China’s Smart Cities in Africa: Should the United States Be Concerned

Commentary by Jason Warner and Toyosi Ajibade

Published November 18, 2024

China has made the transfer of smart city technology one of the dimensions of its security diplomacy towards Africa. How concerned should Washington be about this development?

As China seeks to expand its role as a security partner in Africa, especially through the Global Security Initiative (GSI), one facet of this assistance is the transfer of what is colloquially known as "smart city technology." At their core, smart cities leverage digital technologies-including artificial intelligence (AI), big data, and the Internet of Things-to redesign urban living and governance, connecting urban centers to devices and sensors to undertake surveillance, improve security, ameliorate service delivery, and better overall urban management. But with this extensive network of Chinese surveillance technology entering the hands of often nondemocratic African governments, should the United States and its allies be concerned about such technology's entrance into African urban spaces, or are concerns overblown?

China's Smart City Transfers in Africa

China is encouraging the adoption of smart city infrastructure across the African continent. These initiatives include investments in traffic management systems, energy-efficient building technologies, waste and water management solutions, and intelligent healthcare systems. Additionally, these systems integrate advanced technologies such as facial recognition, AI-driven data analysis, and enhanced urban monitoring tools. These smart city transfers are occurring through China's state-owned enterprises like tech giant Huawei, whose Smart City Solutions financing program is one way African states can fund their efforts.

In recent years, the spread of Chinese-backed "smart city" surveillance systems has expanded across the African continent, with nine countries currently using them: Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia. In Kenya, the Konza Technology City initiative represents Africa's first planned Smart City and in Kigali, Rwanda, the Innovation City is also being developed with Chinese support. In Senegal, musician Akon attempted to create Akon City; the Democratic Republic of Congo has discussed intentions to create its own Kasangulu Smart City; and plans for Modderfontein New City (touted as the "New York of Africa") have failed to materialize.

Both China and African states have strong incentives for undertaking such smart city technology transfers. With over 10,000 firms operating in Africa and $300 billion in investments, China is securing resources, expanding markets, and increasing its regional influence. Beijing's financing model, often backed by state banks, like the China Development Bank, mandates Chinese suppliers, embedding Chinese tech dominance in Africa. This engagement also supports China's strategic goals, including access to foreign tech and dual-use applications for military and space advancements.

Several factors may explain why African countries are receptive to China's smart city initiatives. Such technology allows African governments to bolster their infrastructure and security with low- or no-cost financing, all without the political conditions typically attached to Western aid. More pressingly, rapid urbanization in many African countries has created a dire need for innovative solutions to manage urban growth and improve the quality of life for citizens. Smart technologies are seen as pathways to achieving these objectives while simultaneously fostering economic development. More importantly, African countries may prefer China's smart city initiatives not only due to political alignment but also because China offers what often appears to be low-cost or accessible financing options, which make these large-scale projects more feasible. Chinese state-owned banks, like the China Development Bank and the China Ex-Im Bank, provide loans with favorable interest rates, allowing African countries to fund substantial infrastructure projects without heavily straining their immediate budgets. This arrangement is further bolstered by significant government subsidies that enable Chinese companies, such as Huawei and ZTE Corporation, to offer competitive pricing, often 30-40 percent lower than Western alternatives, making Chinese technology accessible and affordable for resource-limited African states.

Smart City, Hidden Costs?

Despite incentives from both sides, concerns exist.

First, one prevailing concern is that China's smart city initiatives could allow authoritarian regimes to surveil citizens under the guise of modernization. Smart city initiatives often include sophisticated surveillance systems with high-definition cameras, facial recognition technology, and extensive data analytics capabilities, enabling African governments to monitor their populations. Concerns are obvious. Governments in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe have already demonstrated the willingness to deploy surveillance tools for political ends, and reports have emerged of African governments using Chinese technologies specifically to surveil dissenters, track political opponents, and suppress protests, particularly in Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zambia. Concerns also exist around potential data privacy violations, data access violations, and potential data leaks: African countries already struggle with inadequate legal frameworks for data protection, making their citizens vulnerable to domestic misuse of personal information.

A second concern is that African states' reliance on Chinese technology heightens the possibility of Chinese espionage. Safe city projects utilize extensive surveillance systems, and data collected from certain African spaces can be accessed by Chinese firms. A notably concerning example is a deal between China's CloudWalk Technology and the Zimbabwean government, where biometric data is sent to China for facial recognition algorithm development, raising fears of "data colonialism" and surveillance exploitation. In Kenya, reports have indicated that Chinese hackers conducted widespread digital intrusions against key ministries and state institutions focused on information related to Kenya's debt to China. Long-running tropes that China bugged the African Union headquarters that it built have added fuel to the fire.

Third, concerns exist about how African states will pay for these new technologies. Chinese firms like Huawei and ZTE leverage state financial support to underbid their Western competitors, offering prices that are often 30-40 percent lower than those of American or European firms. Yet observers note that these low-interest loans, while beneficial for infrastructure development, can also lead to debt dependency. Indeed, the shift in Africa's debt composition, now heavily owed to China and private creditors rather than traditional multilateral lenders like the World Bank, means more of this debt is non-concessional and costly to repay. This raises concerns about "debt-trap diplomacy," where mounting repayment pressures could force African nations to forfeit strategic assets or policy autonomy to China.

A fourth major concern is perhaps the most damning: African smart cities have thus far failed to deliver what they promise. Despite initial exuberance, enthusiasm for African smart city projects in Africa has waned over recent years due to a mix of economic and practical challenges. Costs of financing such cities have combined with critiques that smart cities are fanciful depictions of the future not rooted in the most pressing African urban realities. As one wrote, the slew of Africa's smart cities "reflect less the answers to African needs than attempt[s] to impress by imitating the work of the art director of the Black Panther and the movie's futuristic city Wakanda."

A Cause for U.S. Concern?

As the United States and its allies struggle to maintain African allies while working towards ideal African futures, how concerned should Washington be about China's smart city tech transfers? A fair bit.

The United States has reasons to worry. Most broadly, China's smart city overtures represent yet one more tool in China's expanding toolkit to court African allies, possibly shifting regional alliances and limiting U.S. diplomatic influence and access to critical resources. Technologically, the expanding dominance of Chinese technology in African infrastructure increases the likelihood of Chinese standards becoming the norm, limiting market access for U.S. companies; others have noted that Chinese companies invest more in research and development than their Western counterparts, thus enabling them to innovate rapidly and capture larger market shares. Furthermore, the widespread adoption of Chinese telecommunications and surveillance systems in Africa raises alarms about potential espionage risks and the spread of authoritarian digital governance models that may undermine democratic institutions.

However, the threats posed by China's smart cities in Africa should be appropriately scoped. Most acutely, cracks exist in the foundations of such partnerships. Struggling with its own debt burdens, China has had to scale back from its Digital Silk Road initiatives, leading certain states to reconsider their relationships with Beijing. Moreover, the presence of such technologies does not mean that China is encouraging the authoritarian use of them by African countries; rather, African leaders are using Chinese technology to undertake antidemocratic practices on their own. Yet even then, some like Steve Fedelstein have argued that using smart city surveillance is a "human capital-intensive enterprise" and that most African governments "possess neither the institutional capacity nor sufficient resources to reliably use safe cities and related techniques to subdue their populations." Commentators also frequently contest the validity of the debt trap diplomacy thesis. More broadly, U.S. concerns about China's smart city initiatives rather than the GSI as a whole would inherently be missing the forest for trees.

To the extent Washington should be concerned, it is fumbling in formulating a response. Despite warnings from the United States about potential security risks associated with Chinese technology, Washington's admonitions have not been matched with substantial funding or technological alternatives. (The irony of such U.S. warnings is evident since the United States itself failed to pass a ban on China-owned TikTok for similar national security concerns). Instead, Washington's rebuttal, the Digital Transformation with Africa Initiative announced by the Biden Administration, pledges only $350 million to $450 million, a paltry sum compared to China's investments. Moreover, the United States faces a tough rhetorical sell: Just how does it make the case to discourage African states from adopting low-cost, modern technology that meets their needs?

In sum, China's smart city initiatives represent another conduit by which China is outplaying the United States by meeting African states' multiple needs-security, economic development, and regime survival -in one fell swoop. In Washington, China's smart city overtures in Africa should cause some amount of concern, not necessarily for what they are, but more so for what they represent: an increasingly capable China that understands African states better than the United States.

Jason Warner is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Toyosi Ajibade is a PhD student in the Security Studies Program at the University of Central Florida.

The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not reflect the official opinions of the U.S. government, U.S. Department of Defense, or U.S. Army.

Programs & Projects