09/19/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 09/19/2024 13:48
Washington, D.C. - U.S. Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.) led a letter signed by U.S. Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), and Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) to 11 of the largest and most popular social media and encrypted chat companies in the U.S. calling for increased resources toward combatting 2024 U.S. election administration and certificationdisinformation.
"We are deeply concerned that the dissemination of election disinformation via your products and/or platforms - if left unmitigated - will suppress voter participation, sow doubt in U.S. democracy and incite political violence," wrote the Senators. "Considering the increase in election disinformation on digital platforms during recent elections, there is ample cause for concern."
"During the 2020 and 2022 U.S. federal elections, foreign adversaries supported the creation and targeting of election disinformation to undermine our democracy. During the 2020 elections, research showed that election disinformation in Spanish stayed up for longer on social media, as compared to English," the Senators continued.
The Senators urged Meta, Google (YouTube), TikTok, X (Twitter), Reddit, Snapchat, Amazon (Twitch), Discord, Signal, Telegram and Apple (Messages) to:
The full text of the letter is available HERE and below:
We write to you concerning the potential spread of election administration and certification disinformation before, during and after the 2024 United States elections. We are deeply concerned that the dissemination of election disinformation via your product(s) and/or platform(s) - if left unmitigated - will suppress voter participation, sow doubt in U.S. election processes and incite political violence.
For the purposes of this letter, "election disinformation" refers to false content about 2024 U.S. elections administration or certification - including falsehoods that pertain to the time, place and manner of the elections, voter eligibility requirements, and the processes of ballot counting and result certification - that is intentionally created to mislead voters and/or to suppress voter turnout.1
Considering the increase in election disinformation on digital platforms during recent elections, there is ample cause for concern. During the 2020 and 2022 U.S. federal elections, foreign adversaries supported the creation and targeting of election disinformation to undermine our democracy.2 During the 2020 elections, research showed that election disinformation in Spanish stayed up for longer on social media, as compared to English3; and recent research from the University of Washington points to how Spanish-English language disparities in the availability and persistence of election disinformation continue.4 In 2022, the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO) found that 62% of Spanish-speaking Latino households had "seen or heard a lot" about the "Big Lie" or false claims about U.S. elections administration and certification being fraudulent - 22% more than English-speaking Latino households.5 Meanwhile, a former U.S. President has spread and continues to spread dangerous election disinformation, despite no evidence supporting these claims.6
Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) technologies have only strengthened foreign and domestic malign actors' capability to create, micro-target and spread election disinformation quickly and on a large scale. Just last week, the U.S. Department of Justice seized 32 Russian-operated internet domains that covertly promoted AI-generated false narratives on social media to target specific American demographics and regions in an effort to subvert the 2024 elections.7 Notably, as a 2024 report from the Microsoft Threat Analysis Center documents, although election influence operations from China, Iran and Russia have started ramping up, their tactics are not limited to AI: "we've seen nearly all actors seek to incorporate AI content in their operations, but more recently many actors have pivoted back to techniques that have proven effective in the past-simple digital manipulations, mischaracterization of content, and use of trusted labels or logos atop false information."8
We ask that you provide a response to the following questions by October 3, 2024. Unless specified, all questions below pertain to the U.S. 2024 elections and use the definition of 'election disinformation' discussed earlier in this letter.
Questions:
Enforcement of policies pertaining to election disinformation:
Resourcing for election safety teams:
De-amplification commitment:
Equitable disinformation mitigation across languages:
Increase election safety resourcing before, during and after the 2024 elections:
Amplifying official election information sources:
Account-level mitigation strategies for one-to-one and group chat service providers, including encrypted chat providers:
Thank you for your prompt attention to these questions and calls for commitment. We look forward to hearing from you.
###