2024 Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Thank you, Chair.

New Zealand associates itself fully with the statements made under this agenda item by the New Agenda Coalition as well as the Joint Statement made by Switzerland on behalf of New Zealand and Ireland also, and wishes to make the following remarks in a national capacity.

As outlined in our General Debate statement, New Zealand remains resolutely committed to full implementation of all the NPT's legally binding provisions. We are, however, deeply concerned about the status of implementation of the Article VI nuclear disarmament obligation and additional commitments agreed by all states parties.

This legal obligation remains unfulfilled more than 50 years after entry into force of the treaty, and in the face of a confluence of deepening, and deeply worrying, developments. For a decade, the nuclear weapon-states have not made any meaningful progress on their nuclear disarmament obligation and unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals agreed in the 2000 Review Conference. There is a lack of compliance with, and erosion and dismantling of, relevant treaty regimes; nuclear modernisation and expansion programmes; extended nuclear deterrence arrangements; and an increased salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. It is widely agreed that nuclear dangers, including explicit and implicit threats of use as well as the risk of proliferation, have reached a level not seen since the depths of the Cold War.

These developments cast doubt on the intention of the nuclear weapon-states to ever implement their obligations and so call into question the long-term sustainability of the NPT as the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We all have much to lose from further deterioration of the NPT regime, and much to gain from recommitment to its strengthening through practical actions that give effect to its Article VI provisions.

New Zealand's firm conviction is that the only rational way to reduce nuclear risks and guarantee our collective safety from the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any nuclear weapons use is for their verified and irreversible elimination.

The ongoing consequences of nuclear weapons testing in the 20th century, including inter-generational human and environmental impacts in the Pacific, should be reason enough for eliminating these weapons. Here, I wish to acknowledge the nuclear test survivors and community representatives attending this PrepCom. We call for all states listed in Annex II of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to ratify so that it can enter into force promptly, and urge the strict observation of testing moratoria in the meantime.

In view of the choice made by nuclear weapon-states to test nuclear weapons in locations distant from their metropolitan centres, it is not surprising that the negative effects of nuclear weapons seem frequently to be omitted in discourse about their perceived utility, and the relative costs of nuclear deterrence versus other models of security. Yet it bears reflecting that nuclear war would have very serious negative consequences for populations in countries that rely on nuclear weapons for their security in the event nuclear weapons are detonated there. This may occur even if they are not in the direct path of nuclear attacks, in view of the transboundary effects of nuclear detonations. The notion also that nuclear use would be controllable and limited under the chaotic and stressful conditions of a nuclear weapons attack is absurd.

In light of how catastrophic the consequences of nuclear weapons use would be to our collective existence, New Zealand would welcome greater attention by the scientific community to help inform future deliberations and spur action by all states towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.

We recognise that the pathway to zero will be complex and must include steps to reduce the current alarming levels of risk that attach to all nuclear weapons.

The New Agenda Coalition, of which New Zealand is a member, has proposed in its Working Paper 2 of 16 May 2024 concrete actions that should be taken. These include, by way of illustration, reaffirming existing obligations, condemning all nuclear threats, and issuing high level political statements of nuclear restraint.

Since the 10th Review Conference, and through last year's Working Group and PrepCom, New Zealand has also worked with Ireland and Switzerland to identify and build consensus among the treaty's membership on ways by which the nuclear weapon-states can generate confidence among the wider membership about their commitment to implementation of Article VI obligations and commitments through enhanced transparency and accountability. Alongside others, we have promoted options for improvements in national reporting by the nuclear weapon-states.

Mr Chair, in this regard we have outlined practical parameters for a new peer review process, which might be piloted with volunteers during this 11th review cycle, to give shape to decisions to be taken at the Review Conference in 2026. We believe our proposals have merit and are worthy of further serious examination by the nuclear weapon-states. The status quo arrangements are not enough. We intend to advance this work in discussion with them, and by working alongside other non-nuclear weapon states, ahead of the 3rd Preparatory Committee. In this context, I wish to refer colleagues to the Joint Statement made by 28 non-nuclear weapon states on the subject of Transparency and Accountability at the first PrepCom in Vienna last year. Its messages and calls for more progress remain highly relevant at this meeting.

New Zealand supports other interim measures towards nuclear disarmament. We recognise that such measures could encompass nuclear risk reduction, which can be a valuable proximate or supplementary form of activity to nuclear disarmament measures. At the same time, we must collectively be alert to a risk "management" mentality supplanting steps to reduce the numbers, roles, and salience of nuclear weapons with a view to their total elimination. That supplanting would be at odds with obligations and commitments previously and freely made in the NPT context. And it would constitute a fundamental error that could serve to further erode this Treaty and the "grand bargain" on which it depends.

Chair, I conclude by recalling New Zealand's General debate statement. We acknowledge that some states parties have set limits to the ambition of what we can achieve in the current geopolitical climate. We, however, will continue to urge meaningful actions by the nuclear-weapon states, in particular, that would give us confidence in a positive direction of travel halfway through this review cycle.

I thank you.