Foreword: An Election of Global Consequence

Commentary by Victor Cha

Published September 26, 2024

This commentary is the foreword to a report from the CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department entitled The Global Impact of the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election. The report features a set of essays assessing the meaning of the election for Europe, Russia, Eurasia, the Indo-Pacific, the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East.

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The audience for the U.S. presidential election is global. As Americans go to the polls, their choices have ramifications for the world. The newly formed Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at CSIS has produced a set of essays assessing the meaning of the election for Europe, Russia, Eurasia, the Indo-Pacific, the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East. While there are many differences to be found in a Kamala Harris or Donald Trump presidency, our scholars also found few in their regions and countries preparing for continuity overall in relations with the United States after this election-they are preparing for change, with only the pace or intensity being determined by who occupies the White House in January 2025. The U.S. election takes place at a moment when the demands of two wars in Europe and the Middle East, China's assertiveness, and coalitions of autocratic leaders are putting unprecedented stress on the rules-based international order. These developments, as much as the election, are compelling changes in how global leaders look at their future with the United States regardless of signals of policy continuity or discontinuity from a Harris or Trump presidency. This report, The Global Impact of the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election, provides concise analysis and predictions covering the globe, from which some common themes emerge.

First, many define this U.S. election as a "make or break" moment. Much work has been completed over the past several years to repair and restore U.S. relationships with allies and partners. Important new work has been initiated to create new institutions and multilateral cooperative arrangements on supply chains, economic security, protection of critical and emerging technologies, and artificial intelligence, among other areas. Discontinuity in this work could precipitate damage and setbacks that may be unrecoverable. It is important, therefore, for the next administration to foster continuity. For many countries engaged with the United States, the focus extends beyond the presidential election to the U.S. Congress and its willingness to provide consistent and transparent signals to the world about the direction of legislation, appropriations, and regulations in support of these projects.

Second, the next U.S. president will, upon entering office, contend with not only two wars in Europe and the Middle East, but also growing cooperation among autocratic powers as a disruptive force in the global order. Russia's war effort, for example, is fueled by Chinese industrial support, Iranian military drones, and North Korean ammunition and ballistic missiles. This bloc strives to support the wars as a way to win predatory gains from a breakdown of the rules-based international order. Moreover, so-called swing or hinge states-South Africa, Turkey, Brazil, India, and others-cannot be expected to support the West and are instead hedging. (South Africa, for example, was silent on Russia's invasion and reportedly selling arms to Moscow.) All of these actors will test a new administration, not with a direct challenge to the United States, but by targeting the soft spots-perceived vulnerabilities such as the strength of U.S. commitments to allies and partners (e.g., in the Philippines over Second Thomas Shoal) or developing nations lacking alternatives to Chinese and Russian influence. China and Russia will probe Harris's relative inexperience in foreign policy with gray zone tactics in security and economic coercion spheres. With Trump, they will probe how far they can push U.S. allies to defer to Beijing's and Moscow's preferences without eliciting a U.S. response in an "America first" minimalist engagement framework.

Third, U.S. allies and partners around the world are preparing for change with the next U.S. president-not in the sense of decoupling from the United States, but certainly by developing greater self-reliance in security affairs and greater regional integration more broadly with their own neighbors in anticipation of a less predominant and preeminent United States. While allies will welcome any signs of continuity with Biden's alliance-centric policies, there is a realization that the U.S. domestic appetite for deep engagement is weak and that this will circumscribe either a Harris or Trump presidency with differences in the intensity and gravity of the change.

On economic security, there is the expectation of continuity given Biden's-and before that, Trump's-commitments to consolidating critical supply chains. But on trade, allies and partners are preparing for confrontation with Trump's punitive tariffs. (Trump famously wanted his briefing memos to cite the trade deficit or surplus of every U.S. ally in Europe and Asia.) They are also aware that Biden did not remove many of these tariffs, including 25 percent on steel and 10 percent on aluminum, and that Harris is unlikely to embrace lowering tariff barriers. Yet, this won't discourage close allies like the United Kingdom and Japan from initially probing the next administration's interest in getting back to trade in some way.

On security issues, whether Trump or Harris ascends to the White House, there are concerns about a decrease in the U.S. security presence at a time when the wars today have demonstrated that neither European nor Asian allies are prepared to defend themselves against conflict in their region without the United States providing core capabilities (e.g., lift, tactical intelligence, command, control, communications, and intellgienceC3I). This was made obvious by the war in Ukraine. Trump's promise to end the war "on day one" would precipitate rapid yet incomplete adjustments by U.S. allies. With Harris, the commitment to alliances will be undeniably strong, but the subtext of greater self-reliance and burden-sharing will not be irrelevant given limited time and resources.

Fourth, the world will look for early reassurances of continuity on climate commitments from a Harris presidency. Trump's hostility toward the Paris Agreement and the Inflation Reduction Act will be a source of discord with European and Asian governments but might also be welcomed by the private sector in those countries for removing the subsidies favoring U.S. companies. Others, such as Australia and New Zealand, may try to press the climate agenda in all but name, focusing on encouraging a U.S. role in building out critical infrastructure, ports, and airfields.

Finally, our scholars note that while the U.S. election is an important variable for change, the domestic context for every country and region is equally important and will help to determine outcomes. For example, China's economic deceleration, unemployment rates, property sector insolvency, and public discontent can create certain types of external behavior regardless of who becomes the next U.S. president. The next administration will contend with untold ramifications of a war-depleted Russia with high casualties, an overheated economy, dwindling financial reserves, and labor shortages. In the United Kingdom, a political move to the left could create new alliance tensions with a Trump presidency (less so with Harris arguably). In Japan, new leadership within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party will also become a variable in the alliance for either Trump or Harris.

Given the global context, there could not be a more consequential moment for the United States to be choosing its next leader. This inaugural report by the CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department offers insights and policy recommendations for the road forward.

Victor Cha is the president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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Victor Cha

Senior Vice President for Asia and Korea Chair