Update on the Armed Resistance in Myanmar’s Kachin State

Commentary by Michael Martin

Published July 17, 2024

The armed struggle against Myanmar's military junta, the State Administrative Council (SAC), has been underway for more than three years. Different armed groups are waging the battle to topple the SAC in different regions of the country. In Myanmar's northeastern Kachin State, the armed group leading the fight is the Kachin Independence Army, or KIA.

Brief History of the KIA

The KIA was formed in 1961 with the stated goal of establishing an autonomous sovereign state for the Kachin people. Over the following 30 years, the KIA and its affiliated political organization, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), were able to secure control over portions of eastern Kachin State and establish an administrative capital in the city of Laiza. In 1994, the KIA and KIO signed a ceasefire agreement with Myanmar's military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council. The ceasefire by and large held until 2010.

In 2010, Myanmar's renamed military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), issued an ultimatum to all the country's ethnic armed organizations (EAOs)-accept transformation into a border guard force under the command of the military junta or face the resumption of armed conflict. The KIA and KIO rejected the ultimatum, and the SPDC broke the ceasefire in June 2011. Over the next 10 years, there was intermittent fighting between the KIA and the Myanmar military.

Based on a 2008 constitution written by the SPDC, a new hybrid civilian-military government was established in April 2011 with former SPDC prime minister General Thein Sein as president. Between 2011 and 2016, President Thein Sein attempted to negotiate bilateral ceasefire agreements with the KIA and other EAOs, but these efforts were frequently thwarted by the intransigence of the Myanmar military. President Thein Sein announced a unilateral ceasefire with the KIA in January 2013, but the Myanmar military refused to abide by the ceasefire. In May 2013, President Thein Sein and the KIA signed a bilateral ceasefire, but in April 2014, the Myanmar military attacked the KIA once again.

In 2016, the KIA formed the Northern Alliance with three other EAOs-the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). The KIA provided extensive training for the soldiers of its allied EAOs and received significant military assistance from the People's Republic of China.

The KIA's Response to the 2021 Coup

On February 1, 2021, the military staged a "palace coup," deposing and detaining the civilian leaders of the hybrid civilian-military government. At first, the KIA and KIO remained neutral about the coup, but they did issue a statement expressing concern about the military's use of violence against peaceful protesters. The neutrality may, in part, have reflected an initial assessment that the coup was largely a political struggle between two factions within the Bamar majority-the Myanmar military and Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy. In addition, the KIA and KIO had never accepted the legitimacy of the 2008 constitution, so they were not as concerned about the power struggle within the hybrid government.

Fighting between the KIA and the military resumed in March 2021 when the junta's forces attacked KIA bases in northern Shan State. The KIA responded by launching assaults on military camps in Kachin State. Periodic skirmishes continued in Kachin State throughout 2021. By the end of the year, the KIA and KIO were fully committed to overthrowing the junta and were cooperating with several other EAOs, including the AA, Chin National Front (CNF), the Karenni Army, the Karen National Union, the MNDAA, the TNLA, and the many of the People's Defense Forces (PDFs) that had sprung up after the coup.

Over the last three years, the KIA's military strategy has focused on several interrelated objectives. First, the KIA seeks to regain control over bases and territory lost to the military between 2011 and the 2021 coup. Second, KIA forces have also sought to extend their area of control to include the towns along the border with China. Third, the KIA has attempted to seize possession of the major mining areas in Kachin State. Fourth, more recent KIA offenses appear to have been designed to take control of the major roads of Kachin State. Fifth, when circumstances are favorable, the KIA has also attempted to drive junta forces out of their bases and outposts in Kachin State.

As is generally the case in military conflicts, both sides have experienced successes and losses over the last three years. In 2024, the KIA has largely been the victor. During a two-month offensive in March and April 2024, the KIA claimed it took over 70 junta military installations. The KIA reportedly captured five separate military bases on June 11, 2024. On June 14, 2024, the KIA took control of the last border trade route to China.

Future Prospects

Assuming that the KIA forces are successful in driving the junta's forces out of Kachin State, it is unclear what additional actions the KIA and KIO will take. The KIA and KIO appear to view portions of Shan State and Sagaing Division as historically Kachin territory, and they may attempt to gain control of those regions. Such ambitions have already caused conflict with TNLA forces.

Another possibility is that the KIA may press on toward Mandalay as part of a joint campaign to topple the military junta. Forces from Chin State have advanced into Magway Division, west of Mandalay, and the Three Brotherhood Alliance has been gradually moving closer to Mandalay from the east. A future coordinated assault by the combined forces of the AA, Chin Brotherhood, CNF, KIA, MNDAA, TNLA, and their affiliated PDFs could take control of Mandalay and threaten the junta's capital city of Naypyidaw.

However, it is also possible that the KIA and KIO will terminate their offensive operations after they gain control of Kachin territory and focus their efforts on defending their newly established homeland and setting up an autonomous Kachin government. The KIA and KIO, along with the Kachin people, will have the opportunity for the first time in more 70 years to create a government of their own design, reflecting their own hopes and ambitions. Given the major challenges such an opportunity presents, it is not unreasonable for the Kachin people to look inward after they win control of their homeland.

Michael F. Martin is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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