What comes next for Syria after Assad

The fall of the over fifty-year-long regime of the Assad dynasty in Syria represents one of the most significant turning points in the recent history of the Middle East. This is especially true given Syria's strategic and symbolic relevance to regional balances over the past decades. It was a fundamental component of the so-called Shia crescent, symbolizing Iran's regional influence in the region; a key force in Lebanon's political trajectory, where it wielded significant influence, partly through its support for Hezbollah; and the last bastion of resistance against the various revolutionary movements that, since 2011, led to the fall of regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen and further destabilized Iraq. In recent years, the Alawite regime of Bashar al-Assad seemed to have emerged victorious from a brutal civil war that claimed over half a million lives.

This was made possible by the network of alliances Damascus had built over the years: dozens of Iranian military advisers were on Syrian soil to organize and direct military operations against the rebels, thousands of Hezbollah fighters fought alongside the Syrian army and proved decisive in the conflict's outcomes, while Moscow launched aerial campaigns against rebel positions. Naturally, each of these external actors was driven by its own interests.

Given these circumstances, it was expected that the situation in Syria would change following the withdrawal of these actors: Hezbollah significantly weakened by Israeli attacks to the point of seeing its command chain decapitated; Iran engaged in an almost open conflict with Israel; and Putin's Russia bogged down in the war in Ukraine. Yet, the speed with which Islamist militants led by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani first conquered Aleppo, then the cities of Hama and Homs, and finally marched on the capital Damascus, forcing Assad to flee, took everyone by surprise.

What might happen now, and what could the new balances in Syria and the Middle East look like in the medium to long term? While it is clearly difficult to outline scenarios given the situation's unpredictability and volatility, one can consider the forces currently at play and their strategic objectives.

The main players in this story, for now, seem to be the men of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, literally "Liberation Movement of Syria"), the leading armed group within the galaxy of rebel forces. According to some sources, it comprises between 15,000 and 20,000 men and controlled the Islamist rebel stronghold in the Idlib region. Led by the Syrian al-Jolani (literally "from the Golan," the Syrian region bordering Israel and partially occupied by Israel itself), the organization follows a Salafi-jihadist ideology and was born out of the Syrian civil war in 2011 under the name Jabhat al-Nusra, as an affiliate of al-Qaeda in Syria. Subsequently, after a period of alliance with the Islamic State under al-Baghdadi, it broke away from the latter as well and assumed a strictly local Syrian focus.

In this phase, Jolani is demonstrating a significant degree of pragmatism, asserting that he is not interested in pursuing a global jihad model or carrying out terrorist attacks and seeking to reassure religious minorities (including Christians, many of whom were allied with Assad) about their freedom to practice their faith. Moreover, al-Jolani is reported to have already held talks and negotiations (directly or indirectly) with some of the most influential regional powers, including Israel and Turkey, as well as with members of Assad's government, to ensure an orderly and peaceful transition of power.

It is also worth noting that Damascus (and to some extent Aleppo and Homs) was captured with little resistance, a sign not only of HTS's intention to avoid gratuitous violence, but also of the collapse of Assad's front.

This last factor invites reflection on what has truly transpired within the Alawite power circle and what internal balances might emerge. The example of post-Saddam Iraq, where suddenly, along with the deposed dictator, the entire state and bureaucratic apparatus of the Ba'ath Party was permanently excluded from any institutional role, contributing to the collapse of institutions and the spread of chaos and violence, illustrates how delicate the dismantling of a dictatorial regime can be. Among the bureaucrats of the Syrian state-necessarily members of the Ba'ath Party, as it was the only real party in the country-there might be individuals capable of ensuring a peaceful transition while keeping the institutions functioning and who are not guilty of serious crimes. Could such figures be included in the new institutions to be created? Their experience in state administration could certainly help prevent the collapse of institutions, but this would also require significant negotiating effort (and political will).

It also remains to be seen how, and if, al-Jolani will succeed in holding together the various, historically diverse, and non-homogeneous elements of the country. The old state bureaucracy, the military, and non-Arab minorities will not disappear. Agreements must be reached with these actors, or there could be open conflict. The Syrian armed forces reportedly comprise around 170,000 men, and a way to integrate them into the new defense structures must be found; otherwise, there is a risk of having a hostile army within the country, with all the resulting consequences. While, according to Iranian military observers present in Syria, the Syrian army is not particularly renowned for its skill or efficiency, it is still unthinkable to have tens of thousands of armed men not integrated into the new institutions. Some sources suggest that Jolani himself might focus on reorganizing the armed forces and assume their leadership, leaving more political roles to trusted allies.

Regarding the other factions in the country, the Kurdish question is undoubtedly the most challenging to resolve. This issue brings us directly to analyze the role of the actor that perhaps most wanted and supported the ongoing changes: Erdogan's Turkey. Since the start of the war in 2011, Erdogan has been one of Assad's fiercest opponents, despite previously being a key advocate for ending the Syrian regime's isolation as part of a strategy aimed at elevating Ankara as a mediator between the West and the Muslim world. It is no secret that Ankara has, directly or indirectly, supported HTS forces over the years and viewed the advance of Islamist forces toward Damascus favorably. However, Turkey's primary interests in Syria include limiting the influence of Kurdish YPG forces, which are allied with the PKK, and preventing the establishment of a Kurdish proto-state in northeastern Syria, known as Rojava, which Turkey views as a PKK stronghold directed against its security.

For this reason, Turkey currently maintains a military presence in Syria and occupies a strip of northern territory. It should also be noted, however, that Erdogan's security dilemmas are partly counterbalanced by Turkey's economic interests, particularly in northern Syria, the city of Aleppo included, which was once the economic and commercial engine of the country. Turkey's influence in northern Syria is evident: the Turkish lira circulates there, electricity and telecommunications are connected to the Turkish network, and schools use Turkish textbooks. This amounts to a de facto Turkish enclave, offering significant economic potential for Turkey. Controlling trade routes to and from Aleppo and participating directly in reconstruction efforts in this area could be a strategic medium-term objective for Ankara, should the situation on the ground finally stabilize. Moreover, in such a scenario, Erdogan could also repatriate the approximately 4 million Syrian refugees currently living in Turkey.

The issue of refugees is another highly sensitive topic. In Europe, a coalition of countries led by the Italian government of Giorgia Meloni has been pressuring the European Commission for months to normalize relations with Assad's Syria. In fact, Italy recently reopened its embassy in Damascus-the first among the major European nations to do so-and one of the main reasons for this move is to declare Syria a safe country, thereby enabling the repatriation of Syrian refugees currently residing on Italian soil. Paradoxically, however, the fall of Assad's regime has led Germany to suspend asylum applications from Syria (Germany is currently home to over 700,000 Syrian refugees). By Monday 9^th of December, almost all other EU countries decided to suspend all the asylum requests from Syria. But can Syria truly be considered a safe country? Or, on the contrary, could potential new conflicts lead to another wave of refugees fleeing Syria? Answers to these questions will depend on the unfolding events, but it is certainly difficult to imagine that Syria could be deemed safe the day after Assad's fall.

The coming days and weeks will be crucial in determining the fate of the country and its people. Al-Jolani is already working on forming a new government and appointed Mohammed al-Bashir as Prime Minister (the former leader of the Idlib province). However, it remains to be seen which territories he will control and what kind of power he will wield. Will he truly continue to act pragmatically and in the interests of the Syrian nation? Or is this a facade, masking an eventual imposition of top-down Islamization on Syrian society, consistent with the Salafist ideology from which he originates? Furthermore, can Syria return to being a united country, or will it be divided among Kurds, Arabs, and external actors? The risk of fragmentation is real, as is the potential for new conflicts, beginning with the possible involvement of the Kurds, who so far have shown little inclination to engage in open conflict with al-Jolani's forces. This cautious stance, however, has not been shared by an actor like Israel on Syria's southern border. Reports suggest that Israel has already moved troops to occupy the buffer zone in the Golan Heights after Assad's forces abandoned these positions.

Looking more broadly, Iran and Russia-both of which have strategic interests in Syria, such as the naval bases on the Mediterranean at Tartus-will need to reposition themselves, as will the United States. Under the new presidency of Donald Trump, the U.S. will have to decide on its stance, even though Trump has stated that he does not wish to intervene in this scenario.

For the time being, it is the local forces already operating in Syria that will have the greatest influence on the immediate course of events. Therefore, the focus should remain on Damascus, as well as the Kurdish-held areas.