Moldova’s Ukrainian Bilateral

Critical Questions by Leah Kieff

Published August 13, 2024

In 2014, when Russia invaded Ukraine, only one in six Americans could find Ukraine on a world map. While that percentage has certainly increased since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it is without a doubt that, even today, far fewer Americans would be able to find Ukraine's smaller eastern neighbor, Moldova, on a map. But Moldova, which is less than four hours from the front lines of the ongoing kinetic combat and which shares a border of more than 1,000 miles with Ukraine, is of key importance to the United States and its partners and allies-and not just for geographic reasons.

Q1: How has the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine changed the Moldovan bilateral relationship with Ukraine?

A1: Moldova's political future is, for better or worse, now intertwined with Ukraine's. This extends not only to Ukraine's success on the battlefield but also to its pathways through EU accession talks and beyond. It is widely agreed that if Russian troops had succeeded in their initial advance across Ukraine, they would have continued their advance to Chisinau. This path of advance would likely have included connecting with the small contingent of Russian forces stationed in Moldova's breakaway region of Transnistria. Such a move would have placed Russian troops on the doorstep of two NATO allies-Poland on the Ukrainian border and Romania on the Moldovan border. This is especially notable as Romania's NATO basing, specifically the Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, has been greatly expanded, including with a large U.S. contingent, as a direct result of Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine. It is important to note that Romania's eastern flank and the Danube River are widely seen as some of the alliance's most vulnerable strategic points when it comes to a potential conflict with Russia. However, this notional advance into Moldova did not occur, as Ukraine repelled the Russian offensive.

Since 2022, Moldova has responded by not only repeatedly condemning the Kremlin's aggression but also by imposing sanctions against Russia. Perhaps more importantly, Moldova has taken in the largest number of Ukrainian refugees per capita of any country in the world. While these refugees have been granted temporary protected status in Moldova, which allows them to access benefits, services, and legal work, a large portion are from nonworking age groups. For example, 92 percent of all refugees traveling into Moldova from Ukraine were traveling with a child, and over 30 percent were elderly. While those refugees who are able to work assist in helping Moldova's labor shortage, the influx of refugees also strains Moldova's social services. The European Union and United States have both contributed significant funds to helping Moldova support this influx of refugees.

More than just supporting displaced Ukrainian populations, Moldova has proven to be a stalwart partner to Ukraine. This partnership includes Moldovan and Ukrainian collaboration on issues ranging from Transnistria and energy independence to the pathway to EU membership.

Q2: How has Moldova's breakaway region of Transnistria factored into Ukrainian bilateral relations?

A2: The breakaway region of Transnistria, wedged between Moldova and Ukraine, has had Russian troops stationed there since 1992. The troops fall into two categories: (1) "peacekeepers," tasked with patrolling the territory as a part of an agreement that ended the war, and (2) other Russian forces-whose presence Moldova never agreed to-tasked with protecting a large Soviet-era weapons depot. It is nearly impossible to imagine that these approximately 2,000 troops could launch an invasion, but their presence and the weapons depot serve as a continual reminder to the government in Chisinau that Moscow's hand is ever close.

Perhaps surprisingly, given Moscow's influence and presence, the Transnistrian government has remained neutral regarding the war in Ukraine. This neutrality is demonstrative of just how much sway the oligarchs in Transnistria have over Tiraspol. After the 2022 invasion, Ukraine closed its borders with Transnistria, closing avenues for both legal and illegal trade from Transnistria to flow eastward and making Moldova the only avenue for Transnistrian goods. The interests of Transnistria's oligarchs are economically aligned with the reopening of the Ukrainian border and the expansion of trade with the European Union. But these interests are challenged by the increased taxes that Chisinau has recently imposed on Transnistrian goods. Transnistrian leaders have labeled these taxes as acts of aggression from Moldova and have responded with economic measures aimed at Chisinau.

Tiraspol has also supported disinformation about Chisinau and Ukraine. For example, leaders in Tiraspol, without evidence, warned that groups from Moldova were planning to commit acts of terrorism within Transnistria in February of this year. In March, a video purportedly showing a drone attack on a military base in Transnistria was released. The Moldovan and Ukrainian governments responded quickly to discredit the contents, but these are not the only false flag operations that have been centered in Transnistria since the start of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Prior to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, both parties were engaged in negotiations via a 5+2 format around the Transnistrian conflict. This grouping includes the European Union, Moldova, Russia, Transnistria, Ukraine, the United States, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Ukraine refuses to continue negotiations in this format, but Russia and Transnistria have continued to advocate for its return. While a reinstatement of the 5+2 format is unlikely, it is possible that eventual negotiations to end Russia's war in Ukraine will include a settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, including the removal of Russian troops and responsible dissolution of the weapons depot. Regardless, both Ukraine and Moldova have a vested interest in Transnistrian stability.

Q3: Are Moldovan and Ukrainian EU memberships linked?

A3: In December 2023, the European Union opened formal accession talks for both Moldova and Ukraine following their attainment of candidate status in 2022. This recognition acknowledged the progress that both countries individually had made on the reform recommendations provided by the European Union as a part of this process. This progress was made despite their own unique internal challenges, including but not limited to the ongoing war in Ukraine and, for Moldova, a lack of personnel capacity.

As Ukraine and Moldova advance through this accession process, they have an opportunity to hold each other accountable and provide support. While their pathways are intertwined, they are not linked. Recent polling in both countries indicates strong support for EU accession, which will hopefully enable the continued progress that is needed. Additionally, while the European Union has stated that the Transnistrian issue will not affect Moldova's pathway to accession, it is difficult to imagine an EU member country with Russian troops stationed within its borders. Ukraine and Moldova have a historic opportunity to be partners in resolving this frozen conflict.

Ukraine and Moldova can also work together to counter disinformation about EU membership within their countries, especially among Russian-speaking populations. Russia will continue its efforts to disrupt and change sentiments in advance of Moldova's October EU referendum vote. In March, Moldovan intelligence cautioned about Russian plans to destabilize the country over the next two years. Russian efforts to turn sentiments against Ukraine across Europe have been varied and ongoing.

While there has been formal progress for both countries along their pathways to the European Union, this may be more of a gesture of solidarity against Russian aggression than reflective of an immediate opportunity to join. Although both Moldovan president Maia Sandu and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky have indicated a goal of 2030 for their countries to respectively join the European Union, there are challenges to them actually becoming members. These challenges, related to EU structures to make their membership feasible, are unrelated to the numerous reforms both Moldova and Ukraine must complete before they are eligible.

Q4: How does energy factor into the Moldovan and Ukrainian relationship?

A4: Even before Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, both Ukraine and Moldova had fraught relationships with Russia that often played out through their energy sectors. In post-Soviet history, Ukraine had long served as the primary pathway for Russian gas to Europe, but following gas shutoffs in 2006 and 2009, both were keen to find alternative pathways to receive and distribute gas. Prior to the start of Russia's 2022 invasion, Ukraine produced about 66 percent of its energy domestically, but Russia's targeted attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure have reduced this domestic production capacity by almost half .

Until recently, Moldova sourced 100 percent of its energy from Russian gas delivered through Ukraine to Transnistria, the site of Moldova's largest power plant. As of 2023, Moldova receives all of its gas from non-Russian sources. Transnistria, however, continues to receive Russian gas, which fuels the majority of Moldova's electricity needs. Historically, Transnistria received the gas for free, with Russia billing the Moldovan government in Chisinau for the costs of Transnistria's gas. This has until recently given Russia an annual opportunity to strong-arm Moldova. But the combination of increased Moldovan energy independence and an audit that disproved the country's debt to Russian energy giant Gazprom has left Moldova in a much stronger position.

Currently, Russian gas flows to Transnistria via Ukraine, but Ukraine has indicated that it will not extend its contract with Russia when it expires in December 2024. The government in Chisinau has suggested that it will still be possible for Russian gas to transit to Transnistria through a few alternative routes following the ending of the Russian-Ukrainian contract. However, it remains uncertain whether Russia will continue to provide this free gas, who will pay transit fees, and how this will affect the price of electricity provided to Chisinau.

It is in neither Chisinau's nor Tiraspol's interest to engage in a tit-for-tat energy dispute nor to have the Transnistrian energy market-and, subsequently, the breakaway region's entire economy-collapse, creating a humanitarian crisis. Ukraine also has a vested interest in Transnistrian stability, not only for humanitarian reasons but also because a portion of Ukraine's electrical grid is linked to Moldova's via the hub in Transnistria.

In 2024, Moldova joined with other European partners to support the secure supply of energy to Ukraine. This includes efforts to integrate Romanian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian electrical systems. As it currently stands, electricity from Romania must transit through either Ukraine or Tiraspol before reaching Chisinau. Lines between Vulcanesti-Chisinau and Balti-Suceava are both expected to be operational in 2025. And aside from electrical progress, Moldova was instrumental in the first delivery of gas from Greece to Ukraine via the Vertical Corridor, an strategic energy infrastructure initiative aimed at securing and diversifying energy supply. Moldova and Ukraine have also been discussing a gas-for-electricity swap, which would benefit both parties. These efforts not only support Ukraine's energy supply but also further diversify Moldova's energy flows. Assuming that the development of Moldova's energy sector will continue, it is poised to continue being a strong partner for Ukraine in ensuring that both countries have reliable energy supplies.

Q5: What role might Moldova play in an eventual Ukrainian reconstruction effort?

A5: Moldova and Ukraine's bilateral relationship has only strengthened since Russia's 2022 invasion. Their collaboration covers everything from energy and EU accession to a Transnistrian resolution, as previously discussed. But as the war progresses and eventually concludes, Moldova has an opportunity to play a key role in the Ukrainian reconstruction effort.

The total damage to Ukrainian infrastructure since the start of Russia's 2022 invasion is estimated at well over $150 billion. In support of organizing the eventual reconstruction, the Ukrainian government has already begun standing up processes and systems to categorize and organize these needs. International donations and commitments to support these efforts from the European Union and across the world have already begun to accrue in Ukrainian coffers.

Moldova's geographic position makes it uniquely positioned to support Ukrainian reconstruction efforts. However, while supporting these efforts would be advantageous for developing Moldova's own infrastructure and industry, it also has the potential for significant negative effects on Moldova's economy if not planned and executed strategically. For example, the need for building materials in Ukraine has already caused a spike in costs in Moldova, and members of Moldova's already-depleted labor force might leave for lucrative jobs supporting Ukrainian reconstruction. Additionally, Moldova's infrastructure needs upgrading to support the anticipated scale of movement of goods and people. For instance, the rail system needs upgrades, including to ensure interoperability with neighboring countries. It is important for Moldova's government to begin planning for this potential role and opportunity in the near term.

Q6: Why does Moldova's future matter to the United States?

A6: Moldova's importance to the United States and its partners and allies is not due simply to its strategic geographic location, but also due to its future as a free and democratic European state. Moldova has long struggled between its ties to the east and west, and its progress has often been hindered by systemic institutional corruption and oligarchs prioritizing their own profit margins. But over the past several years, Moldova has shown a commitment to true institutional reform, even if it has been, like most bureaucratic endeavors, slower moving at times than would be desired. These foundational reform efforts, combined with the groundswell of international support for Moldova following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, has provided a significant opportunity for a stable democratic future.

It is in the interests of Russia and other malign actors to maximize domestic instability within the United States as well as within U.S. partners and allied states. Unfortunately, post-Soviet states, especially the Russian-speaking populations, are low-hanging fruit for manipulation attempts from Russia. Moldova has long fallen victim to these efforts, but it is building institutional foundations that will make malign influence less effective. A stable democracy in Moldova, capable of withstanding Russian aggression and providing opportunities for its population, supports stability in Europe, which does and should matter to the United States.

Leah Kieff is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Project on Prosperity and Development at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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