10/31/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 10/31/2024 08:46
Photo: Lintao Zhang/Getty Images
Commentary by Audrey SchafferandKari A. Bingen
Published October 31, 2024
This series-featuring scholars from the Aerospace Security Project, non-resident experts, and the broader space community-explores key space trends, challenges, and policy issues that will confront the next administration as well as offers recommendations for how to navigate them.
On January 11, 2007, the People's Republic of China purposely destroyed its own defunct weather satellite to test a destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile, demonstrating to the world its intention to develop comprehensive national space power and to challenge U.S. leadership in space. In the intervening years, China has invested heavily in its space capabilities to fulfill these ambitions.
As China steadily grows into the world's second-largest space power, it's time for the United States and China to get serious about engagement on space. While the next administration should approach such engagement with a healthy dose of skepticism about the prospects for progress in one dimension of a multifaceted and contentious bilateral relationship, the future utilization of space depends on orderly operations and on avoiding miscalculation in what is fundamentally a shared domain. The rapid growth of satellites and debris in space, more close calls between approaching satellites, and increasingly threatening on-orbit behaviors all heighten the risk that an unintended collision or worse could undo years of progress in bringing the benefits of space down to people on Earth.
Today, China is second only to the United States in its ability to harness space for national security advantage. Over the past decade, China has fielded hundreds of military communications, intelligence, missile warning, and navigation satellites to enable its overall military modernization and build space-enabled kill webs to find, track, and target U.S. forces. During the same period, China has advanced its ability to deny U.S. space advantages, developing a robust, full-spectrum suite of counter-space weapons designed to deter U.S. military intervention in a crisis and blunt U.S. combat power in a conflict.
At the same time, China has become a world leader in space exploration. China now has its own space station-the "Heavenly Palace"-an Earth-orbiting outpost that could become the only permanent human presence in low Earth orbit if the International Space Station is deorbited later this decade before U.S. commercial space stations are in place. China also is pursuing a human lunar exploration program that could land Chinese taikonauts on the Moon before U.S. astronauts return after more than a 50-year lapse. China has already become the first country to return lunar rock samples from the far side of the Moon and before the end of the decade could become the first country to return samples from Mars, demonstrating not only its cosmic ambitions but its ability to achieve complex technological feats at speed.
Furthermore, China is poised to challenge U.S. commercial space dominance, with its ability to capture international market share limited only by other countries' willingness to buy Chinese goods and services-a U.S. taboo that is not embraced worldwide. China has begun to launch several large constellations of commercial communications satellites-systems intended to rival SpaceX's Starlink constellation. China is also building out commercial remote sensing systems, again with a stated goal of competing in global space markets. In many cases these systems rival-or exceed-the performance of similar U.S. commercial systems.
And yet, despite-or perhaps because of-the many facets of U.S.-China competition in space, it will be imperative for the next administration to talk with China about these very issues to prevent competition from spilling over into conflict and to preserve access to space for current and future generations. Such engagement is not a substitute for continued U.S. investments and policies that maintain U.S. global leadership in space, prepare the United States to protect and defend its space-related interests, and foster a vibrant U.S. commercial space sector.
Precisely because China poses the most significant threat to U.S. national security space activities, the next administration should engage China to create lines of communication to manage crises and, if possible, create mutually understood guardrails on space warfare. The entire world-especially the United States-loses if conflict that extends into space results in an environment littered with debris or a catastrophic loss of space-based services for Earth-based users. Worse would be if the United States and China stumble into avoidable and unwanted conflict because of a misunderstanding or a miscommunication about a deliberate or accidental space-related incident. However, developing mutual understandings and two-way communications requires participation from both sides to be meaningful. China must come to the table, and the next administration should invite them.
Even more elementary, with both countries operating or poised to operate thousands of satellites in similar orbits, it is important that the United States and China have a common understanding of basic operating guidelines and who to call when satellites are on a collision course. Just as aviation and maritime traffic rules of the road have evolved to enable government and commercial entities to operate safely in those domains, so too must a global system for space traffic management emerge that everyone-including China-understands and follows. Moreover, the United States alone cannot materially curb the creation of new space debris if China-responsible for more than 25 percent of launches in 2023 and on track to exceed that pace in 2024-does not heed international guidelines on space debris mitigation.
Finally, the United States and China both are poised to explore and exploit the same valuable regions of the Moon, the lunar south pole where permanently shadowed craters house ice, a crucial resource for establishing an enduring presence on the Moon and expanding humanity's reach into the solar system. To avoid unnecessary friction that can arise from competition for scarce resources and operations in close proximity, the United States and China should discuss principles for safe, peaceful, and prosperous coexistence on the lunar surface.
This will not be easy. The United States must approach any engagement with its eyes wide open and should not assume engagement is a substitute for investments that maintain U.S. space advantages. Prior administrations have tried-largely in vain-to engage China on space-related issues, and the next administration may not enjoy greater success if the other party is truly unwilling to come to the table. After all, Beijing has shown no proclivity towards such engagements and has, along with Russia, blocked progress at the United Nations on reducing space threats. However, even at the height of the Cold War, the United States still maintained lines of communication with the Soviet Union and found common ground to cooperate in human spaceflight through the Apollo-Soyuz project, all while continuing robust investments in national defense.
To preserve those benefits that the U.S. government, U.S. businesses, and the American people have come to expect from space systems, the next administration should find a way to engage China in a constructive, two-way dialogue on the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space, while investing in the means to protect and defend U.S. interests in space and maintain the United States' historic leadership in this vital domain.
Audrey M. Schaffer is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.Kari A. Bingen is the director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
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