08/30/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 08/30/2024 02:54
Failure of an aileron control cable fitting in climb
France - BEA
After experiencing slight turbulence during the initial climb, the pilot moved the wheel to bring the wings level. During this action, an aileron control cable fitting failed, probably as a result of stress corrosion cracking in a warm, humid, salt-laden environment. This failure meant that the wheel could not control right roll while still being able to control left roll. This malfunction led to a high risk of an in-flight loss of control. The pilot and passenger, both experienced pilots, were able to diagnose the situation and adopt a strategy to return and land while controlling this risk.
While the aeroplane was being examined by the maintenance workshop, the left flap control cable fitting failed, also due to stress corrosion cracking.
The BEA issues 2 safety recommendations:
- Taking into account risk of failure of a flight control [Recommendations FRAN-2024-012 & FRAN-2024-013]
The BEA recommends that:
- considering that the phenomenon of stress corrosion to which certain flight control cable fittings made of 'AISI 303 Se' stainless steel are particularly susceptible has been identified for many years;
- considering that the failure of a primary flight control exposes the pilot to a high risk of loss of control in flight;
- considering that the FAA has issued airworthiness directives to address this phenomenon on certain types of aircraft;
- considering that the occurrence of events such as the one involving the F-OOOO illustrates the persistence of the risk on other types of aircraft not covered by the airworthiness directives issued by the FAA and highlights the overall ineffectiveness of the process based on the publication of SAIB and/or SIB by certification authorities;
the FAA identify all aeroplane types likely to be equipped with flight control cable attach fittings made of AISI 303 Se stainless steel and, for those, impose appropriate corrective actions.
EASA identify all aeroplane types operated by the Member States likely to be equipped with flight control cable attach fittings made of AISI 303 Se stainless steel and, for those, impose appropriate corrective actions, where appropriate in coordination with primary certification authorities.
The recommendations are being processed
The status of the recommendations is available at SRIS2: click here
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Note: in accordance with the provisions of Article 17.3 of Regulation No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation, a safety recommendation in no case creates a presumption of fault or liability in an accident, serious incident or incident. The recipients of safety recommendations report to the issuing authority in charge of safety investigations, on the measures taken or being studied for their implementation, as provided for in Article 18 of the aforementioned regulation.
Local date | 18/02/2022 |
Responsible entity | France - BEA |
State or area of occurrence | France - 971 Guadeloupe |
Location | Les Saintes Terre-de-Haut AD |
Human consequences | None |
Aircraft consequences | Minor |
Occurrence class | Serious incident |
Occurence category | SCF-NP: System/component failure or malfunction [non-powerplant] |
File number | BEA2022-0058 |
Aircraft category | Aeroplane - Small aeroplane |
Operator | France (Aéroclub de l' Aviation Civile de Guadeloupe) |
Manufacturer / Model | CESSNA - 172 |
Aircraft Registration | F-OOOO |
State of registry | France |
Last departure point | French Antilles - TFFS (LSS): Les Saintes Terre-De-Haut |
Planned destination | French Antilles - TFFR (PTP): Pointe-A-Pitre Le Raizet |
Flight phase | Take-off |
Serial number | 172S9608 |
Operator Type AG | Flying club/school |
Operation Type | Non-Commercial Operations - Pleasure - Cross Country |
BEA is the French air safety investigation authority for civil aviation. The sole objective of the investigation is to improve air safety. It is intended neither to apportion blame nor to assess responsiblity.