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10/31/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 10/31/2024 08:46

Strengthening the International Governance of Space

Strengthening the International Governance of Space

Photo: Matthew Dominick/NASA

Commentary by Audrey Schaffer

Published October 31, 2024

This series-featuring scholars from the Aerospace Security Project, non-resident experts, and the broader space community-explores key space trends, challenges, and policy issues that will confront the next administration as well as offers recommendations for how to navigate them.

For almost the entire history of the space age, Earth's orbit has been a relatively quiet place. The number of satellites grew at a steady rate. A normal space operation involved staying in the same orbit until the end of a satellite's life. When a catastrophic incident happened, the vastness of space combined with the relatively small satellite population resulted in low risks to other satellites. The high barriers to entry into space meant that virtually all satellite operators had the requisite experience-and incentives-to manage their fleets safely and responsibly. And although space has been used for national security purposes since the dawn of the space age, the domain itself was largely free of weapons and hostile acts directed at other spacecraft.

Space is no longer a quiet place. Over the past four years, the number of satellites orbiting Earth has grown exponentially, and more mega-constellations are on the way. The space debris population has increased steadily due to both accidents and irresponsible behavior. A stable orbit, while certainly still the norm, is now just one mode of satellite operations, with some satellites being purpose built to inspect and repair other satellites and others to serve logistics depots in space. The satellite operators responsible for these missions are more diverse than ever, with widely varying levels of experience and operational sophistication. And strategic competition has come to space, with several countries reportedly developing, testing, or deploying space-based weapons meant to disrupt, damage, or destroy other satellites as part of a natural evolution in the methods and reach of warfare.

As crowding, complexity, and competition increase, international governance of space has remained largely stagnant-despite the large number of people, institutions, and nations that take for granted that space-based services will continue to be delivered from a safe and secure space environment. The bedrock of international space law, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, was negotiated almost 60 years ago at a time when only three countries had successfully launched objects into space. While its principles have stood the test of time, its lack of pragmatic rules and concrete standards make it a necessary but insufficient pillar of international space governance in the twenty-first century. In the intervening decades, few new international rules or guidelines have been established, and those that have are almost entirely voluntary in nature, resulting in uneven adherence and minimal enforcement.

The next U.S. presidential administration should address this mismatch by leading the international community in strengthening the rules-based international order for space. Perpetuating space as a largely ungoverned domain risks undermining what the United States has come to enjoy-and expect-from space. Failing to exercise strong U.S. leadership could result in the emergence of new rules and norms that are devoid of the U.S. principles, policies, and practices that have made the U.S. space industry the best in the world and that have precipitated the emergence of a global space economy dominated by the United States.

The first order of business should be to establish a global space traffic coordination system-the data sharing, rules of the road, and enforcement mechanisms that perpetuate a stable and predictable space operating environment. In no other domain do vehicles routinely transit near others without some means of communication and coordination to reduce the risk of accidents. As space traffic grows, so too must the means to ensure spaceflight safety. The United States is uniquely positioned to lead the world in addressing this issue, as U.S. companies are driving the growth in space activities and technological innovations to effectively manage the resulting congestion.

But the United States cannot unilaterally set space traffic rules and expect others to follow them. It must work with the international community to create a space traffic system that is part and parcel of the broader international order. While there are many international governance bodies related to space that could take up this challenge, none has the unique combination of expertise, pragmatism, and inclusiveness that is necessary to create an effective, legitimate, and universal new regime. The next administration should consider whether the time has come for a new international organization dedicated to establishing and administering a global space traffic coordination system.

The next administration must also grapple with a fundamentally new space security environment-one in which the development, testing, and deployment of ground-based and space-based counterspace weapons are routine. Although the march from the militarization to the weaponization of space is almost certainly an irreversible trend, the lack of guardrails on such behavior need not be. Establishing pragmatic limitations on counterspace weapons, or the testing thereof, is surely in the interests of the United States, as it has the most to lose from the unchecked proliferation of space weapons and space debris that threatens U.S. access to and use of space.

In 2022, the Biden administration unilaterally declared that it would not conduct destructive, direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing and encouraged other nations to join suit. Since then, dozens of nations have made similar voluntary commitments and 155 nations voted in favor of a United Nations resolution recommending the same. But voluntary commitments on one type of weapons behavior may not be sufficient to protect U.S. security interests in space, which include safeguarding the burgeoning space economy from the harmful effects of indiscriminate space weapons testing. The next administration should evaluate whether to propose legally binding negotiations on limiting destructive, direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing and/or to propose additional voluntary norms on other counterproductive space weapons activities.

Finally, as humanity turns its attention back to the Moon-with the first lunar landing in almost 50 years likely to occur in the next four years-the next administration should take stock of space governance at the final frontier. The Artemis Accords, established in 2020 during the Trump administration and continued into the Biden administration, have been an unqualified success, with over 40 nations voluntarily committing to their principles over the past four years. But one key nation is notably absent from this growing list-China.

As China pursues its own lunar ambitions with its international partners, it will undoubtedly be interested in exploring the same promising areas of the Moon as the United States and its Artemis Program partners. The next administration should make a concerted effort to engage China on lunar governance, preferably by bringing China into the Artemis Accords, as the first step in establishing a single governance system for the Moon. Failing to do so risks establishing de facto spheres of lunar influence that exacerbate rather than ameliorate tensions back on Earth.

The common ingredient for success in each of these areas will be U.S. leadership. The next administration should not sit on the sidelines as space governance develops or devolves. But it will be challenging. Unlike space itself, space governance does not occur in a vacuum. The same geopolitical dynamics challenging countless facets of the current rules-based international order manifest in space diplomacy as well. U.S.-China relations are strained, and yet China is second only to the United States in terms of the scope and scale of its space activities. China must, therefore, be part of space governance discussions, lest the United States establish one-sided rules that at best benefit no one and at worst disadvantage itself and its allies.

But China isn't the only country that should be included. Unlike during the Cold War, there are more than just a handful of superpowers operating in space. Today there are over 80 nations and countless commercial companies operating in space-a welcome expansion of those able to access and benefit from space. The rise in space actors, however, means that the space diplomacy landscape, like that of the space environment, is increasingly complex.

The next administration should embrace this challenge and put its full diplomatic weight behind creating a lasting and inclusive international system that allows humanity to enjoy the benefits of space for generations to come.

Audrey Schaffer is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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Senior Associate (Non-Resident), Aerospace Security Project