U.S.-India Security Cooperation: Thriving through Turbulence

Commentary by Richard M. Rossow

Published September 26, 2024

This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department entitled The Global Impact of the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election. The report features a set of essays assessing the meaning of the election for Europe, Russia, Eurasia, the Indo-Pacific, the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East.

If the last four years have proved anything about U.S.-India strategic relations, it is that the partnership can thrive during turbulence. U.S.-India leaders can increasingly take trust for granted. The priority now is to seek new ways to deepen security collaboration that meet the two nations' shared goals. India is strategically and geographically important, both as a pillar of strength in an uncertain region and as a military heavyweight facing its own serious challenges with China. It is vital for the next U.S. administration to quickly fill key roles that manage the relationship and affirm continued support for nascent areas of cooperation that will improve military coordination and interoperability.

Security cooperation between the United States and India continues to break new ground. In the last four years, India has taken steps that might have been hard to imagine two decades ago.

Four things stand out. First, on military interoperability, India joining the multination Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) based in Bahrain and taking on joint missions has been underplayed publicly. Just a few months after becoming a full member, the Indian Navy carried out its first vessel interdiction as part of its commitment. Second, the U.S. Navy has started to utilize Indian shipyards for repair work. Thus far, three Indian shipyards have been approved by the U.S. Navy to perform repair work on ships. Third, India is allowing the United States access to strategic geographies. In March 2024, the U.S. Coast Guard held sea exercises in collaboration with India in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, directly at the mouth of the Strait of Malacca, a vital shipping lane. And fourth, the Quad was elevated to an annual leaders-level summit.

Such changes are significant both for their own sake and for the fact that they have come in the face of powerful differences on global affairs. Some of these global issues, such as contrasting approaches to dynamics in places like Iran and Myanmar, are chronic issues that India and the United States have managed to work through. But others land conspicuously on policymakers' tables and require skillful management to avoid a significant bilateral disruption.

There are a number of examples of global issues that could have increased U.S.-India tensions in the past four years, beginning with the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, which left chaos in India's neighborhood. Likewise, differences in perception regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine have caused real tensions between the U.S. and Indian foreign policy establishments. Startling information about India's "murder for hire" scheme in the United States has similarly caused some level of a reevaluation of the relationship. Lastly, both countries continue to have very different approaches to instability in the region. Notably in recent years, the United States and India had starkly different approaches to Bangladesh. The United States attempted to pressure Bangladesh to revert back to a functioning democracy, while India preferred the status quo under the now-deposed prime minister Sheikh Hasina.

For most of recent history, stark challenges in issues of this magnitude would have seriously damaged U.S.-India ties. But while these challenges may have caused friction, important progress continues to occur in the U.S.-India security partnership.

Irrespective of who wins the U.S. election later this year, the next administration must avoid eroding trust with India. Security ties with India have enjoyed strong support across administrations from both parties for nearly three decades.

In the initial days of a new U.S. administration, the two governments should assess the overall stability of countries across South Asia to coordinate where appropriate and deconflict if necessary. Beyond that, a few key priorities must be addressed:

1. Ensure the two most crucial confirmed roles-U.S. ambassador to India and the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia-are filled. It took over two years for the Biden administration to obtain Senate approval for Ambassador Eric Garcetti's nomination, and the Trump administration never had a confirmed assistant secretary covering the region.
2. Affirm support for key architectures. These include the leader-level Quad summits and the U.S.-India 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue, as well as the important U.S.-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET).
3. Quickly set dates for key defense engagements. The U.S. and Indian militaries continue to widen and deepen their military exercises. The next U.S. administration should quickly commit to these key initiatives, notably the tri-service exercise, Tiger Triumph.

South Asia is looking more unstable than usual. Sri Lanka is still trying to rebuild after its 2019 economic and political chaos. Bangladesh's prime minister just fled the country, Myanmar has an escalating civil war, and Pakistan and Nepal have precarious political situations. More than ever, having a strong partner in the middle of South Asia is in the interests of the United States. Although the United States and India still sometimes struggle with difficult issues, the benefits of the partnership are becoming more apparent over time. Trust is the foundation, and finding tangible ways to deepen cooperation is essential for regional security.

Richard M. Rossow is senior adviser and holds the Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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