Lessons from Israel’s Last War in Lebanon

Commentary by Daniel Byman

Published October 2, 2024

As Israeli troops enter Lebanon to conduct what its officials called "limited, localized, and targeted raids" against Hezbollah positions along the border, they would do well to remember, and learn from, their problems in their last major operation there in 2006. The legacy of Israel's last war in Lebanon has shaped both Hezbollah and Israeli approaches to conflict. Israel's impressive strikes on Hezbollah in recent months suggest that they are unlikely to repeat the tactical disasters of 2006, but solving the broader strategic dilemmas Hezbollah poses will be far harder.

In July 2006, after two weeks of heavy bombing of Hezbollah positions, Israel sent thousands of troops into Lebanon as part of its "Operation Change of Direction," assuming they would sweep aside the defenders. Disaster after disaster ensued. A lucky Hezbollah rocket strike killed 12 paratrooper reservists in Kfar Giladi, inside Israel. Hezbollah forces in Lebanon fought from tunnels, hiding from Israeli forces and at times popping up to ambush them. Hezbollah ambushed an Israeli armored column in the Saluki Valley, blocking the road in front of and behind the column and then firing volley after volley of anti-tank missiles into the helpless Israeli forces, which lacked supporting artillery and infantry. As Timur Goksel, who advised UN forces in Lebanon, noted, "Anyone dumb enough to push a tank column through Wadi Saluki should not be an armored brigade commander but a cook."

Even as Israeli soldiers floundered in Lebanon, Hezbollah rained down rockets on Israeli homes and workplaces throughout the entire 34 days of the war. Israel's international reputation also suffered, as human rights groups and international media criticized Israel for its bombing of Hezbollah facilities in civilian neighborhoods. Even though Hezbollah lost many fighters in 2006, its successful defiance of Israel electrified Arab audiences, and the group's popularity soared.

Although the war concluded with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which banned Hezbollah forces from going near the Israeli border and bolstered the peacekeeping presence there, Hezbollah quickly learned that these peacekeepers were not going to stand in its way. Hezbollah fighters, at times under the cover of the fake environmental organization "Green without Borders," reentered the area.

Hezbollah's weapons investments after 2006 followed the logic of the war. Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah's leader until his assassination by Israel last week, had long argued that Israel was a "spider web," which from far away looked strong but could easily be swept aside. The political effectiveness of striking Israel with rockets and missiles during the war highlighted the country's casualty sensitivity: Hezbollah, unlike Israel, was willing to sacrifice.

The group massively expanded its already-large rocket and missile arsenals, with the total number rising to between 120,000 and 200,000. This arsenal has some precision-guided systems as well as many long-range systems that can hit all of Israel. Hezbollah also continued to put military weapons and forces in civilian areas and train its ground forces to repel an Israeli invasion, including by extending its tunnel network.

Israel, too, prepared for another round of war, and this time, they did not blithely assume that they could easily sweep aside Hezbollah. The detonation of Hezbollah beepers and pagers, the repeated assassinations of senior Hezbollah commanders, and the killing of Nasrallah all are stunning Israeli intelligence successes.

Israel's military has also trained regularly in preparation for a war with Hezbollah-"We worry about Iran, train against Hezbollah, and fight Palestinians," noted an Israeli security official during a visit to the northern border last year.

As Israel's war in Gaza and the recent weeks in Lebanon make clear, Israel's doctrine for the use of force has also become more destructive -- that, too, is a lesson of 2006. Israel Defense Forces Northern Commander leader, Major General Gadi Eisenkot, warned after the 2006 war that the next time Israel would destroy "every village from which Israel is fired on" to make Hezbollah pay a high price for its actions. Israel probably is less concerned about damaging its international reputation than it was in 2006: after the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians in Gaza, killing more in Lebanon is not likely to make it worse.

Hezbollah, recognizing the risk of a far more damaging war, has been hesitant to escalate to an all-out war so far, in part because it fears the anger of other Lebanese. The country has suffered a multiyear political and economic crisis, and a greater conflict would make a bad situation much worse.

Yet the war with Hezbollah remains a roll of the dice even though recent Israeli operations are tilting the odds in Jerusalem's favor. As Hezbollah's 2006 rocket strike on Kfar Giladi suggests, an operation can go from an apparent success to a bloody failure in the blink of an eye. If Hezbollah unleashes its vast rocket and missile arsenal, this war has the potential to be far worse than 2006 given the greater size of its forces and the range of many of the systems. It is unclear, however, if Hezbollah will, or even can, unleash much of its massive arsenal given Israeli strikes on its personnel, launchers, and communication disruptions and its concerns about an all-out war.

In addition to the short-term risks, Israel's long-term plan for Lebanon is unclear. Occupying Lebanon is a nonstarter, and Hezbollah forces can retreat deeper and deeper into the country if they need to limit their casualties. Indeed, Hezbollah forces may try to drag out the war, exhausting Israel, which is fighting on multiple fronts.

Israel may seek some sort of buffer zone along its border, but it is not clear who would police it. This was a goal in 2006, and Hezbollah was able to circumvent it. Hezbollah remains the strongest organization in Lebanon, and neither UN forces nor the country's military stopped the group. The greater destructiveness of the Israeli campaign may make Hezbollah more cautious this time, especially if Israel backs it up with continued strikes in response to buffer zone violations. However, maintaining that consistently over time is a difficult feat.

The best hope for Israel is that it pushes Hezbollah back and the United States can negotiate a ceasefire. Hezbollah would then lick its many wounds. Israel, in turn, would again fall back on keeping Hezbollah deterred, with both sides preparing to fight another day.

Daniel Byman is a senior fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and a professor at Georgetown University.

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