The Arsenal of Instability: How Expanding Western Defense Production Impacts Negotiations in Ukraine

The Arsenal of Instability: How Expanding Western Defense Production Impacts Negotiations in Ukraine

Photo: Artem Hvozdkov via Getty Images

As Western states continue to mobilize their economies for greater military competition, their enormous productive capacities could erode Russia's materiel advantage in a future conflict with Ukraine. If Russia feels that Ukraine will one day be much stronger than it is today, Moscow faces incentives to pursue a total military victory or a punitive peace settlement that eliminates Kyiv's ability to resist Russian aggression in the future. If Russia is unable to completely achieve either goal, the West's rising industrial capacity may also prompt it to reinvade and launch a preventive war as Ukraine and its backers grow better equipped.

States often seek to limit the likelihood that their adversaries will attempt to revise any war-ending agreement by decreasing their enemy's power to do so by conquering them or capturing territory that provides defensive advantages or reduces the adversary's war-making potential-industrial centers or resource-rich areas, for example. But even when states that fear defection from an agreement are able to reach one, they may still be tempted to launch preventive wars if the balance of power begins to shift against them, making an early attack more attractive to avoid facing a more powerful opponent later.

Fear that the West will seek to strengthen post-war Ukraine until it can retake captured territory or otherwise revise a war-ending agreement might push Russia to pursue expansive objectives on the battlefield and in negotiations. For example, Russia might seek to capture more defensible territory or shift the balance of future power by extending its control to the edges of Zaporizhzhia Oblast or even to the city of Dnipro. Doing so would increase the proportion of the front line that runs through the Dnipro River-a natural barrier-and potentially transfer much of Ukraine's missile industry to Russian hands. Russia would probably see these as highly favorable developments, but the result would likely be to further prolong war-exactly what many proponents of negotiation hope to avoid.

Russia might also fail in these goals, especially if the Trump administration pursues a policy of freezing the frontline during negotiations. Such an outcome will increase the temptation of a preventive war in the future. If the West increases its collective output of military materiel and continues to arm Ukraine after a war-ending agreement, Russia might fear that the balance of power is shifting against it, allowing Ukraine to consider an offensive to retake captured territory or force renegotiation of the agreement. This fear would incentivize a preventive war-another Russian invasion of Ukraine to degrade its military capacity or capture more territory.

Negotiating an arms control agreement would seem to be a natural solution to this particular barrier to ending the current conflict, but such agreements have kept the peace poorly in practice. Ukraine's supporters would be better off supporting the creation of a demilitarized zone and an international peacekeeping mission. Demilitarized zones prohibit military activity by the warring parties in a certain area, while peacekeepers monitor a ceasefire to help maintain peace following a conflict. Both measures have a much stronger record of success than arms control agreements. In Ukraine, they would help limit both sides' fears that the other would seek to revise any war-ending agreement if the balance of power shifts in the future and curb Russia's motivation to reinvade and launch a future preventive war, which may be why some European governments are discussing such a possibility.

While peacekeepers do not always succeed-Egypt ordered peacekeepers in the Sinai to withdraw days before closing the Straits of Tiran in what Israel had previously declared it would see as an act of war-they offer opportunities for Ukraine, Russia, and their international supporters to signal their commitment to peace. Contributing forces to the peacekeeping mission could be particularly important if it allows important third parties like China to demonstrate their desire to avoid another war. But no matter which countries contribute, negotiators will have to consider how the West's relative industrial might pose a barrier to a peace or ceasefire agreement.

Alexander Palmer is a fellow with the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Audrey Aldisert is a research associate in the Defense and Security Department at CSIS.

Special thanks to Gregory Sanders for his thoughtful feedback, Leena Marte for the data visualization, and Madison Bruno for editing and publication support.