11/21/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 11/21/2024 11:03
The Sahel region has faced substantial security, economic and development challenges in recent years. Over a decade of security crisis, driven by the activities of jihadists groups, that sparked international security interventions, has been compounded by recent political upheavals. A series of coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger led, among other things, to the recalibration of their international relations, severing ties with Western partners and fostering closer alliances with countries like Russia. Security conditions continue to worsen, resulting in significant civilian casualties and widespread displacement. Neighbouring countries are closely observing these developments, concerned about potential impacts on their own stability. Meanwhile, the war in Sudan, ongoing since April 2023, remains marked by extreme violence, creating immense hardships for its population and threatening the broader stability of the region. However different they may be, these scenarios are being carefully watched by North African countries. Algeria has deployed military forces along its southern border and initiated deradicalisation programmes. Egypt and Libya are managing the influx of tens of thousands of refugees from Sudan. Morocco, for its part, is setting up development projects with the Sahelian states to support crisis recovery.
We have invited experts from the ISPI and MED network to share their insights on rising tensions in the Sahel and the repercussions in North Africa. These topics will be at the center of dedicates panel discussion during the Rome MED Meditarranean Dialogues 2024, to be held in Rome from 25 to 27 november.
"After the recent military coups in the central Sahel, peace, stability, and social cohesion have been severely strained, especially following the withdrawal of Western partners. In Mali, militant groups, particularly Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), have exploited the vacuum left on the ground by France's departure and the end of the UN mission to intensify attacks, target ethnic militias, and form alliances with former rebel groups and local communities in the north. Burkina Faso faces unprecedented levels of violence, exemplified by the 2024 Barsalogho attack, which killed several hundred. Niger's coup has escalated militant activity and shifted alliances, with the arrival of Russian paramilitaries further complicating the security landscape. The resulting instability has far-reaching consequences. The alleged expansion of jihadist groups toward the Gulf of Guinea has destabilised northern Benin and Togo. North African countries are also affected: Algeria faces increased border threats and arms trafficking; Morocco contends with growing migration pressures, intercepting thousands fleeing the Sahel; and Libya's chaos amplifies regional instability".
Laura Berlingozzi, Postdoctoral researcher, DIRPOLIS Institute, Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies
"In the Sahel, trends of violence, casualties, and forced displacement are all on the rise. Most worryingly, are increases in violence against civilians both by militant Islamist groups and by security forces in Burkina Faso and Mali. Recent attacks in and around Bamako by the Macina Liberation Front, part of the militant Islamist coalition Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), have shown improved planning, execution, and capabilities to degrade the Malian armed forces. This growing pressure reflects a broader deterioration of security in Mali under the military junta currently in power. Similarly, widespread attacks along Burkina Faso's southern borders by different JNIM-affiliated groups raise questions about the junta's strategy there, the country's stability, and their implications for neighbouring coastal countries."
Daniel Eizenga, Research Fellow, Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS)
"Mauritania and Senegal are concerned about the increasing number of attacks by the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) group against isolated security posts in the western region of Mali since 2022. The latest attack, on August 18, 2024, in Melgué (a locality separated from Mauritania by the Karakoro river, and located 35 km from Senegal), was viewed as a warning. Since September 2024, the two countries have been carrying out joint land and river patrols in the area. Further patrols and civil-military activities are planned by the two countries to guarantee security and stability along their borders, in line with the Senegal-Mali-Mauritania tripartite military cooperation framework established in 2007".
Hassane Koné, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies
"The Algerian government views the insecurity situation on its southern borders - linked to terrorism and organised crime, but also due to the internal political situation in the neighbouring Sahelian countries - as a significant threat to Algeria as well as for the regional stability. As the regional strategic country, Algeria has adopted a multifaceted approach. Besides the use of advanced surveillance technologies, Algiers has deployed its military - as well as gendarmerie and gardes-frontières (GGF or border patrols) - to secure its southern borders. The Algerian authorities also strongly insist on diplomacy and regional and continental cooperation and dialogue, to tackle the growing instability in the Sahel region. To tackle violent religious extremism, which nurtures terrorism, Algiers also places significant emphasis on deradicalisation programmes and countering violent extremism narratives."
Abdelkader Adelrahmane, Independent Researcher and Consultant on Peace and Security in North Africa and the Sahel
"For Morocco, the Sahel is more than just a geographical neighbourhood. It is an area of historical, cultural, political and geostrategic significance. Morocco is committed to the stability and development of the Sahel and has launched three major initiatives: the Rabat Process on Atlantic African Countries, facilitating access to the Atlantic Ocean for the countries of the Sahel, and the Africa-Atlantic Gas Pipeline. These initiatives are based on the principle that there can be no stability without development, just as there can be no development without stability. They can provide a geopolitical response to the concerns inherent in peace and security, while respecting the sovereignty of individual countries. They reflect the desire of the Sahel states to work in synergy to create a more integrated area. Morocco is contributing with its experience in infrastructure development, human development, and the promotion of a tolerant Islam and with the provision of its counter-terrorism capabilities. The mobilisation of donors will be necessary for the success of these initiatives, which are also counting on the commitment of Mauritania and the support of traditional partners such as the United States and the EU in favour of peace and stability in the Sahel."
Larabi Jaïdi, Senior Fellow, Policy Centre for the New South
"Neither the military coups and the withdrawal of Western forces nor the escalating jihadist insurgency in the states of the Central Sahel have had any major impact on the situation in Libya over the past three years. The two competing power centres in Libya both seek to cultivate good relations with the authorities in Niger, Chad and other Sahel states. In the case of Haftar's forces, this has meant constraining the ability of Chadian rebel groups to use southern Libya as a rear base. Their approach to Nigerien rebels will be similar. The most tangible consequence of instability in Libya's southern neighbours is the arrival of dozens of thousands of refugees from Sudan, who - like other migrants and refugees in Libya - are exposed to exploitation by smugglers and armed groups."
Wolfram Lacher, Senior Associate, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP
"The situation in Sudan remains alarming, with violence escalating further in Gezira and North Darfur. Victim figures most likely exceed 150,000, while 11-11,5 million people are estimated to have been displaced since April 2023. Humanitarian aid is available to the local population only through Sudan's emergency response rooms - volunteer neighbourhood-based mutual aid groups, which are under-resourced and targeted by both warring parties. While peace negotiations, including the Geneva talks launched earlier this year, have so far failed, the war bears a huge destabilising potential for the entire region. The heavy refugee burden affecting neighbouring countries is likely to feed local conflicts in host countries, as well as illegal migration towards Europe. At the same time, weapons proliferation, intertwining with regional security challenges (i.e. Egypt-Ethiopia rivalry), and the possible penetration of violent extremist groups in search of a safe haven - as Sudan was for Al-Qaeda in the 1990s, all pose alarming security threats to an already troubled region."
Sara de Simone, Associate Research Fellow, ISPI
"There are about half a million Sudanese refugees from Sudan's civil war registered with the Egyptian authorities. It is hard to know how many others are unregistered in the country, but a safe bet would put them in the hundreds of thousands. Their stay in Egypt is becoming more and more difficult, as Egypt instituted a visa requirement for those living on its territory and as security forces began to round up refugees and deport them back to Sudan. Not only xenophobia and racism in Egypt made things harder for many, but also Egypt's poor economic situation and deteriorating social conditions resulted in a lack of needed services and assistance for displaced Sudanese living in the country. Only by ending the civil war and helping Sudan's development can refugees first return safety to their country and, second, build the successful lives they deserve."
Imad K. Harb, Director of Research and Analysis, Arab Center Washington DC
"With an influx of almost one million refugees, the Sudan war is taking a heavy toll on Chad, a very fragile country. The arrival of so many displaced persons has spiked food inflation in eastern Chad and some disagreements with locals over access to land and wood (refugees cut trees to build better tents/homes in camps). Chad is walking a tightrope by cooperating with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which in recent years has granted aid and loans to N'Djamena and has significant interests in Sudan. According to a UN panels of experts, the UAE has been channelling weapons to support the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary force (something that the UAE denies). This risks a backlash from communities living on both sides of the border: affected by RSF campaigns against civilians, they might take out their anger against Chad's government."
Ulf Laessing, Head of Regional Program Sahel, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung