The Passing of Vietnam Party Chief Nguyen Phu Trong

Critical Questions by Gregory B. Poling

Published July 23, 2024

Nguyen Phu Trong, longtime general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, died on July 19 at age 80. His passing after more than a decade in power marks the beginning of a struggle for political preeminence that will continue at least until Vietnam's 14th Party Congress, scheduled for 2026. The inner workings of the party are opaque to outsiders, which will fuel uncertainty and much gossip in the intervening year and a half. But there is no denying that with Trong's passing Vietnam has entered a new era in which intraparty contestation will increase and potentially affect policy.

Q1: What is Nguyen Phu Trong's legacy?

A1: Reserved, capable, and most importantly, incorruptible, Nguyen Phu Trong served as party secretary of Hanoi and chairman of the National Assembly before being elevated to the position of general secretary at the 2011 Party Congress. He was chosen mainly as a compromise candidate among competing factions but proved to be the most important Vietnamese political figure in a generation. Among his most profound legacies are the strengthened role of the general secretary, an unfinished campaign to fight corruption and reinforce party discipline (alongside a shrinking of space for public debate and activism), and the balancing of Vietnam's relationships with China, the United States, and other outside powers.

The general secretary is the most important of Vietnam's "four pillars," alongside the prime minister, president, and chairperson of the National Assembly. But unlike in China, the Communist Party of Vietnam still operates under a system of collective leadership, and the general secretary's powers are constrained. That said, Trong accumulated more influence during his time in the position than any recent predecessor. During the 2016 Party Congress, he secured a second term by outmaneuvering Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who had hoped to succeed him. Dung was seen as pro-business and a modest reformer; he led the faction of those who rose primarily through the ranks of the government bureaucracy rather than the party itself. After ousting Dung, Trong was better able to pursue his domestic agenda, focused on combatting the corruption and breakdown of party discipline that had accompanied economic and social reforms over the previous three decades. In 2018, after President Tran Dai Quang suddenly passed away, Trong took up that role as well. At the next Party Congress, in 2021, he gave up the presidency but stayed on for a norm-breaking third term as general secretary.

These decisions added to but also revealed the limits of Trong's influence. The party remains plagued by factionalism, so much so that it could not agree quickly on a successor to Quang in 2018 or choose a new general secretary in 2021. In this context, Trong served as a bandage, covering over party divides but unable to heal them. He was the most respected figure in the system but not powerful enough to secure the elevation of his preferred successor. That compelled Trong to stay on for a third term despite age and ill health.

The quiet struggle among the party's factions intersected with, and at times seemed to weaponize, Trong's signature program: the dot lo or "blazing furnace" campaign against corruption. Between 2021 and early 2023, the Vietnamese government launched criminal investigations of 7,500 individuals and indicted more than 4,400 for graft. The Communist Party of Vietnam has disciplined tens of thousands of its own, including high-ranking officials and eight members of the Politburo, the country's top decisionmaking body. From early 2023 to mid-2024, two presidents, the National Assembly chair, and the permanent member of the Secretariat (the fifth-most-senior official) were ousted. Each might have been involved in corruption, but their falls also indicate that they were outmaneuvered in the factional struggles ahead of the 2026 Party Congress. Meanwhile, the breadth of the anti-corruption campaign has created bureaucratic paralysis, with officials hesitant to make any bold decisions or approve large projects for fear of future prosecutions.

Q2: Who will succeed Trong?

A2: The Politburo named President To Lam interim general secretary a day before announcing Trong's death. Lam, 67, previously led the powerful Ministry of Public Security, where he helped steer the anti-corruption investigations that brought down other senior leaders. He just became president in May after the corruption-related resignation of Vo Van Thuong and tried (unsuccessfully) to continue serving simultaneously as public security minister. The Politburo has yet to announce if Lam will continue in this interim role until 2026 or if it will elect a new general secretary to serve out the rest of Trong's term.

Lam now appears to be the most powerful person in Vietnam and the likeliest to formally succeed Trong in 2026. But despite the political bloodletting of recent years, the system remains one of collective leadership, and there are other prominent officials who might come out on top or at least remain as checks on Lam's power. The most obvious is Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, 65, the last of the "four pillars" elected in 2021 who is still standing. Chinh has long experience in party positions but, like Lam, also served in the Ministry of Public Security. Other potential candidates include General Luong Cuong, 66, who became the permanent member of the Secretariat in May, and General Phan Van Giang, 63, who has served as defense minister since 2021.

Lam might remain double-hatted as president and general secretary through 2026, as Trong did from 2018 to 2021. But even that does not guarantee his elevation to a full term at the top. Even less clear than who succeeds Trong is whether they will command the same influence. It seems unlikely that any of the leading contenders will command the degree of cross-factional respect that Trong did. If others could easily bridge those divides, Trong would not have been seen as the indispensable man and kept in power for so long. The intraparty struggles and horse trading will be kept from outsiders, rendering any odds-making in the 2026 leadership contest little more than a guessing game.

Q3: What does this mean for policy and U.S.-Vietnam relations?

A3: Lam's elevation, at least temporarily, to the top job has sparked concern about an increased role for the internal security services and a further diminishment of civil liberties. These are understandable fears drawn from his time as public security minister, which undeniably overlapped with a period of increasing pressure on activists, bloggers, and other independent voices. But these concerns might be premature. Lam was not the primary architect of those campaigns so much as their enforcer. He has only been among the four pillars since May and the interim general secretary for a few days. That gives very little indication of his own policy preferences. And for the time being, he is only the first among equals in a system of collective leadership. Domestic policies could shift in the coming months, either due to Lam's own efforts or as a reflection of the jockeying for power within the system, but they could just as easily remain fixed until at least 2026.

The same can be said for the fate of the anti-corruption campaign and the severe regulatory and infrastructure bottlenecks dragging on Vietnam's economic growth. High-profile arrests are likely to continue for some time, if only because of cases already under investigation. On July 22, for instance, police arrested five senior officials, including a former deputy environment minister, for violating mining regulations. The campaign could ultimately slow or become more discriminating, either before or after the Party Congress, but that remains to be seen. In the meantime, the economy will face countervailing forces. On the one hand, Vietnam is likely to enjoy the second-fastest GDP growth among major economies in Southeast Asia over the next two years, and the recently approved direct power purchase agreement could be a game changer for foreign firms seeking access to renewable energy before investing in the country further. On the other hand, the atmosphere of bureaucratic caution is not going to ease overnight, so the slow disbursement of government funds and infrastructure shortfalls will continue to hamper growth for some time.

The picture seems clearer when it comes to foreign policy. The party, regardless of its leader, will continue to prioritize Vietnam's independence and agency amid great power competition. This has always been the bedrock of Vietnamese strategy. That means Hanoi will continue to seek stability and productive relations with Beijing where possible. It cannot, after all, change geography. But no Vietnamese leader will compromise on sovereignty, including in the South China Sea disputes. And as every available survey of public and elite opinion in the country shows, there is nowhere on Earth more fearful of Chinese hegemony than Vietnam. That is why Vietnamese leaders, whether from the party or government, value strategic ties with the United States and its allies as a counterweight to their necessary relationship with China.

In 2015, Trong became the first general secretary to ever visit the United States, meeting with President Barack Obama in the White House. Lam visited for meetings with U.S. counterparts in 2019, as has nearly every Vietnamese prime minister and president in recent years. When Trong met with President Joe Biden in Hanoi in September 2023, the two formally concluded the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which made clear to every official in Vietnam that the collective leadership prioritized the bilateral relationship. The same is true of Vietnam's recently concluded comprehensive strategic partnerships with Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea. There is no reason to think that Lam or any other contender for leadership in Vietnam would seek to slow the momentum in those deepening relationships. And when Secretary of State Antony Blinken travels to Hanoi this week to attend Trong's state funeral, he will carry the message that the United States is committed to advancing the U.S.-Vietnam partnership that Trong helped build.

Gregory B. Poling is a senior fellow and director for the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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