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07/02/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 07/02/2024 13:46

Changes at North Korean Missile Operating Bases: Part 2

Key Findings

  • During the past five years, North Korea has undertaken numerous small and significant changes at many of its ballistic missile operating bases.
  • This second part of Beyond Parallel's missile operating bases update covers developments at Sakkanmol, Sangnam-ni, Sino-ri, and Yusang-ni Missile Operating Bases.
  • As with the bases covered in Part 1, these bases are among approximately 15-20 known ballistic missile operating bases and ballistic missile support facilities that have never been declared by North Korea.
  • The timing and nature of these developments across multiple ballistic missile operating bases indicate that they are a component of Kim Jong-un's ongoing efforts to elevate the Strategic Force's status and improve its operational readiness.
  • These developments are a component of Kim Jong-un's ongoing efforts to elevate the Strategic Force's status and improve readiness, as well as a concerted effort to continue improving the quality of life and morale of the troops and their families.

Introduction

This second part of Beyond Parallel's missile operating bases update covers developments at Sakkanmol, Sangnam-ni, Sino-ri, and Yusang-ni.1 As with the bases covered in Part 1, none of these bases have ever been publicly acknowledged by North Korea. During the past five years, North Korea has undertaken numerous small and significant changes at many of its ballistic missile operating bases. The timing and nature of these developments across multiple ballistic missile operating bases indicate that they are a component of Kim Jong-un's ongoing efforts to elevate the Strategic Force's status and improve its operational readiness. Many of the observed changes have also focused on replacing outdated housing and improving food availability in an ongoing effort to improve the quality of life and morale of the Strategic Force troops and their families.

Notably, no training launch pads like those observed at the Kal-gol Missile Operating Base (see Part 1 of this report series) and used for training missile crews with their TELs were observed at any of these four missile operating bases.

Sakkanmol (삭간몰) Missile Operating Base

The Sakkanmol Missile Operating Base is one of North Korea's early forward missile operating bases that began construction during the early 1990s and was completed approximately ten years later during the early 2000s. Satellite imagery acquired during the six years since our previous report indicates that the base remains operational and has undergone several ongoing changes to its headquarters and support infrastructure.

Between 2018 and 2019, a large new building within the headquarters and administration area was completed. Subsequently, during 2023 an ambitious program to upgrade and expand the headquarters area was undertaken. The first phase of this project was undertaken from January to June and witnessed two of the original large buildings in the center of the area being razed and the central courtyard expanded eastward. The project's second phase took place from June through December and witnessed the expanded courtyard being graded and a large new building erected. Accompanying this, several small buildings in the immediate area were razed or rebuilt between 2022 and 2023.

In addition to these changes, three old greenhouses were razed and two new greenhouses built, approximately 13 buildings were razed, 3 buildings were razed and replaced, six new buildings were erected, and several existing buildings (including the cultural education hall) had their roofs replaced.

While some of these minor changes are typical of those observed at other large military facilities in rural areas, many appear to be a component of Kim Jong-un's ongoing efforts to both elevate the status of the Strategic Force and improve readiness, as well as enhance the quality of life and morale of the troops and efforts to improve food availability.

No significant changes were observed around the entrances to the seven underground facilities (UGF) or the hardened drive-through missile checkout facility at the southern end of the base.

Sangnam-ni (상남리) Missile Operating Base

The Sangnam-ni Missile Operating Base is located within Hamgyong South Province and approximately 248 kilometers north-northeast of the demilitarized zone, 388 kilometers northeast of Seoul, and 1,140 kilometers northwest of Tokyo. Along with the other missile operating bases in the northern mountains, the Sangnam-ni Missile Operating Base forms North Korea's rear (or strategic) ballistic missile belt.

Construction of the Sangnam-ni missile operating base is believed to have begun sometime around 1994, and major work was essentially complete by 2008. As one of North Korea's "newer" missile operating bases, significant changes during the six years since our previous report on the base were not anticipated.

Satellite imagery collected during the intervening years has generally proven this to be correct, as only minor changes have been observed. These changes have focused on the support infrastructure and include what appears to be the addition of a swimming pool immediately west of the headquarters area, the rebuilding of a large warehouse-type building east-northeast of the headquarters area, and the razing of four buildings in Togyongdong-ni 1-kilometer to the east. While some of these changes (those around Togyongdong-ni) may be related to improving food availability, most do not appear to be specifically focused on improving the quality of life and morale of the Strategic Force troops. Rather, they appear to be what would typically be expected to be seen at large North Korean military facilities.

Nothing of significance was observed at the base's six UGF entrances or the hardened drive-through missile checkout facility (with two bunkers) at the south of the valley.2 While it is likely that some ongoing activity observed in the construction support area south of the headquarters over the years was associated with these developments, ongoing work within the UGFs cannot be ruled out.

Sino-ri (신오리) Missile Operating Base

The Sino-ri Missile Operating Base is located within Pyongan North Province, approximately 220 kilometers north-northwest of the demilitarized zone and 270 kilometers northeast of Seoul. The base, along with the Yusang-ni Missile Operating Base, is sometimes described as being part of a central (or operational) ballistic missile belt. However, it may be part of the rear (or strategic) ballistic missile belt.

Although having been first established as an army base during the 1960s, Sino-ri began the conversion to a weapon testing and missile operating base during the early 1970s with the deployment of a FROG-7 rocket unit. Subsequently, units with more capable systems (Hwasong-5, -6, -7, etc.) would train or be stationed at the base. As such, it holds the honor of being among North Korea's oldest and most well-established ballistic missile operating bases. In the five years since our last report on the Sino-ri Missile Operating base, satellite imagery was expected to indicate that the base remains operational and has undergone a series of ongoing changes to its infrastructure.

While no significant changes were observed within the headquarters and administration areas at Mipa-dong, those that did appear elsewhere within the base are likely related to Kim Jong-un's ongoing efforts to both elevate the status of the Strategic Force and improve readiness, as well as a concerted effort to continue improving the quality of life and morale of the troops and their families.

The most common changes observed have been the razing of old housing units and the construction of 20+ new, more modern units to replace them. Additionally, several large new greenhouses have also been built.

No significant changes were observed at the base's numerous UGF entrances, the concrete TEL shelters near Tumi-dong, drive-through facilities (not hardened) west of Kyong-dong, the two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities north and northwest of Kyong-dong, or the hardened drive-through missile checkout facility (with one bunker) north of Pongu.3

Yusang-ni (유상리) Missile Operating Base

The Yusang-ni Missile Operating Base is located within Pyongan South Province, approximately 146 kilometers north-northwest of the demilitarized zone and 220 kilometers northeast of Seoul. The base, along with the Sino-ri Missile Operating Base, is sometimes described as being part of a central (or operational) ballistic missile belt. However, it may be part of the forward (or tactical) ballistic missile belt.

The construction of the Yusang-ni missile operating base likely began in 2003, which aligns with the start of the Hoejung-ni missile operating base's construction. While the majority of surface construction was completed in 2019, minor construction activities have continued, with the latest observed in early 2021.

Satellite imagery collected in the three years since our last report in 2021 continues to indicate that the base remains operational and that there have been few significant changes. This lack of significant changes is not unexpected due to the base's relatively new status. Typical among the minor changes observed was the construction of two small support buildings south of the headquarters area in 2022.

No changes have been observed around either the base's primary or secondary UGF entrances or at its hardened drive-through missile checkout facility.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an internationally recognized analyst, award-winning author, and lecturer on North Korean defense and intelligence affairs and ballistic missile development in developing countries. He is concurrently senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS); and senior adviser and imagery analyst for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). Formerly, he has served as founder and CEO of KPA Associates, LLC, publisher and editor of KPA Journal, senior imagery analyst for 38 North, chief analytics officer and co-founder of AllSource Analysis, Inc., and senior all-source analyst for DigitalGlobe's Analysis Center.
Victor Cha is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair and the inaugural holder of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Jennifer Jun is project manager and research associate with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
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References

  1. The national designators for these missile operating bases are unknown.
  2. There is some question as to whether what are identified as the two southernmost UGF entrances are actually completed or abandoned structures.
  3. It is unclear if either or both of these are missile checkout facilities. One may be a motor vehicle maintenance facility and the other may be an entrance to an underground facility.

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