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31/07/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 31/07/2024 15:57

Outcomes of the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting

Outcomes of the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting

Photo: SHUJI KAJIYAMA/POOL/AFP via Getty Images

Critical Questions by S. L. Narasimhan

Published July 31, 2024

The annual Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting was held in Japan on July 29, during which the Quad members-Australia, India, Japan, and the United States-convened to discuss the progress made and future actions of the Quad. The meeting comes amid global geopolitical conflicts, including the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and China's increasing aggression in the West-Pacific. India is expected to host a Quad Leaders' Summit later in 2024.

Q1: Is the Quad a security grouping?

A1: The Quad emanated from a core partnership group that was established by Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to coordinate humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts after the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean. The four countries formally started the Quad in 2007; however, it fizzled out after the first meeting. It was revived in 2017, at a time when the bilateral relationships between these four countries had improved significantly.

Several analysts have referred to the Quad as the "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue." However, none of the four countries that form the Quad have officially called the Quad a security grouping. The only two security-related subjects that the Quad covers are cybersecurity and maritime security, both of which can be considered nontraditional security subjects. Therefore, one can conclude that the Quad is not a security grouping.

Q2: Is "Squad" the new Quad?

A2: The "Squad" is an informal Indo-Pacific grouping that is comprised of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States. The calls for the creation of the Squad seem to be in response to the recent dangerous maneuvers in the South and East China Seas and the frequent stand-offs between China and the Philippines in the Second Thomas Shoal.

There seems to be a conflation between the Quad and the Squad. This is because some analysts have written that India is the weak link in Quad. The primary reason for this is that Australia, Japan, and the United States are treaty allies, whereas India is not. Other reasons attributed are that India has continental boundary issues with China that hinder it from being fully committed to the Quad, that India has declined to be part of the freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, and that it does not have the capacity to invest in resources. Therefore, there seems to be a feeling that the Quad may become the Squad by replacing India with the Philippines.

The Squad has already conducted maritime exercises and is expected to conduct more while also providing increased security assistance to the Philippines overall. The Squad is still in its early stages of development, and therefore, how the informal grouping will progress is yet to be seen. However, its overall efforts appear geared toward the tensions between China and the Philippines, demonstrating that the Quad and the Squad are two groupings serving two different purposes.

Q3: Should the Quad become a formal organization?

A3: The Quad started as an informal grouping in its first and second iterations. In recent years, there have been calls to make the Quad a formal grouping with a secretariat. However, there are two diverging viewpoints on making the Quad a formal organization. The first argues that the Quad should become a formal grouping to balance China; this argument is based on the premise that the Quad was originally formed as a counterbalance to China. The second contends that Quad was formed not to counter China, but rather as the coming together of four like-minded countries to work on issues that could support regional development.

If all four countries were to agree that the Quad is a counterbalance to China, then the Quad may likely have to become a formal grouping to better coordinate actions. However, the second definition-that the Quad is meant to support regional development-is largely agreed upon by the four member countries, which indicates it is likely that the Quad will continue in its current state and not become a formal organization.

Q4: Is the Quad effective?

A4: Since the Quad was reinstated in 2017, there has been a feeling that for the group to progress, it should decide on deliverables and ensure their completion. The Quad has delivered on vaccines for Covid-19, satellite data sharing for disaster management, and STEM scholarships and infrastructure fellowships. Work is in progress on other deliverables.

Analysts have expressed doubts about Quad members' commitment to the group, given their preoccupation with the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. However, most meetings-outside of the last summit meeting-have taken place on schedule. With the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting held on July 29, the next summit meeting should not be far off. The Quad has also been making considerable progress on other activities; for example, it launched the Quad Cyber Challenge in February 2023 to promote cyber awareness and good cybersecurity habits. A second Quad Cyber Challenge has been mentioned in the joint statement after the recent meeting of the foreign ministers, demonstrating that the Quad partners remain committed to the group's cause and are endeavoring to make it a success.

Q5: What were the outcomes of the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting?

A5: This meeting reviewed the progress on the decisions made in the previous Quad meetings. The joint statement addressed a wide range of themes. It reaffirmed the commitment to the principles of the UN Charter and emphasized the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The statement also highlighted the significance of steps being made toward meeting the UN Sustainable Development Goals and decisive actions against climate change. Additionally, it underscored the necessity of maintaining a rules-based international order while condemning terrorism and emphasizing the need for enhanced cooperation on counterterrorism efforts. The discussion in the joint statement included concerns about North Korea and Myanmar as well as the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, stressing the importance of international stability.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief was identified as a critical area for collaboration, as was reaffirming the importance of Association of Southeast Asian Nations centrality in regional affairs. The statement also focused on critical and emerging technologies (CET), maritime security, and cyber security. Overall, the meeting highlighted the Quad's dedication to addressing these diverse issues facing the region through collaborative efforts.

The meeting also extensively covered ongoing maritime conflicts in the East and South China Seas. In terms of future initiatives, foreign ministers expressed an intention to launch a Quad maritime legal dialogue under the Quad Maritime Security Working Group to aid in upholding maritime order in the Indo-Pacific region. Other initiatives involving CET, cybersecurity, and women's empowerment are also in motion.

Despite the numerous themes covered during the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting, there has been some criticism over limited mentions of security cooperation broadly, and the Taiwan Strait specifically. The Quad may have avoided these topics to balance China's existing sensitivity to the Quad's existence. The Quad is gradually maturing, and with a steadily increasing agenda and numerous achieved deliverables, it is likely to grow stronger in the future.

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) S. L. Narasimhan is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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Senior Associate (Non-resident), Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies