a welcome change from Abdi's hardline approach.

With respect to Somaliland's economic woes, Abdirahman will continue to face the problem of attracting foreign investment and economic assistance for development beyond the Somaliland diaspora, something that is made difficult precisely by the lack of international recognition. Here, Somaliland's commitment to the West, and especially Taiwan, may come under strain due to China's likely renewed attempt to woo Somaliland with economic and financial rewards in exchange for subscribing to its "one China" policy, earlier rejected during the Abdi presidency. This is because of Abdirahman's previously expressed interest in establishing relations with Beijing, instead of Taipei, and China's determination to undercut the incoming Trump administration in the geopolitically and strategically crucial Red Sea/Gulf of Aden neighborhood, where Beijing established its first overseas military base in 2017, in Djibouti.

Somaliland's international importance in the Horn of Africa

Somaliland plays an important role in the geopolitically and strategically significant region where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean. Its foreign policy alignment, mainly with some Western countries and Taiwan, in a strategically pivotal area for crucial international players worldwide, makes Somaliland potentially an ally for actors seeking to advance their regional interests, including Western countries. Although Somaliland's quest for international recognition has failed to make significant strides, the MoU with Ethiopia and the return of Trump to power in the United States may heighten prospects for it. For some, rewarding Somaliland for its longstanding commitment to democracy and security would strengthen its resolve and serve the interest of asserting power in the critical but highly volatile neighborhood. At the same time, recognising Somaliland would mean bypassing Mogadishu and go against the international practice of prior consent from the host state - something particularly hard to obtain in Africa, where traditionally countries have never mutually recognised any split that was not authorised by the country in question Therefore, while Somaliland maintains strong legal arguments, some governments fear that a potential recognition could have significant fallouts at the regional and international level.