Debating Global South Reactions to Russian Nuclear Threats

Commentary by Heather WilliamsandJ. Luis Rodriguez

Published July 30, 2024

Heather Williams is the director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and senior fellow in the International Security Program at CSIS. She recently wrote a piece arguing that the Global South should more forcefully and publicly condemn Russia's nuclear threats, such as nuclear drills. J. Luis Rodriguez is an assistant professor of international security and law at George Mason University's Schar School for Policy and Government, who studies the interests and lawmaking strategies of the Global South in global security governance. In the following, Heather and Luis debate whether Russia has suffered any costs in the Global South for its nuclear saber-rattling and how the United States might more actively engage the Global South.

Heather: I recently wrote a piece arguing the Global South should do more to call out Russian nuclear saber-rattling. I argued that part of the reason Russia keeps doing things like nuclear exercises and increasing nuclear risks is because there are no costs for doing so. Western countries have certainly condemned it, but countries in Africa and Latin America have been largely quiet. But Luis, I believe you disagree with me on this one?

Luis: I agree that the international community should condemn nuclear threats more forcefully. But countries in the Global South have not been silent. They have expressed their dissatisfaction over the increasing salience of nuclear weapons globally. For example, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries expressed their concerns about nuclear tensions publicly and loudly at a meeting of the UN General Assembly in October 2023. Also, at the Second Meeting of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Ban Treaty, in November 2023, representatives from developing countries publicly criticized nuclear-armed states for modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals and threatening to detonate nuclear weapons. So, the Global South has called out nuclear saber-rattling.

Developing countries have also argued that recent nuclear developments hinder progress toward nuclear disarmament. They have rejected the notion that there is a difference between responsible and irresponsible nuclear practices, such as nuclear sharing or nuclear exercises. Granted, Global South countries have not responded immediately, collectively, and loudly against Russia specifically, much like the United States and its allies have done.

The cohesive response of the United States and its allies against Russia's nuclear saber-rattling is not surprising. The United States has invested significantly in these relationships, understanding allies' preferences and aligning interests. The same level of investment has yet to be made in the Global South. Russia has deployed economic, diplomatic, and political resources to engage countries in the Global South in nuclear forums, primarily to blame Western states for paralysis in these talks. And Russia has been able to exploit the Global South's discontent with Western approaches toward nuclear issues and governance. So, it is not surprising either that developing countries have taken their time to react and that some are reluctant to call out Russian nuclear actions particularly.

It's fair to say that the Global South's process of responding to Russia's nuclear threats has been slow, divided, and not specific enough about Russia. But it does not mean there is no response or there are no costs for Russia in the Global South. For instance, Russia is an observer in the NAM and has expressed interest in participating in talks related to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In response, the NAM adopted a new rule that only allows non-nuclear-weapon states to participate in these meetings. While the resolution does not name Russia specifically, the result has frustrated Russian diplomats. It also shows that countries in the Global South might be receptive to Russia's criticism of Western dominance in global nuclear governance. Still, these countries are not automatically giving Russia a blank check for its nuclear actions.

Heather: I particularly appreciate your point that Russia has done more to engage Global South countries on these issues than the United States has. It's important that we also keep this in the context of wider U.S. geostrategic competition. As you know, strategic thinking in the United States is currently focused on how to deter two peer competitors. The bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture Commission of the United States, for example, stated in its 2023 report that "America's defense strategy and strategic posture must change in order to properly defend its vital interests and improve strategic stability with China and Russia." The report also points to the role for diplomacy and a "whole-of-government" approach to challenge Russian and Chinese nuclear expansion and regional ambitions. Amid these policy debates about how to deter two peer competitors, though, I'm often left wondering: What or who are we competing for? To be sure, U.S. allies and influence over the international order are at stake. But Global South countries are integral to achieving those objectives and are an oft-unspoken part of the discussion. Russia and China certainly see the Global South as part of the competition, and influence there is one of the many stakes of this great power competition. My article and your initial response focused on Russia, but China is arguably even more influential in the Global South.

Luis: The question about China and the Global South is important and complicated. China uses different strategies depending on particular regions and even particular countries in the Global South. It does not have a one-policy-fits-all approach. Let me explain my answer with examples from Latin America, my region of expertise. In this region, China has slowly but effectively increased its economic presence by deepening its engagement in trade, finance, investment, and technology transfers. But this engagement varies depending on the country.

In contrast, the United States remains the primary security partner of most Latin American countries. China has limited its military reach to Latin America, perhaps to avoid confrontations with the United States. The U.S. Southern Command constantly conducts naval exercises with Latin American countries, and the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation guarantees close contact and collaboration between the United States and Latin American armed forces. The United States also remains Latin America's preferred partner to develop domestic nuclear capabilities. The United States has increased its cooperation with some Latin American countries, such as Mexico, to help them master peaceful uses of nuclear energy. China has also limited its nuclear cooperation with Latin America, except for helping Argentina build a new nuclear plant. Despite this context, some U.S. officials have portrayed the increasing China-Latin America partnership as a potential security threat.

Heather: I appreciate that the term "Global South" itself is problematic and lumps together a very diverse group of states, regionally and politically. What is an alternate term? Undeclared countries? Neutral states? Or would it be better to refer to them by specific region? On nuclear issues, for example, Mexico is a leader in multilateral forums and pushing for progress on nuclear disarmament, whereas other countries such as Malaysia are particularly worried about nuclear smuggling and export controls. Do you think there are obvious small groupings or distinctions we should make among developing countries when it comes to talking about nuclear issues? Or should they be considered on a state-by-state basis?

Luis: The term we use to talk about developing countries should depend on the nuclear issue. "Global South" is a helpful category for understanding the projects and reforms in global nuclear governance that developing countries support, like the Ban Treaty. Regional distinctions are also useful for understanding the specific geopolitical challenges countries face, like the Indo-Pacific as a concept, or the regional nuclear risk reduction measures these states promote, like nuclear-weapon-free zones, for instance.

However, I do not think the "Global South" is the most useful analytical category in nuclear politics. Using the term as an umbrella category to criticize developing countries silences the actions and condemnations of some of these nations just because they are not collectively reacting. In contrast, the "West" might be a useful category. The United States has invested leadership and resources to coordinate positions among its developed, Western allies. But the "Global South" is different. There is no clear leader among developing countries, their preferences are too diverse, and the collective action problem is more difficult to overcome given the number of states within the category.

Let me use Latin American examples again. The region has had a complicated time criticizing Russia collectively. Some countries have a close relationship with Russia, like Venezuela, for example, and they reject explicitly naming and shaming their ally. These countries might disagree with the methods but sympathize with Russia's alleged defense against what they see as a hypocritical West. Others, like Brazil, have been more subtle out of rising power solidarity. And yet others, like Chile, have explicitly called out Russia for its behavior. Ecuador has even condemned Russia at the UN Security Council for planning to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.

I'm not rejecting or criticizing the use of the term "Global South" as a project to reform nuclear governance. For instance, the term helps to study how Latin American countries have advanced reforms to the global nuclear order with other developing states. But the concept might obscure the contradictions and diversity of responses and interests among developing states, even among one region, as Latin America illustrates. The term might also overlook many similarities between developed and developing nations when it comes to nuclear approaches. So, I think the best conceptual strategy is to choose categories depending on the specific nuclear issue we are addressing.

Heather: I notice that you've mentioned a couple of times now the importance of how and where the United States invests its leadership and resources to engage on nuclear issues. The Biden administration seems to be prioritizing its engagement in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia on nuclear issues. For example, I know that in 2023, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability Mallory Stewart visited South Africa and Egypt to engage on these issues. But it sounds like many of these countries are too embedded in their alliances or partnerships with Russia, and potentially China, to engage with the United States. Venezuela, for example, probably can't be divided from its allegiances to Russia. For other countries, though, how do you think the United States could or should engage them on nuclear issues? There are a few options we might consider:

1. Getting countries "on side": The United States could continue trying to convince Global South countries that Russia is an irresponsible nuclear actor and should be condemned. This might include joint statements calling out Russian nuclear threats and aggression or initiatives such as the U.S. attempt in April this year for a UN Security Council Resolution against an arms race in space, which was clearly targeted at Russia.
2. Focusing on smaller, practical steps: Rather than calling out Russia, the United States might instead focus on building relationships on specific issues, such as export controls or nonproliferation, which could then evolve into more partnership and shared interests and values on nuclear issues.
3. Prioritizing relationship maintenance: The United States is juggling a lot of foreign policy and security priorities at the moment, to include deterring two peer competitors, strengthening ties with allies and partners, and combating transnational issues such as cyberattacks or smuggling. Perhaps rather than trying to "out-compete" Russia and China for favor with the Global South, the United States should instead prioritize maintaining and stabilizing its existing relationships and preserving the status quo.

Luis: Not crafting a new strategy is the easiest path for the United States, but it might also be the most dangerous. U.S. policymakers have been constantly puzzled or frustrated about the reactions of the Global South to Russia's nuclear saber-rattling. And we are talking about a country with limited engagement among developing countries. Imagine what would happen if, in the future, a conflict between the United States and China breaks out and China engages in nuclear saber-rattling. China has a more robust and expansive presence in the Global South than Russia. So, developing countries would be even more reticent to criticize China, and more might even take China's side. The United States cannot automatically assume how developing countries will react in that scenario or presume these countries will take the U.S. side.

The United States should start crafting a new engagement strategy in the Global South around nuclear issues today precisely to gain the support of developing countries in the future. And I understand that even a country like the United States has limited resources and must decide where to invest them. However, the assumption that developing countries will follow the U.S. lead in condemning nuclear saber-rattling has proven wrong with Russia today. So, I advise the United States to start getting developing countries on its side by taking small, practical steps like the ones you propose.

Heather: OK, Luis, you said there was a second problem with the argument that the Global South needs to do more to call out Russia. What's that?

Luis: Countries in the Global South have criticized Russia, but perhaps not as loudly in the typical forums and certainly not as a block. Let me answer again with Latin American examples.

To collectively and publicly criticize Russia's methods, the region has worked with the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) to condemn all explicit and implicit nuclear threats. OPANAL resolutions for the past couple of years do not specifically mention Russia. Russia's allies would object. But these documents have publicly condemned nuclear saber-rattling and all instances leading to potential nuclear escalation.

The region has repeated these criticisms even in the first Western Hemisphere nuclear risk reduction workshop. In April 2024, the United States hosted this dialogue in partnership with the Mexican government at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York. This was the first time that U.S. officials sat down with a nuclear umbrella country (Canada) and countries under a nuclear-weapon-free zone (Latin America) to share opinions about nuclear risks. This is the right move. It's an example of the small, practical steps we talked about before. The United States can organize more of these workshops to understand these countries' varied approaches to managing conflicts, especially to reducing nuclear dangers, instead of treating them all as a block under the Global South label.

I also wonder if some Latin American countries have been reticent to criticize Russia because they understand deterrence. They might have thought that Russia had to threaten nuclear use to deter the United States and the West from crossing its redlines. Some Latin American states might see Russia as constraining itself since it keeps making its redlines more flexible. So, while they might not like Russia's nuclear saber-rattling, they might think Russia is just bluffing.

But things are changing. Russia has started preparing for nuclear use. In May, Russia announced that it was planning to conduct military exercises to test "practical aspects of the preparation and use of non-strategic nuclear weapons." As I mentioned before, some countries have loudly criticized this policy individually in traditional forums, like Ecuador at the UN Security Council. To respond collectively, Latin American countries have had conversations to condemn these developments in their traditional platforms, including OPANAL. On July 16, OPANAL member states published a communiqué condemning "the threats of use of nuclear weapons, irrespective of their class or location" and "the increased operational alertness of nuclear arsenals." And they called for "nuclear weapons not to be used again irrespective of the circumstances by any actor, and under any circumstances." While the communiqué does not call out Russia explicitly, potentially given its allies' reticence, it shows a common Latin American rejection of nuclear saber-rattling.

Heather: Interesting, but don't you think the whole point of calling out Russian bad behavior is to do it publicly? I would argue that a more public condemnation would send an important signal to other states that nuclear threats and bullying come with diplomatic and, potentially, economic costs. Private messaging might have some influence on Russia, but public messaging arguably would have the same effect in Moscow while also reaching places like Pyongyang, Beijing, and Tehran. What's the case for keeping this private?

Luis: Russia is responsible for its nuclear saber-rattling, not the countries in the Global South. To different degrees, Global South countries have condemned nuclear saber-rattling publicly in regional and international forums, even if some of them have not called out Russia explicitly. Many developing countries have avoided naming and shaming Russia specifically because they see nuclear weapons as sources of risks, not particular nuclear countries. They condemn the weapon, not the country. Some states in the Global South are also dissatisfied with the dominance of nuclear-armed countries, especially Western ones, over the global nuclear order. They reject the premise that some nuclear-armed states are more responsible than others. We might disagree with their strategies and positions, but we need to understand their nuances before trying to force the Global South to abandon them and name and shame Russia more forcefully. This could backfire. Russia has identified and exploited the Global South's dissatisfaction with the West, and Russia has deployed its diplomatic apparatus to appeal to these countries. Let's not increase that dissatisfaction even more by calling the Global South complacent.

Heather Williams is director of the Project on Nuclear Issues and senior fellow with the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. J. Luis Rodriguez is an assistant professor of international security and law at George Mason University's Schar School for Policy and Government.

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