Press Briefing: Previewing the 2024 APEC Forum and G20 Leaders’ Summit

Press Briefing: Previewing the 2024 APEC Forum and G20 Leaders' Summit

Photo: Imtiyaz Khan/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

Transcript - November 12, 2024

This transcript is from a CSIS press briefinghosted on November 12, 2024.

Samuel Cestari: Thank you, Lisa. Hi, everyone. And welcome to this CSIS press briefing previewing the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum and G-20 Leaders' Summit. Today, we have a lineup of CSIS experts spanning three separate programs who will share their expectations and insights on the two meetings' likely areas of focus and potential deliverables that may result from them.

A couple of housekeeping notes before we get started. Each of our speakers will offer several minutes of introductory remarks, after which we'll turn to your questions. We'll also be distributing a transcript of today's call shortly after its conclusion. The transcript will be made available on CSIS.org.

With that, let's go ahead and get started. I'll turn first to Dr. Victor Cha, president of the CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and the CSIS Korea Chair. Dr. Cha, please go ahead.

Victor Cha: Thank you. Thank you very much. And good morning, good evening to everyone. So I don't know how familiar folks are with APEC and the G-20. So APEC will be November 14th to 16th in Peru, and G-20 will be 17th to 19th in Brazil. APEC, formed in 1989, was conceived of as this informal institution of Pacific economies - and the key word there is "Pacific economies"; it's not necessarily Pacific Rim states which is why some entities like Taiwan participate - with a purpose of promoting free trade. APEC now, I think, are 21 economies that count for 50 percent of global GDP, 40 percent of global population.

G-20 formed in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. Had very high expectations at the time. It was the 20th largest - 20 largest economies from the Global North and emerging South, at the time. But lately, it's been hamstrung by geopolitical rivalry, poor performance during the pandemic and, of course, the war in Ukraine. APEC - you know, I think this particular APEC will provide a(n) important venue for some of the new leaders among APEC countries to sort of - there's lots of side meetings that take place at this big multilateral gathering. So we have new leadership in Japan, in New Zealand, in Indonesia, in Taiwan, in Mexico. And so this will provide an opportunity for them to have meetings.

And, you know, APEC is a year-round process. So there were 270-plus working groups that are working year-round to hammer out an agenda for the leaders this week on things like sustainable development, green energy, and trade. But, to be frank, in actuality I think the APEC and G-20 will be about one thing. And that is that all that, I think, the APEC leaders and G-20 leaders will be talking about is the one world leader who is not there - and that is Donald Trump - and what to expect from the next Trump administration on trade, alliances, and other issues.

In fact, it's a little bit of political irony - political historical irony that Biden will be at APEC and in a very similar position as Barack Obama when he went to his last APEC meeting in 2016, which was also in Peru, which was also after Trump won the election. And from what I recall, Obama got a lot of questions about Trump and his message was to wait and see and see - you know, because we didn't know Donald Trump to see what would happen and to hope for the best.

But, of course, now we're in a very different situation where we do know what the first Trump administration is like and I think there will be a lot of combination of lamenting, speculation, guessing about what we'll see coming first in terms of policies out of the campaign and how countries are best able to position themselves.

You know, some world leaders are now brushing up on their golf game in the hopes that they will have a chance to play golf with President Trump. Others are trying to finagle a stop in West Palm Beach on the - off of APEC and the G-20. You may even see some leaders leave early - leave the G-20 early if they get an opportunity to bump into Trump on the golf course or something along those lines.

But, I mean, again, with - now with control of both the executive and legislative branches Trump - the new Trump administration is going to elicit a lot of guessing and talk about what was the first policies coming out of the administration whether it's on immigration - you know, everything from potentially mass deportations but also to highly-skilled legal immigration increasing. Climate and energy - certainly more investment in fossil fuels. Cutting energy regulations.

With regard to the APEC agenda specifically, you know, Trump has said climate change is a hoax. He disdains all sorts of alternative energies. He wants to drill. I think he's even said at one time that windmills kill bald eagles.

On Ukraine, you know, the big question I think will be whether Trump will allow the assistance package to expire in 2025 without any additional support, and on trade which is, of course, one of the key issues for APEC, you know, the question will be whether Trump will seek to renegotiate or even tear up trade agreements like USMCA or KORUS.

And then on tariffs, you know, Trump famously said that tariffs were a beautiful word, and the question is whether he will move forward and place across-the-board tariffs on a lot of the U.S. trading partners.

We put together a short study in the geopolitics department where we found that there is only one Asia Pacific economy today that has a trade deficit with the United States and that is Australia. Everybody else has trade surpluses. Same thing in Europe. Almost all allies have trade surpluses except, I think, for Latvia, of all countries. And so, you know, that's something I think that Trump is going to focus on.

On U.S. and China as far as I know it's not clear whether there will be a U.S.-China bilat at this meeting. Of course, it was at APEC last year in San Francisco where there was a very important meeting that took place between the Chinese and the United States amidst spiraling trade and security tensions.

As you will remember in the run-up to APEC last year we had the spy balloon in February that went across the United States before it was shot down. Blinken canceled his trip to China. We're in a tariff war or trade war with China. There was tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea.

And so APEC provided a venue even though it was in the United States, arguably a neutral ground in which Xi and Biden could meet to try to put a floor under U.S.-China relations. You know, some agreement on establishing military-to-military exchanges, agreement on fentanyl, some other sorts of things.

But, you know, that's not the environment in which we are now coming up to Peru. There's no real point for a U.S.-China bilateral meeting to advance any new agenda other than to ensure some sort of stability in the interim before the transition and I don't know but Xi - if Xi were to meet with Biden, you know, maybe their messages he'd want to convey to Trump through Biden but I don't know for sure.

I'll finish with a question and that is the question of whether U.S. participation is even relevant to the mission of APEC anymore. You know, APEC's mission is about creating and building a free, fair and open trading order. The politics of both parties in the United States has moved solidly in the direction of protectionism and away from high-quality FTAs that penetrate governance in partner countries on things like labor and environment and regulation and anticorruption and transparency.

And, you know, it's ironic that, you know, Trump will be talking about tariffs across the board while, at APEC, it's been announced that Xi is going to - Xi Jinping is going to sign a new updated free-trade agreement with the host country Peru.

So, you know, it's a big and it's an open question. And, you know, I think, if you talk to, like, our ambassador to APEC, U.S. ambassador to APEC, and others, they say that, you know, that APEC partner countries will continue to keep the trade agenda alive for a day in the future when the United States will come back to trade, except that day doesn't look like it's coming any time soon.

So with that, let me stop. Sam, I'll turn it over to you.

Mr. Cestari: Thank you, Dr. Cha.

Next we have Erin Murphy, deputy director for the CSIS chair on India and emerging Asia economics and senior fellow for emerging Asia economics. Erin, over to you.

Erin L. Murphy: Thank you. And good morning, good evening, wherever you are. And thanks for joining us today.

I'm probably going to echo a lot of points that Dr. Cha has made, but they're worth reemphasizing. But I'll start first by talking about the APEC agenda and where this matters and where it will continue to matter. But the APEC heads, those that have been hosting APEC - of course, Peru is a very enthusiastic host. This is, I think, the third time that they've hosted APEC. But they've tried to work to make sure that there's been a through line so that there's more accomplishments rather than this just being a talk shop.

I think that the members that were part of this - at least, this is, you know, what we've heard from ambassadors and those that have been attending all 270 of these coordinating meetings - that there was a little frustration of just coming up with roadmaps and lofty ideas and that they felt that there was an impetus to at least start implementing some of the things that are in these roadmaps.

So there's been a bit of a through line between Thailand or among Thailand, the U.S. and Peru. And that's been on sustainable development, inclusive economic growth, and then the general trade and investment issues that pop up. But another issue is on digital innovation. Critical and emerging technologies are certainly at the top of everyone's mind, particularly how that deals with such issues as digital trade, but also the future of work and labor.

So this APEC summit is going to focus a lot on that, including on resiliency and how to actually implement inclusive economic growth, particularly in the face of digital innovations, but also in capturing the opportunities that are out there that comes with looking at some of the other issues that they're looking at, including decarbonization and energy transition.

As Dr. Cha has said, this is not something that's going to be of interest to the next U.S. administration, although maybe Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and Elon Musk, who have been environmentalists, or at least more supportive of renewable-energy technologies, might be able to have some influence on at least accepting other types of energy. But certainly, as Dr. Cha said, wind, not only does it kill bald egos - eagles - or egos, there we go - a little Freudian slip there - you know, I think Trump has already said that he wants to kill some of the wind-turbine projects that are being set up in the United States.

This is, I think, more of a chance for new leadership to meet. And this is, I think, especially good for an opportunity for these leaders after the U.S. election. Now that we know who has won, there's guesses of how long it was going to take to count votes and figure it out. And as Trump is naming people to his Cabinet and to White House staff, the picture of how policy will proceed is becoming a lot more clear.

So for these leaders, I think it's an opportunity for them to talk about what are we going to do in another Trump administration. What do tariffs mean for us? What do the economic frameworks that we've all signed onto mean for us? And how do we deal with this deficit issue?

So there are several new leaders that will be attending APEC for the first time. And they're all part of bigger conversations, both with the U.S. and also for regional issues. You have Mexico, Thailand, Vietnam, Japan, Indonesia. Indonesia - Prabowo will be having a bilat with Biden, but he also had a call with Trump, which he put on social media. But we also have leaders from New Zealand, Singapore, and Taiwan. And so this will present some very interesting opportunities, particularly as China is there as well, in how APEC partners go forward.

So, of course, tariffs will be top of mind. Trump is not only talking about a potential 60 percent tariff on Chinese imports coming into the United States, but also putting on a 10 to 20 percent blanket tariff on foreign goods. He's already said that he is planning to withdraw the United States from the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, or IPEF. Several of the IPEF signatories will be there, so there's going to probably be discussions about what can be saved from IPEF, including supply chain agreements and some of the other items that have been signed onto that Trump may actually support, but we'll have to see.

There's also a question mark, of course, over the Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity, or APEP, which is the Latin America side of IPEF. The difference there being that the U.S. has several free trade agreement with Latin America companies, unlike Asia - the Indo-Pacific area. But he's likely to withdraw from both. I think that this basically answers the question for companies that are CPTPP, or the Comprehensive Progressive Trade Partnership for the Pacific, the TPP part two. So the U.S. is not going to join that anytime soon. And it probably also won't weigh in in terms of CPTPP bringing on new members. There's several countries that are in the queue to try to join CPTPP. And that includes Ukraine, but also Costa Rica, Uruguay, Taiwan, and China.

You know, this is not going to be a swan song for Biden. Not only is he a lame duck, but a super lame duck because his successor is going to have very different policies than he is. So I think in terms of bilats or having little minilaterals with leaders, I don't think there's going to be a whole lot of interest. And partly because there's nothing that Biden can do today that could prevent changes in a couple of months. Things like IPEF and APEP have not been ratified by Congress. There were no plans for that, which means that there is no durability to those agreements.

There are other things that have been in train that will continue, including the 21st Century Agreement between the U.S. and Taiwan, which does afford some trade negotiations. But in terms of market access or anything like that, we're not likely to see this. So I don't think that this is going to be a great time for Biden - (laughs) - in terms of accomplishing anything. But it might be, you know, a nice trip for him to say goodbye to folks, visit Latin America, and go from there.

You know, for APEC and its future, you know, as Dr. Cha said, it will continue to be there for when the U.S. decides that it wants to be part of the trade and investment framework. Even if there was a Democrat administration, if Harris had won, the U.S. attitude towards trade would have remained the same, but not as extreme, I think, as Trump in terms of adding tariffs. There are still tariffs still in place. And certainly IPEF did not have any market access built within it, as you would see in a traditional free trade agreement or a TIFA trade and investment framework.

So, you know, the pendulum will eventually swing another way when - and this tends to be cyclical. When you look at the United States in the '80s, you know, Democrats and Republicans were targeting Japan with Section 301 tariffs and others, especially on the automotive industry. And if you close your eyes and listen to what they were saying about Japan then, you could easily think that they were talking about China today. But also just unfair trade practices.

But APEC will continue. It has mostly been a talk shop. So, you know, this through line from Thailand, U.S., to Peru, and trying to implement things. It is kind of an outlier, but that will likely continue, especially when it comes to sustainable development and resiliency, particularly in the view of climate change. Whether Trump believes climate change is real or not, a lot of these countries that are attending APEC do. And that includes China, which is very aggressive in terms of renewable energy technology, including on solar panels but also wind turbines as well.

So APEC will continue. Trump has attended before. He was there in 2017. The first half of his speech praised many Southeast Asian countries, but the other members as well, and then launched into a discussion on the many deficits that the U.S. had with those countries in attendance and how he wanted to have a more free - fair trade.

In terms of the U.S. trying to pursue anything multilaterally on trade, APEC is probably not that forum and I don't think the U.S. will necessarily pursue that in the Trump administration. But he does seem to be open to the idea of bilateral frameworks or bilateral trade agreements. He's said that he's open to it. I think one thing to look at if you have time on your hands is to read Robert Lighthizer's book, and I think that that will give you a good sense of where the Trump administration is on trade. But generally, it's not going to be any different.

So I think the most interesting thing that will come out of this, of course, is the bilaterals. Perhaps in a moment of self-awareness, Vladimir Putin has said he's not going to go because Russia wrecks everything, so that's true. But it will be interesting to see how these countries that are part of things like IPEF and APEP but are also facing the potential for tariffs and other potential trade issues for Mexico, I think there's a lot of things to discuss - but among those countries and how they may either band together or cooperate to mitigate the impacts.

And with that, I'll leave it there and turn it over.

Mr. Cestari: Erin, thank you.

I'd like to quickly mention that after our next speaker we will turn to your questions.

(Gives queuing instructions.)

Next, we have Dr. Ryan Berg, director of the CSIS Americas Program. Ryan, over to you.

Ryan C. Berg: Thanks, Sam. And thanks to my colleagues for their very important remarks thus far. I'm just going to try to round out what's been said, and then also we did mention we would talk about the G-20 and so after talking about APEC for a little bit I will talk about the G-20 because of course Biden is on his way to Brazil after he's in Peru. So his trip is the 14th to the 16th in Peru and then the 17th to the 19th he'll be in Brazil.

This is Biden's first visit to South America, his second visit to Latin America overall. Recall that he was in Mexico City for the North American Leaders Summit. He's hosted in Los Angeles the Summit of the Americas in 2022. But there's been little interaction between the president and his South American counterparts throughout the term. And this is quite a surprise, I would say, to a lot of his South American counterparts given the number of trips he took when he was vice president to the region. There were high hopes, I think, among regional leaders, many of whom were still the same when Biden came into office and had personal relationships with them; there were expectations that he would be more involved in Latin America, and those expectations didn't come to pass.

Between the two trips Biden is touting that he's going to go to the Amazon, the first president, sitting president to do so, and perhaps the first president to do so since Teddy Roosevelt's expeditions to the region. The White House says he's going to meet with some indigenous communities, talk about the effects of climate change on the Amazon, and then tout Brazil's global leadership role on issues like on climate and on preservation of the Amazon, and he's also going to pitch COP-30, which of course will be held in a different Amazonian city, not Manaus where he will be but in Belém, another northern Amazon city next year.

So first on APEC, Biden is going to try to make the case for U.S. leadership in the Asia Pacific. He's going to highlight, as my colleague Erin said, IPEF and APEP, the two framework or pillared agreements for the region. But the message of deepening economic ties is going to call on deaf ears, I think, and it's going to be overshadowed - Biden's trip will be overshadowed very clearly by all of the things that Xi Jinping will be up to when he visits APEC. Most importantly when he visits APEC and is in Peru, he's going to inaugurate a new mega port north of Lima's the country's capital, called Chancay. This has been a port that's been in the making for many years. I believe the original agreement was signed somewhere around 2016. Construction on the port, they broke ground about four or so years ago.

It's taken a long time to get to this point, but finally, we are here, and the Chinese are very eager to inaugurate this new mega port on the Pacific coast of Latin America. They say that it's going to increase connectivity between the Chinese economy and pretty much every country in South America, and they have big plans to use a lot of the infrastructure projects they're currently developing, to link them to Chancay in order to decrease the amount of time that it takes to ship foodstuffs, soy, wheat, critical minerals, anything that the Chinese would like to trade by about 10 days, based on current routes.

At the moment, if something is coming from Brazil, for example, it needs to sail either through the Panama Canal; if in northern Brazil, or coming out of southern Brazil, around Argentina, through the Strait of Magellan or through the Beagle pass, and this is going to cut about 10 days off the shipping times for - average estimated shipping times by opening Chancay.

Now this has alerted the United States to the fact that not only is this port going to increase trade ties between China and many of the countries in South America, but also, having measured the length of and width of the berths at the at the port itself, as well as the depth - it is a deepwater mega port - that this could be potentially a dual use port. And so the commander of SOUTHCOM, former commander of SOUTHCOM, Laura Richardson, when she was commander in late October, made a visit to the region, made a couple statements about how - that we see this as a potential dual-use facility. We think that the PLA Navy may well someday have port calls there for logistics or resupply. So we see this with quite a bit of concern.

Xi, however, will have to inaugurate the port virtually for a couple of reasons. First, the Chinese haven't yet built out all of the infrastructure which connects the city of Lima to Chancay, which is still, besides the port, largely a small fishing village, a hamlet, really, that is about to receive a whole heck of a lot more attention. And the second reason that he will inaugurate the port virtually is that Peru has experienced the spate of violent incidents, especially in Lima and the surrounding areas, which actually caused it to declare a state of emergency in several instances. So physical security is not to the point where Xi feels comfortable going in person to inaugurate Chancay.

Nevertheless, this is going to catch, I think, a lot of attention in the U.S. policymaking community. It's certainly going to overshadow anything that Biden says about the robustness of ties between the U.S. and our Latin American counterparts, or between the U.S. and our Asian counterparts.

I think there's another thing that needs to be said about Chancay which is very important, and it illustrates the depths of Chinese influence in Peru and how that influence has been burgeoning over the last several years. About six months ago, when Chancay was nearing the finish line, the Peruvians notified the Chinese that there was an administrative error in the processing of the contract, which is part of the BRI agreement, to build Chancay, which is to say the company that was building and proposing to both own and operate the port, Cosco Shipping, was not allowed to be both an owner and an operator of the port, that that ran afoul of administrative law in Peru.

And there was a moment in time where it looked as though the entire project could potentially be scuttled and the Chinese would be left without one of these crown jewels in their set of BRI projects in South America.

Dina Boluarte, the very unpopular president of Peru, made a state visit over the summer to Beijing, and upon returning to Peru, pushed for the laws of the country to be changed in favor of the Chinese such that Cosco Shipping could be both the owner and the operator of the Chancay port. And so here we are. Cosco is now set to be the owner and the operator of the Chancay port, a first for China in in the region.

Lastly, on APEC, as my colleague Dr. Victor Cha mentioned, China and Peru have a free trade agreement. Peru is one of five countries, I believe, with free trade agreements with China in Latin America. The others are Nicaragua, Ecuador, Chile, and Costa Rica. Peru and China signed an FTA back in 2009. I believe it was only a couple months after the U.S. signed its free trade agreement with Peru. But what's interesting about this visit for Xi is not only the Chancay inauguration, but also the announcement that there will be an optimization of the free trade agreement, and that the Chinese at least are saying that there could be an increase of about 50 percent in trade over the coming years. And the Chinese side also says that it's bringing about 400 business leaders and entrepreneurs with Xi in order to scope out investment deals.

So this is all occurring in a context where the U.S. has clearly elected Donald Trump as its next president. The Trump administration is unlikely to continue the two signature economic initiatives that my colleague Erin Murphy described, APEP and IPEF. And so Biden is, indeed, in the region, but the question really is what are the future of these pillar agreements? What does the future of economic engagement with the U.S. look like? Meanwhile, China is inaugurating major infrastructure projects and optimizing its FTA with Peru.

I'd like to shift, for a second, over to the G-20, because Biden, as I mentioned, will be - will be heading there after his visit to Peru. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva will be pushing, of course, a lot of Brazil's climate agenda. He's also going to be pushing a Ukraine peace deal, which recently has gotten more favorable words - has garnered more favorable words from Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky. Previously the Ukrainians were highly skeptical of Brazil's push for peace, which is partly being developed with China. But now they have pivoted slightly and said some more favorable things about Brazil as a potential arbiter in the conflict. I think responding very clearly to the very decisive election of Donald Trump and the desire to get a peace deal in Ukraine.

So another thing that's on the agenda item for Lula, and very important to the Brazilians, is what they call the global billionaire's tax. Something that they would like to push in order to increase revenue, but also, in the words of Lula, to increase the amount of fairness of the global economy. I'm not sure that the global billionaire's tax is going anywhere at the G-20, but it will make a nice talking point for the Brazilians. And then, of course, the last thing that the Brazilians will be pushing for, which frankly is something the Brazilians are always pushing for in international fora, is the reform of international institutions.

So you will doubtless hear a lot from Lula about reform of the U.N. Security Council, reform of the World Bank, reform of the International Monetary Fund, efforts to de-dollarize and prevent the unilateral use of sanctions by the United States, for example. This is a classic Brazilian talking point that they - that they use at a lot of international fora where they get a chance to speak or lead. And Brazil will try to rally countries in the G-20 to its vision of U.N. Security Council reform, for example.

Notably, Biden is not staying past the G-20 on the 19th. The Brazilians have said that they invited Biden to stick around for an extra day, if he was interested. And that he could do a state visit, seeing how this is his first visit to South America. From what I'm hearing, the White House declined. Biden couldn't fit it in his schedule. And so the Chinese are now sticking around. Xi will stick around for an extra day on the 20th of November, and most likely get the state visit that was initially offered to the Biden administration.

One last thing on the G-20, which will be something that the United States will, frankly, welcome, because it would have been a potential pain point with Brazil. Brazil will not be joining China's Belt and Road Initiative this year. There were rumors that it was set to do so, and that it was going to use the G-20 as its platform for announcing its accession to the BRI. The Brazilians have decided against acceding to the BRI for the moment. And so they will not be using the G-20 to make this announcement. I think that will be very much a welcome decision by the United States because it will, again, remove another potential pain point between the U.S. and Brazil at the G-20.

With that, I'm going to turn it back over to Sam and your questions. Thank you.

Mr. Cestari: Thanks, Ryan. I really appreciate it. And thank you to all of our speakers for the insights that you've shared so far here today.

So at this time we're going to go ahead and open it up for questions.

(Gives queueing instructions.)

I'll turn it over to our operator, Lisa, to open up the line. Lisa, why don't we go ahead with our first question?

Operator: Thank you. That question comes from the line of George Condon with National Journal. Please go ahead.

Q: Great. Thanks much.

I'm trying to understand how they're going to approach talking about tariffs. Are they doing it - are they going to be sort of more diplomatically and try to persuade the United States not to go down that road, or is it more sort of threatening the next administration that there'll be certain retaliation and maybe a trade war? Or will they just save all that for when they're talking to Trump?

Ms. Murphy: I can -

Mr. Cestari: Would anyone like to - go ahead, Erin.

Ms. Murphy: Yeah, I can start on that, and if anyone wants to jump in.

You know, I think for Trump, perhaps on tariffs, it could be a point of negotiation, or at least the start of talks certainly with ASEAN. That was basically how he opened the conversation. But as we saw from his administration, there were Section 301 tariffs that were put in place that also targeted allies. So I expect kind of more of the same.

So in terms of how do these leaders talk and engage, I'm sure that they have been preparing for the potential that he could have been president. This is not going to be their first time with a Trump presidency and sort of know what to expect.

I think for China the prospectus or the specter of 60 percent tariffs is going to be difficult. So I expect a lot more in terms of bilateral conversations between the U.S. and China on that. Again, Trump sees himself as a dealmaker and I think could be convinced that there's going to be a lot more pain on the U.S. side in the medium to longer term. You know, you're not going to necessarily see that at the beginning.

I think you're already starting to see the impacts of tariffs already happening on the U.S. economy with manufacturers starting to stockpile inventory but also furloughing workers. You know, if that conversation continues to get out to the Trump administration, there may be a recalculation. But how does Trump save face in the midst of that?

So in terms of how these leaders speak, we'll perhaps see during APEC, I think, in formats where they have discussed going forward and what working with the U.S. looks like, perhaps the IPEF leaders get together. There are certainly going to be ministerials. Just because the U.S. withdraws doesn't mean that it's necessarily over. You could see perhaps something similar to what Shinzo Abe did when the U.S. withdrew from TPP and created - I think at that time it was called the TPP-11, which was bringing the remaining members of TPP together.

But I do think that a lot of this is going to have to be discussed bilaterally. Leaders are already calling Trump. I'm sure this will be top of mind. And several leaders - I think it was Dr. Cha that mentioned were trying to make a quick stop over to Florida on their way home. I know that that's what the South Korean leader is attempting to do. And we'll probably see more of that.

Again, I think, you know, poor Biden is probably not going to get too much in the way of meetings, and most people will be trying to connect with Trump, or at least a representative from that administration.

So I'll leave it there, and if anyone else wants to jump in.

Dr. Cha: Yeah, this is Victor.

I agree with everything that Erin said. And I think the point on IPEF makes sense. I mean, I think that, you know, there's a very good chance that Trump will do with IPEF what he did with TPP literally on the first day that he took office because he likes the drama, like the TV drama, of it. And the question is whether IPEF members - I think, Erin or Ryan said this, where IPEF members will start thinking and positioning themselves to think about doing what they did on TPP, which is, is there going to be a leader that will sort of take up the mantle of this - of this group once the United States is no longer in, and, you know, try to keep things moving, keep it alive.

You know, I think there always are these hopes that the United States will eventually come back to a position on trade in the region again at some point in the future. And so I think we'll see that.

I don't think that there's anything that these countries can - these economies can signal that would deter Trump from considering across the board tariffs against every economy that has a trade surplus with the United States regardless of all the studies that show that, you know, the trade wars with China did nothing to really benefit the U.S. consumer or the - or necessarily reduce the trade deficit in dramatic ways.

You know, he thinks a certain way about this issue, going back to the 1970s and the '80s and the '90s, and that's not going to - and that's not going to change. So I don't think there's much signaling that they could do, but there is positioning in terms of those who are committed to something like IPEF, the willingness for them to carry the mantle once the United States pulls out.

Dr. Berg: If I can just jump in - this is - this is Ryan - my colleagues have mentioned that the Trump administration is likely to pull out of IPEF. I share that same sentiment with APEP. But I will just say that perhaps IPEF is a little bit more advanced in some of the discussions.

APEP was seen in the region as a little bit of a day late and many dollars short. The first meeting on APEP didn't happen until November of last year and if you talk to many leaders in the region it was really just a way of keeping the United States involved in conversations about trade.

It wasn't necessarily about expecting new market access or new opportunities for engagement with the United States. It was really about face time with Biden and keeping the United States engaged in at least some level of conversation about trade with the region. But given how long it took to get APEP off the ground, and given the fact that it doesn't include any new market access - as has been noted about IPEF as well - I don't think that there will be a kind of collective disappointment in the region if APEP doesn't survive the first couple months of the Trump administration.

And, anyway, beyond that, Latin America and the Caribbean has more free trade architecture than any other region of the world with the exception of Ecuador. Every country on the Pacific coast in North America, Central America, and South America has a free trade agreement with the United States.

The USMCA includes Mexico. You've got CAFTA-DR which includes all the Central American countries and some Caribbean. We have a U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement. We have the U.S.-Peru and we have the U.S.-Chile free trade agreement.

So APEP was really just moving on top of that free trade architecture and trying to put countries together in order to offer them something on top of, you know, an FTA with the U.S., which they already have.

Mr. Cestari: Thank you, Ryan.

Lisa, can we please open it up to our next question?

Operator: Thank you.

(Gives queuing instructions.)

We do have a question from Aamer Madhani with Associated Press. Please go ahead.

Q: Thank you, all. Victor touched on this in the topper but I was hoping to get a little bit more.

For the sake of argument, if Xi does meet with Biden and the White House seems to be keeping open the idea that this meeting could happen what's the value for Xi? And on the other side, what's the value for a lame duck president to be speaking with Xi for the U.S.?

Dr. Cha: So, you know, I mean, it's a - it's a good and it's a fair question. I mean, I think that for Xi, again, I think it would be about trying to just maintain continuity in terms of contact to try to set the stage for the coming of the next Trump administration to, you know, convey any messages that they might want to convey, although they could do that directly with Trump interlocutors. They wouldn't necessarily have to use Biden.

But I think also, you know, part of the Xi - when Xi meets with Biden part of his audience is not - it's not solely the White House or the U.S. government. It's about American CEOs and continued U.S. investment or trying to renew U.S. investment in China and get rid of the perception that there's a hostile business environment in China. So I think it would be for that purpose as well.

For Biden, you know, it would be sort of, you know, on one sense to say, goodbye, nice to work with you. But still, there are a lot of other pressing issues, not least of which is what China can do to sort of stop all of the support it's giving to Russia in the war in Ukraine, and if there's anything they can do to stop the North Koreans from sending ammunition and troops to Kursk and the fight. So, you know, there are clearly things - and, you know, there are the issues - they could touch base on the issues that they agreed to in San Francisco last year, and to check or to benchmark progress on those sorts of issues.

So, you know, I don't - I think the U.S. government, as it should, will focus on sort of business as usual. And one of the things that we need to do with the time that's left in office is Biden said he's going to run through the tape at the end of the race, he's not going to kind of walk through it. So I would expect those sorts of things. And I think that's why the administration, as you said, is still leaving open the possibility of a meeting.

Mr. Cestari: Erin, Ryan, would you like to add anything there?

Ms. Murphy: No, I think that covers it for me.

Mr. Cestari: Got it. OK -

Dr. Berg: Yeah. Very robust for me, too.

Mr. Cestari: Perfect.

Lisa, can we please open it up to our next question?

Operator: Thank you. And the next question is from Tsubasa Yamazaki with Kyodo News. Please go ahead.

Q: Thank you for taking my question.

I think you may have touched on this already, but I would like to ask you again. In light of the American first agenda under the upcoming Trump administration, how do you think the roles of APEC and the G-20 will change, in terms of economy? And, again, the Trump administration emphasis on bilateral negotiations, do you think the functions of APEC and the G-20 may decline? How should individual countries make use of APEC and G-20? Thank you.

Mr. Cestari: Would anyone like to take a first jab at that?

Dr. Cha: So I'll - yeah. So, it's Victor. I'll go first. I'm sure Erin has - and Ryan - have something to say on this.

I mean, so I think for APEC countries - I think they should, and I think they will, continue to pursue the agenda that APEC countries want to pursue. That list of things that Erin mentioned - everything from digital trade to emerging critical technologies, the inclusive and sustainable development. I think they will continue to pursue that agenda. In a sense, it's attributed to APEC that these things will continue to move forward and that leaders will continue to have a discussion. The 270 working groups will continue to work on these issues, whether the United States is there or not. The United States, you know, Australia, Canada, Japan, and others were critical to the creation of APEC in 1989, but this organization can sustain and continue to move forward. And it will show that, even if the United States is not fully on board with the - with the agenda.

So I think that's important in and of itself. The other thing that I would say is that I agree that, you know, a Trump administration may not be interested in these organizations in the same way that, for example, the Obama administration was interested in the creation of the G-20. They may not feel the same way. And Trump does like to do things bilaterally, because he has the most leverage when he's working bilaterally with other countries. But at the same time, I would not put it past - out of the realm of possibility that the Trump administration will create new institutions, you know, in a way that Trump would like, that may try to partially address some of these issues.

I mean, we have to remember that things like the Quad, right, the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India, was something that was certainly expanded and built upon by the Biden administration, but it was started by the Trump administration. If you talk to Trump administration folks from the first - from the first term about Biden's Camp David trilateral summit, they really don't have negative things to say about that idea because they feel like they - that was something that they were working on during the first Trump administration as well. So, yes, I think that he may tear up IPEF. He may downgrade the level of participation at APEC or at the G-20. But I wouldn't put it past him to sort of come up with new institutions that - you know, that are more suited to the purposes and the priorities that they have. Over.

Ms. Murphy: Yeah, just to weigh in. I agree with everything that Dr. Cha said. Just in addition, I - you know, these things are cyclical. These organizations, in terms of importance and influence, wax and wane depending on what's happening in the world, who its leaders are, and where people feel certain issues should be discussed. And so there's kind of a bit of a backlash to globalization, but then in some areas of the world and others seeing this as a future for their economic growth and development. So APAC and G-20 will continue to exist. It will continue to be an important platform for countries to engage on these issues.

I mean, there's certain things that are going to have to be discussed, particularly as we're in a new industrial revolution, critical and emerging technologies, AI, quantum computing. How does this impact economic growth and development? How does this shift the future of work? How do countries share technology, or how do they protect it? These have national security and foreign policy implications. And now that economic security is part and parcel of national security, these types of forums are going to be important to discuss, or at least have some sort of platform to discuss, these issues.

For APEC, as Dr. Cha said, other countries have made it strong. And it will continue to go forward. And will - you know, despite U.S. engaging actively or not - will still have some of the largest economies in the world, and some of the most important ones. For G-20, it's the same. And G-20, again, its importance waxes and wanes. Its ability to actually make policy or influence issues related to trade and economics can be challenged. And as we've seen more recently, in terms of who the leader is or who's the host year.

So, you know, that will continue as well. But, you know, these are still important fora leaders to meet and to discuss these issues. It gives them a chance to meet bilaterally, which is why Trump has attended them in the past. He's not a big fan of travel, but certainly his Cabinet members have traveled to these. And, you know, that's important. So, you know, it's not the end of these organizations. In fact, I think some countries will see this as more important fora. And I think that they have a longer shelf life than, you know, the Bretton Woods institutions, that require probably a lot of reform. So I'd be more positive in terms of APEC and the G-20 than I would be, you know, the functionality of the World Trade Organization.

Over.

Dr. Berg: Can I just weigh in?

Mr. Cestari: Ryan would you like - yeah, go ahead.

Dr. Berg: Yeah. Can I just weigh in on the - on the survivability of the APEP, which I think we think is, like IPEF, probably not going to survive very long, if at all, in the incoming Trump administration? That is not necessarily going to be left with a void where there's simply no economic program for the region. They will replace it with something, but they would like to put their own imprint on it.

And so there was an earlier question of, you know, what happens to some of these institutions when an administration comes to power that prefers to deal bilaterally with many of its relationships. Well, it's not that they're only going to be engaging bilaterally; they will replace it with something. But I think there is a desire to create something that is - that is theirs, something that has their imprint on it, something that shares their priorities.

And so remember that in the first Trump administration there was a trade program for the Americas just like the APEP. It didn't get started until more than two years into the term and so it didn't have very long to flourish, but it was called América Crece - America Grows. And I think you could have a kind of América Crece 2.0 in the - in the incoming Trump administration, where there's a desire to increase the amount of funding available at multilateral financial institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank for infrastructure projects that can compete, for example, with China. There's probably a desire to use the DFC in a more strategic way.

There will be something that replaces the APEP if, in fact, the APEP doesn't survive. It's not going to be left with a void. But it's going to be left - it's going to be filled by something that is from the administration with its own imprint.

Mr. Cestari: Thank you, Ryan.

That seems to be all the questions that we have right now. I want to thank all of our speakers and participants for joining us for this timely call. Please feel free to reach out for anything we can do to help be a resource looking ahead to the APEC forum and G-20 leaders summit. We're here to help, so please don't hesitate to reach out. As mentioned at the top of the call, we'll have a transcript distributed to all of you and it'll also be available on CSIS.org.

So, with that, I hope everybody has a great rest of your day, and thank you for joining us.

Ms. Murphy: Thank you.

(END.)