11/06/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 11/06/2024 14:33
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Commentary by Benjamin Jensen
Published November 6, 2024
Americans across the aisle need to put aside our differences and draft a common blueprint for foreign policy and grand strategy for the next four years. Democrats can find compromises with Republicans to forge a new consensus that speaks directly to Trump voters' concerns about economic policy and migration. And Republicans can find ways to speak to Harris voters' concerns about maintaining the international partnerships America needs to address ongoing conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa and deter a larger conflict in the Asia-Pacific. This compromise starts with putting the trepidations of voters who swept Trump into the White House front and center and assessing them in relation to the larger trends shaping the global security environment in 2024.
First, the security environment in 2024 is not the same as 2016 or 2020. Major wars now engulf Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Global and regional order are breaking down, creating a risk of runaway conflict. Furthermore, wars are exacerbating migration and inflation concerns that were on the mind of the American public as they went to the polls. In other words, the next administration can focus on economic policy and migration-as the Trump campaign promised, and in a more deliberate, humane manner than campaign rhetoric suggested-but it cannot do so without dealing with the reality of addressing ongoing conflicts.
This produces the first area for compromise. President Trump can play the role of shrewd negotiator-using personal, high-level engagements-to address ongoing conflicts. Yet, it must start with an agreement that the United States will not abandon Ukraine (or NATO) and will work with a wide range of partners to address other regional conflicts, as he did in the Abraham Accords.
Second, if foreign policy reflects the will of the voters guided by elected officials, then the Trump administration will need a strategy that puts economic interests on the same level as security interests. America likely cannot go back to the ideal expressed in George Washington's Fairwell Address of free trade and neutrality, much less Taft's tariffs, but it can shape a new era of global economic relations that lifts up those voters-across the world-that feel left behind by globalization and automation. Making America great again starts with listening to communities that have seen declines in public health-largely linked to the ongoing drug crisis-alongside aspects of economic well-being that are linked to stable employment. Too many Americans are surviving on credit card debt and gig-economy side hustles, creating a significant disconnect compared to record corporate profits and stock market returns. You can't put families first if no one is home to eat meals together. It also means that the president can revisit the bipartisan Senate effort to secure the border and avoid the more drastic proposals for mass deportations almost certain to trigger an economic shock.
This produces the second area for compromise: President Trump can and should use the tax system to promote American trade interests and the key industries required to promote twenty-first-century growth-something his predecessor did as well through the CHIPS Act and Build Back Better Framework-but should avoid the extremes highlighted on the campaign trail. Trump showed his ability to negotiate trade deals in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. He can build on that and use economic policy to address domestic American concerns and create better linkages between democracies. New trade and investment deals that promote American growth, for example, could be used to build deeper inroads in the Asia-Pacific that offer well-paying jobs in the United States and an alternative to authoritarian China. In fact, the resulting economy-focused strategy could serve as a bridge for engaging the Chinese Communist Party at senior levels from a position of strength.
Third, both the character of war and prevailing power balances are in flux globally, signaling further geopolitical risks on the horizon. First, the costs of precision strike continue to decline, creating a world where even poor states and insurgents can hold maritime traffic and overseas bases at risk. The same is true in cyberspace. Countries that are economic basket cases like Iran and North Korea can still afford robust cyber capabilities.
On top of this trend, high debt levels and an aging population will limit the nation's ability to convert economic power into military capability at the exact same moment the United States needs to modernize to match China's drive to win the battle for AI supremacy. This trade-off will only be made more complex by the rising costs of national disasters, leaving horrible choices between raising the debt and burdening future generations, modernizing the military, or paying for hurricane, fire, and flood relief. The United States cannot ignore a world on fire, especially when the aftermath triggers additional waves of migration and inflation that deepen domestic political divides in America. At the same time, Washington-whoever is in charge-cannot ignore economic reality.
As a result, the Trump administration will need to find a way to modernize the military with an eye on cost savings and cutting bureaucratic red tape. The win for Democrats is a continuation of building a military that can deliver the promise of integrated deterrence. The win for Republicans is that they can deliver on their promise to reform the government.
Compromise in turn can trigger new defense paradigms. The instincts of the Trump campaign to cut waste in government and search for efficiencies are not unwarranted. For decades, both parties and most nonpartisan analysts have decried the design of the national security bureaucracy. This byzantine web often stifles timely decisionmaking under the auspices of interagency coordination. Why not explore how to use advances in AI/ML to facilitate strategic analysis? Productivity gains don't have to be limited to the private sector, and exploring reforms doesn't mean firing all civil servants.
This produces the third area of compromise: Trump's team-which will almost certainly include a novel mix of tech titans and entrepreneurs-can accelerate the use of AI/ML and unmanned systems in the Department of Defense while starting a rigorous process of reforming-not destroying-the national security enterprise. This system can be an inherently public-private partnership that invests in American industry and a twenty-first-century arsenal of democracy that employs Americans and supports frontline democracies. Unmanned systems can replace rising personnel costs in the military and provide more flexible options for supporting U.S. interests and partners overseas.
Despite the mix of emotions in the divided American electorate right now, there is a clear path for a foreign policy built around a consensus that addresses the concerns of the public. The largest risk on the horizon is inaction and allowing partisan debates, often amplified by foreign powers, to further divide the nation. Factions are the death of democracy. Common vision and compromise can provide a foundation for solving the vexing collective-action problems of the twenty-first century.
Benjamin Jensen is a senior fellow for Futures Lab in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., and the Frank E. Petersen Chair of Emerging Technology and professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting. The views expressed are his own as a private citizen.
Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
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