Yes, Libya Does Matter

At the Red Castle in downtown Tripoli, one day this past Spring, I observed Libyan school students gaze up at a tall, iron clad replica of what is said to be (and contain the remains of) the mast of the USS Philadelphia, scuttled in the nearby harbor in 1804 by the U.S. naval hero Stephen Decatur. Wherein American telling, Decatur led a dramatic rescue of the Philadelphia's captured crew before setting it ablaze, in the Libyan version of events the details likely take on a different hue. The incident over two hundred years ago was the beginning but not the end of American involvement in what was then the Barbary Coast.

Red Castle in Tripoli with steel replica of the mast of the USS Philadelphia, allegedly containing remnants of the original.

Long-serving International Republican Institute (IRI) chairman Senator John McCain, who visited Libya a half dozen times before the U.S. Embassy was relocated in 2014 to neighboring Tunisia due to civil conflict, toured the Red Castle in December 2013 (his second visit to Libya that year). Two years after the killing of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens in Benghazi, standing before the mast of the Philadelphia, McCain remained positive about the country, stating "[a]lthough these are difficult times, we are very optimistic about the future." In 2016, with Libya split, both territorially and administratively, between Tripoli in the west and Benghazi in the east, McCain declared U.S. policy towards the country "an abject total disgraceful failure on the part of this administration." Passing away in 2018, McCain was arguably the last American political figure of any standing on either side of the aisle to champion the country and U.S. interest in its stabilization.

For McCain, an energetic supporter of democratic activists and freedom fighters across the globe, he saw the potential of Libya; not just a people unshackled from decades of an authoritarianism with a bizarre twist, but also a large country close to Europe with a rich history, a relatively small population, and the largest hydrocarbon deposits on the continent. In the eyes of most Libya watchers, the country's future should have been bright, akin to that of the oil and gas producing states of the Persian Gulf, if only given the chance.

In the aftermath of Amb. Stevens' killing, the overall U.S. approach, diplomatically and militarily, in Libya, however, has been what AFRICOM Commander Waldhauser described in a frank nomination back-and-forth with McCain in 2016 as an "economy of force mission." When asked what the Obama administration strategy was to confront the deteriorating situation in the country, including the presence of ISIS, Waldhauser answered, "I am not aware of any overall grand strategy at this point."

Eight years and two U.S. administrations later, little has changed, at least in terms of American attention to a situation that should be uppermost in the ranks of U.S. strategic priorities in the region. On the ground, though, much has changed and not just in Libya. What had been a limited Russian footprint, in the guise of the Wagner Group, ostensibly to assist with de-mining in 2017 in the east, has since morphed into a Russian forward operations base, a few hundred miles from key NATO allies in southern Europe. Initially backed by the UAE, in 2019 Russia firmly entered the Libyan political fray with Wagner forces joining an eastern push against Tripoli. A late intervention in 2020 by Turkish forces blunted the advance, saving the internationally-recognized government.

Since a 2020 ceasefire brokered by both Russia and Turkey, things have settled into an uneasy stalemate between Tripoli and Benghazi. This has allowed Russia to refocus Wagner, now under the command of Russia's military intelligence (GRU), towards opportunities for self-aggrandizement further to the south. Restyled the Africa Corps, ex-Wagner forces, which include thousands of foreign mercenaries, are being bolstered by a recruitment drive for deployment throughout the continent. The trail of havoc that has ensued, fueled by war profiteering (mining, oil, human trafficking et al) should be keeping the White House up at night.

From Mediterranean ports on the Syrian coast to safe harbors and airstrips in eastern Libya, Russia has developed a sophisticated pipeline, moving men and military material in one direction and pilfered African natural resources in the other. The implications for stability and U.S. national security interests across the continent are not insignificant. Since 2020, there have been at least five military coups in sub-Saharan Africa and civil war is Sudan is resulting in the worst humanitarian crisis of the 21^st century. Lurking somewhere in the background has been the Africa Corps or whatever name it chooses to go by. Perhaps not a key instigator in all, Russia is present nonetheless, ready to avail itself of unfolding opportunities and riches, at the expense of retreating European and American interests.

While this has been occurring, the West seems stuck in some post-Arab Spring malaise or, where the U.S., specifically, is concerned, the lingering aftershock of Benghazi. Southern European nations, when looking south, seem solely focused these day on preventing illegal migration across the Mediterranean, so its diplomatic and assistance efforts are thus narrowly focused; but this overlooks Libya's continued deterioration as a nation state. For its part, the U.S economy of force approach has ceded much of the necessary diplomatic lift to the Europeans, who have demonstrated little interest beyond the parochial, and to the UN, which, not surprisingly, lacks the necessary clout and leverage to effect positive change.

The U.S. Global Fragility Act, enacted in 2019, is intended to bring the full weight of U.S. military, diplomatic, and assistance efforts to bear on cases such as Libya, where the regional implications of instability are wide-ranging. But, apart from the recent appropriation of some funding for Libya under the Act, and the welcomed announcement of a 10-year plan to stabilize the country's economy and government, the full attention and weight of U.S. policy tools have yet to be deployed. A serious signal of American interest and commitment to Libyan stability will be the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, if and when that happens. Until then, the U.S. is relegated to observing from over the horizon as opportunists [read: Russia] continue feeding off the country's resources, while abusing Libya as a doormat for sowing broader regional instability and plunder. The losers are many, but most of all Libyans for whom McCain's vision of "a peaceful and inclusive transition to democracy that will benefit all Libyans" is slowly receding over the horizon.

Up ArrowTop

Public link

Please use the above public link if you want to share this noodl on another website.