Treasury Takes Action as Part of a U.S. Government Response to Russia’s Foreign Malign Influence Operations

The United States takes action to defend and protect U.S. election institutions and processes from Moscow's attempts to influence the 2024 Presidential Election

WASHINGTON - Today, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 10 individuals and two entities as part of a coordinated U.S. government response to Moscow's malign influence efforts targeting the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Russian state-sponsored actors have long used a variety of tools, such as generative artificial intelligence (AI) deep fakes and disinformation, in an attempt to undermine confidence in the United States' election processes and institutions. Beginning in early 2024, executives at RT-Russia's state-funded news media outlet-began an even more nefarious effort to covertly recruit unwitting American influencers in support of their malign influence campaign. RT used a front company to disguise its own involvement or the involvement of the Russian government in content meant to influence U.S. audiences.

"Today's action underscores the U.S. government's ongoing efforts to hold state-sponsored actors accountable for activities that aim to deteriorate public trust in our institutions," said Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen. "Treasury will not waver in our commitment to safeguarding our democratic principles and the integrity of our election systems."

Today's designations complement law enforcement actions taken by the Department of Justice and the Department of State's designation of the Rossiya Segodnya media group and five of its subsidiaries, RIA Novosti, RT, TV-Novosti, Ruptly, and Sputnik, as Foreign Missions, steps to impose visa restrictions, and release of a Rewards for Justice (RFJ) reward offer of up to $10 million relating to information pertaining to foreign interference in a U.S. election.

RUSSIAN Foreign malign influence Operations

The Kremlin employs an array of tools, including covert foreign malign influence campaigns and illicit cyber activities, to undermine the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and its allies and partners globally. Russia routinely uses its intelligence services, government-directed proxies, and covert influence tools in these efforts. The Kremlin has increasingly adapted its efforts to hide its involvement by developing a vast ecosystem of Russian proxy websites, fake online personas, and front organizations that give the false appearance of being independent news sources unconnected to the Russian state.

Today's designations follow prior OFAC actions that have highlighted and disrupted Russia's global malign influence campaigns, including Kremlin-directed malign influence efforts, interference in U.S. elections, efforts to subvert democracy in Moldova, destabilization activities in Ukraine, and the operation of outlets controlled by Russian intelligence services, among others.

RT EXECUTIVES' and RaHDit Members' Russian Government Influence Operations

RT, formerly Russia Today, is a Russian state-funded news outlet that began broadcasting internationally in 2005. In 2017, RT registered as an agent of a foreign government in the United States. Beginning in early 2024, RT executives began an effort to covertly recruit unwitting American influencers. RT used a front company to disguise its own involvement or the involvement of the Russian government.

Margarita Simonovna Simonyan (Simonyan) is the Editor-in-Chief of RT and a central figure in Russian government malign influence efforts. She allowed the operations of a front company to occur under the cover of RT. Elizaveta Yuryevna Brodskaia (Brodskaia) is the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of RT, who has reported to Russian President Putin and other government officials. Anton Sergeyvich Anisimov (Anisimov) is an RT Deputy Editor-in-Chief, who conducts activities on behalf of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Andrey Vladimirovich Kiyashko (Kiyashko) is the Deputy Director of the RT English-Language Information Broadcasting and is responsible for updating Russian government officials and providing an overview of RT's operations. Konstantin Kalashnikov (Kalashnikov) is RT's Digital Media Projects Manager, who, in early 2022, worked with Kiyashko. In mid-2023, Brodskaia and Kiyashko implemented a large-scale influence operation for RT on U.S. social media with the intent of obscuring RT's connection to the content meant to influence online audiences. Elena Mikhaylovna Afanasyeva (Afanasyeva) is an employee of RT's Digital Media Projects Department and reports to Kalashnikov. Starting in early 2024, Afanasyeva covertly interacted with prominent U.S. social media influencers under the cover of a fake persona, purporting to be an employee at a U.S. company to obscure RT's and the Russian government's involvement.

The pro-Kremlin hacktivist group RaHDit is composed of active and former Russian intelligence officers. Aleksey Alekseyevich Garashchenko (Garashchenko) is the head of RaHDit and was an FSB officer at the time he started leading the group. Garashchenko directly interacts with members of the Russian intelligence and security services, members of the Russian Presidential Administration, and employees from RT. Anastasia Igorevna Yermoshkina (Yermoshkina) is an affiliate of Garashchenko. Aleksandr Vitalyevich Nezhentsev (Nezhentsev) works with Garashchenko and is an administrator and developer of cyber tools used by the FSB. Nezhentsev also leads a team focusing on developing new tools that can be used in the surveillance of information data files.

Today, OFAC designated Simonyan, Brodskaia, Anisimov, Kiyashko, Kalashnikov, Afanasyeva, Garashchenko, Yermoshkina, and Nezhentsev pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation.

Doppelgänger and RRN Russian Malign Influence Operations

Autonomous Non-Profit Organization (ANO) Dialog (ANO Dialog) is a Russian nonprofit organization founded in 2019 by the Moscow city government that leverages AI technology in online Russian disinformation for use against election campaigns. ANO Dialog Regions (Dialog Regions) is ANO Dialog's subsidiary organization that is co-located at their Moscow headquarters and also has offices throughout Russia.

Vladimir Grigoryevich Tabak (Tabak) is the Director General of both ANO Dialog and Dialog Regions. He previously held several positions in the Russian Presidential Administration.

ANO Dialog is linked to Doppelgänger-a Russia-linked influence operation network identified in 2022-that used deep fake content to develop Russian disinformation campaigns. In fall 2022, Tabak was expected to attend a meeting with senior Russian government officials. The meeting discussed the presumed success of the Doppelgänger activity and provided feedback and guidance on future projects.

In July 2022, ANO Dialog and Tabak provided services to the Russian government, working on a project for the creation of fake online posts on popular social media accounts, including "Reliable Recent News" ("RRN") and "War on Fakes"-a Russian disinformation website publicly linked to the Doppelgänger activity-that would be composed of counterfeit documents, among other material, in order to elicit an emotional response from the audiences of these accounts. An ANO Dialog advisor purchased RRN's new domain, "rrn.world" in order to avoid using the former domain, "rrussianews.com," which would have maintained a connection to Russia. Tabak also coordinated with ANO Dialog and the Russian government on the payment of services for an RRN-affiliate translator.

In late fall 2023, ANO Dialog personnel identified U.S., UK, and other public figures as potential targets for deepfake projects. Because of this, the EU sanctioned ANO Dialog for its role in the disinformation network and specifically as the owner and operator of the "War on Fakes" website. In May 2024, Tabak and several Dialog Regions officials coordinated with Russian government officials regarding the creation of bot accounts on popular social media messaging platforms for use in a misinformation campaign regarding voting locations in the U.S. 2024 election.

Today, OFAC designated ANO Dialog pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation; Dialog Regions pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, ANO Dialog; and Tabak pursuant to E.O. 14024 for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation and for being a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of ANO Dialog and Dialog Regions, persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024.

Also today, the Federal Bureau of Investigation announced the seizure of domains associated with RRN/ANO Dialog and Social Design Agency (SDA)-which OFAC had previously designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for its activities on behalf of the Russian government-that have been used in furtherance of the Russian Doppelgänger disinformation efforts targeting the United States and Europe.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

As a result of today's action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.

In addition, financial institutions and other persons that engage in certain transactions or activities with the sanctioned persons may expose themselves to sanctions or be subject to an enforcement action. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC's ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, please refer toOFAC's Frequently Asked Question 897 here. For detailed information on the process to submit a request for removal from an OFAC sanctions list, please click here.

Click here for more information on the individuals and entities designated today.

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