R 142012Z NOV 24
MARADMIN 547/24
MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC PPO PO//
SUBJ/EMPLOYMENT OF CRASH-RATED ACTIVE VEHICLE BARRIERS//
REF/A/OUSD I&S Memorandum DoD Memorandum-Employment of
Active
Barriers, May 13, 2024//
REF/B/MCO 5530.13//
REF/C/DEPSECDEF Memorandum-Installation Security and
Unauthorized Installation Access, April 4, 2019//
REF/D/OUSD I&S Installation Security and Unauthorized
Installation Access Reporting Requirements, September 7,
2021//
REF/E/DoDM 5200.08, Vol 3, Physical Security Program:
Access to DoD Installations, September 18, 2020//
REF/F/UFC 4-022-01/July 27, 2017//
REF/G/UFC 4-022-02/June 8, 2009//
REF/H/DoDD 5210.56, Arming and the Use of Force, November
18, 2016//
REF/I/MCO 5500.6H//
REF/J/ CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of
Engagement/Standing
Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, June 18, 2008
(CONTENT IS CLASSIFIED)//
REF/K/MCO 5210.11F//
REF/L/MCO 5530.14A//
REF/M/MCO 3302.1F//
REF/N/Naval Message R1014444Z JUN 22 - USMC Reporting
Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (SUAS and
Unauthorized Installation Incidents Worldwide (MOD1)//
REF/O/Naval Message R281529Z JUN24 â€" Updated USMC
Reporting Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft//
REFERENCE (A) IS THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY MEMORANDUM ADDRESSING THE
EMPLOYMENT OF ACTIVE VEHICLE BARRIERS.
NARR/REFERENCE (B) IS THE MARINE CORPS SITE PERIMETER
ACCESS CONTROL ORDER.
REFERENCE (C) IS THE DEPSECDEF MEMORANDUM THAT DEFINES
ATTEMPTED AND SUCCESSFUL UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATION ACCESS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE STOPS.
REFERENCE (D) IS THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY MEMORANDUM THAT FURTHER
ADDRESSES UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATION ACCESS AND REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS.
REFERENCE (E) IS THE DOD MANUAL PROVIDING POLICY FOR
ACCESS CONTROL TO DOD INSTALLATIONS.
REFERENCE (F) IS UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA 4-022-01,
SECURITY ENGINEERING: ENTRY CONTROL FACILITIES/ACCESS
CONTROL POINTS.
REFERENCE (G) IS UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA
4-022-02, SELECTION AND APPLICATION OF VEHICLE BARRIERS.
REFERENCE (H) IS THE DOD DIRECTIVE ARMING AND THE USE OF
FORCE. REFERENCE (I) IS THE ARMING OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE USE OF FORCE MARINE CORPS
ORDER.
REFERENCE (J) IS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
INSTRUCTION, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/STANDING RULES
FOR THE USE OF FORCE FOR US FORCES. REFERENCE (K) IS THE
MARINE CORPS RECORDS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM. REFERENCE (L) IS
THE MARINE CORPS PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM MANUAL.
REFERENCE (M) IS THE AUTOMATED MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEM
MESSAGE THAT PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
FOR SUAS INCIDENTS, INCURSIONS, AND C-SUASENGAGEMENTS.
REFERENCE (N) IS THE AUTOMATED MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEM
MESSAGE THAT CONSOLIDATES AND CLARIFIES SMALL UNMANNED
AIRCRAFT SYSTEM-RELATED REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN
REFERENCE (M). //
POC/T. PIERCE/CIV/PP&O POP/[email protected]/
(703) 695-7202//
POC/K. PANG/GYSGT/PP&O POP/[email protected]/
(703) 692-4272//
POC/M. TOOPS/CTR/PP&O POP/[email protected]/
(703) 692-4234//
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. Physical security is critical to
ensuring mission readiness and the safety and security of
Marines, service members, their families, and civilians
aboard Marine Corps sites. Access control is a key element
of physical security, ensuring only authorized personnel
and visitors gain access to our sites and installations.
Drivers of vehicles that breach the site security perimeter
Entry Control Facility (ECF)/Access Control Point (ACP)
without authorization pose a threat to site security
personnel, occupants of the installation, and the assets
and resources supporting Fleet Marine Force missions. The
employment of crash-rated active vehicle barriers (AVBs),
also identified as Final Denial Barriers, are highly
effective in preventing breaches when such barriers are
present, operable, and properly installed as outlined
below. This MARADMIN implements reference (a), reinforces
unauthorized installation access guidelines, and provides
guidance on the employment of crash-rated active vehicle
barriers during installation access control operations.
This MARADMIN addresses required notifications, as
directed in reference (a), for AVBs that are improperly
placed and AVBs that are inoperable for more than 30 total
days in a 12-month period.
2. Background. Marine Corps site perimeter access control
requirements contained in reference (b) require all
persons entering Marine Corps sites to have their identity
established and verified, be determined fit for access,
and establish a purpose for access.
3. Unauthorized Installation Access. Reference (c)
addresses unauthorized installation access and provides:
3.A. Attempted unauthorized installation access is defined
as one or more individuals attempting to enter the
installation without both completing the proper access
control procedure and being granted access by security
personnel, regardless of their intent.
3.B. Successful unauthorized installation access is
defined as one or more individuals proceeding past the
final point at which they would be forced to stop, such as
by a crash-rated vehicle or denial barrier at an entry
control point or by a perimeter fence or wall, regardless
of their intent.
3.C. Administrative stops, by a non-rated barrier (e.g.,
concrete/jersey barriers, tire shredders, etc.) or
pursuing security forces, are considered a successful
unauthorized installation access if they occur past the
final point at which they would be forced to stop (i.e.,
beyond the site ECF/ACP).
3.D. Reference (d) identifies that an attempt to enter the
installation includes proceeding in the direction onto the
installation, past the point where the individual first
begins the access control process required in references
(b) and (e).
3.E. Reference (d) notes that an individual who is denied
access during the access control process and departs the
installation through a turnaround conducted under the
continuous control of security personnel is not considered
to have attempted to access the installation.
4. Employment of crash-rated AVBs. Reference (a) provides
that an AVB is a barrier that can be configured to either
permit or deny entry of a vehicle and can be quickly
switched between two configurations through an action by
security personnel; and employment of an AVB is taking
action to switch an AVB to the configuration in which a
vehicle is denied entry. Reference (a) further notes:
4.A. Site commanders are responsible for ensuring security
personnel are able to quickly, confidently, and
appropriately employ any crash-rated AVBs present at the
installation to mitigate threats, control access to the
installation, and protect the installation and its
personnel. DoD analysis of reporting of attempted and
successful unauthorized installation access events show
that security personnel often do not employ present,
operable AVBs during the events and these decisions often
lead to unauthorized
installation access resulting in the breach of the
installation perimeter when it could reasonably have been
prevented.
4.B. A crash-rated AVB is not likely to cause death or
serious bodily harm when it is properly placed, which
means when it is placed in a manner that a typical
approaching driver is likely able to see it with
sufficient time and distance to slow or stop before
contacting the AVB. Factors that determine whether a
crash-rated AVB is properly placed include, but are not
limited to, lighting, signage, the barrier's paint scheme
and the barriers physical location relative to the
ECF/ACP. There remains a risk of collateral
damage to vehicles and occupants other than the intended
target when an AVB is deployed. Site security personnel
must maintain awareness of drivers of vehicles in adjacent
lanes who may be unaware of the AVB activation and may
still face risks due to the limited time they have to
react. This risk can be reduced through training and
methods outlined in reference (f). Reference (f) provides
guidance related to the planning, design, and further
requirements for an ECF/ACP while reference (g) provides
guidance for planning, design, construction, and
maintenance of vehicle barriers, to include AVBs.
5. Employment of AVBs. Reference (a) directs:
5.A. Site security personnel at an ECF/ACP in the United
States will employ a properly placed crash-rated AVB that
is present and operable when the apparent intent of a
driver of an inbound vehicle is to breach the installation
security perimeter without authorization, unless security
personnel can determine and clearly articulate how:
5.A.1. The driver does not pose a threat; or
5.A.2. The use of a crash-rated AVB would not be
objectively reasonable based on the totality of the
circumstances, including the visibility of the AVB at the
time of the breach.
5.B. Site security personnel will be expected to
specifically articulate the rationale behind their
decision not to employ a properly placed crash-rated AVB,
and when their decisions are not objectively reasonable,
commanders must direct remedial training.
5.C. Commanders should consider appropriate disciplinary
or administrative actions for security personnel who
inexplicably or unreasonably fail to employ AVBs in such
a manner consistent with this guidance on a repeated basis.
5.D. Commanders, with support from the site Provost
Marshal, Police Chief, or Security Officer, and servicing
legal office will establish, maintain, and regularly train
security personnel on:
5.D.1. Standards for determining objective reasonableness
when using force consistent with the law, and
references (h), (i) and (j);
5.D.2. Procedures for the employment of all crash-rated
AVBs present at the site, including AVB response and
cycle times; and
5.D.3. Circumstances and situations which would preclude
the employment of a properly placed crash-rated AVB.
5.E. Testing. Site commanders are responsible for properly
maintaining AVBs and will ensure AVBs are tested at least
monthly in accordance with reference (a). Tests will be
recorded manually or electronically, and records will be
maintained in accordance with reference (j).
6. Required Notifications.
6.A. As directed in reference (a), the following
notifications are required:
6.A.1. Within 30 days of a determination that a present,
operable crash-rated AVB is improperly placed; and/or
6.A.2. It is determined that a crash-rated AVB present at
the installation has been inoperable for more than 30 days
in any 12 month period.
6.A.3. Marine Corps Sites
6.A.3.A. Marine Corps Installations. For the incidents
outlined in paragraph 6.A.1 and 6.A.2, commanders are
required to notify the Deputy Commandant (DC)
Installations and Logistics (I&L) (COMMCICOM G3) and the
DC Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O), Protection
Branch (POP) at CMC PPO POP WASHINGTON DC, via the
Automated Message Handling System (AMHS), including the
chain of command. Service Level Training Installations
will ensure that the CG TECOM is included in all
notifications. COMMCICOM G3 is further required to notify
the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (OUSD)
Intelligence and Security (I&S), via
e-mail at the OUSD I&S organization mailbox:
osd.pentagon.ousd-intel-sec.mbx.dod-physical-security@mail
.mil, upon notification, and include the PP&O, Operations
Division Protection Branch, Physical Security
organizational organization mailbox at
[email protected].
6.A.3.B. Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) Sites. For the
incidents outlined in paragraph 6.A.1 and 6.A.2,
commanders are required to notify the Commander, MARFORRES
(COMMARFORRES) and the DC PP&O, Protection Branch (POP),
at CMC PPO POP WASHINGTON DC, via the AMHS, including the
chain of command. COMMARFORRES is further required to
notify OUSD I&S, via e-mail at the OUSD I&S organization
mailbox: -osd.pentagon.ousd-intel-sec.mbx.dod-physical-
[email protected], upon notification, and include the
PP&O, Operations Division Protection Branch, Physical
Security organizational mailbox:
[email protected].
6.B. Notifications are intended to facilitate the
development of a corrective action plan.
7. Coordination. This MARADMIN has been coordinated with
the DC I&L, CG TECOM, COMMARFORRES, and Headquarters
Marine Corps Judge Advocate Division.
8. Administration and Logistics
8.A. Guidance contained in this MARADMIN will be included
into the references (i) and (l) update.
8.B. Commanders at sites outside of the United States will
coordinate and deconflict the contents of this MARADMIN
with the appropriate Geographical Combatant Commands and
Sub-Unified Command.
8.C. This MARADMIN is applicable to the Total Force.
8.D. This MARADMIN shall remain in effect until the
contents of this MARADMIN are incorporated into the update
to references (i) and (k).
8.E. Commanders will ensure all measures are integrated
into and synchronized with their Antiterrorism Plans in
accordance with reference (m).
8.F. Commanders are reminded that reporting of all
incursions is required and will be conducted in accordance
with references (n) and (o).
9. Release authorized by Lieutenant General J. W. Bierman,
Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations.//