Don’t Rush Syrian Refugees’ Return

Commentary by Will Todman

Published December 11, 2024

Just one day after Bashar al-Assad's ouster, Austria announced plans to deport Syrians back to Syria. A dozen European countries also announced that they had stopped processing Syrians' asylum claims. This is a huge mistake.

Many European states have wanted to send Syrians back to their home country for a long time. Before Assad's fall, several states had hardened their stance on refugee returns, pushing for Syrians to return even without political reforms. The collapse of the regime has given them the opportunity to pursue these aims openly. Even more Syrian refugees are in the Middle East, and their hosts are hoping for their rapid return after 13 years of war.

However, refugee return to Syria will be fraught with challenges. Rushing the return of millions of Syrians would put even more pressure on Syria at an extremely fragile moment and would undermine the prospect of a successful transition. It could backfire in ways that destabilize the wider Levant, frustrating host communities' expectations, exacerbating social tensions, and leading to renewed flows of displacement. To avoid a broader crisis, donor governments should temper expectations of rapid returns, formulate a comprehensive strategy for safe refugee return, and provide sufficient funding to facilitate an orderly process. It requires time, not rapid-fire edicts.

Over the past 13 years of conflict, about half of Syrians have been forced from their homes. Most of the 5 million Syrian refugees in neighboring countries have said they hope to return to Syria someday. A survey by the UN Refugee Agency in June 2024 showed that 57 percent of refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt still wanted to go back. Many want to return because of the challenging conditions in these countries, where historic economic crises have made life particularly hard for displaced people. In fact, 87 percent of Syrians in neighboring countries said their income is not enough to meet their basic needs. Host countries buckled under the burden that Syrians placed on public services, restricted their ability to establish roots, and pressured them to go home.

But conditions in Syria prevented most from seriously considering going back. Although Bashar al-Assad's cruelty has been well-documented, the videos emerging from the Saydnaya prison provide even more proof of why Syrians were so afraid to go back. After opposition forces broke into the prison, cameras captured starving detainees staggering out onto the streets. Some couldn't even remember their own name, while a toddler, likely born in the prison, wandered out of a cell in a daze. As well as arbitrary detention and torture, Syrians also feared forced conscription and ongoing instability in Syria.

With Assad's fall, thousands of Syrians in Lebanon and Turkey rushed back to Syria. For many, the Assad regime was the main obstacle to going back to their homes. Countries hosting refugees have seized on this excitement to encourage more returns, with Turkey's foreign minister saying millions of Syrians "can now return to their land."

But despite this excitement, major obstacles to return remain. As well as violence, Syrians don't want to return because of a lack of jobs and basic services. Even though Assad is gone, Syria's new transitional government will not be able to fix these problems quickly, especially with international sanctions still in place. The local currency is plummeting in value, and substitute currencies are scarce.

Many refugees also don't have homes to go back to. Some houses were destroyed during the war, others have new people living in them, and many refugees lack documentation to prove they own their properties. Returning in the winter is especially difficult because refugees do not know if their homes will provide shelter from the cold or not.

Syria is particularly fragile. Even though Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has tried to ensure the continuity of government functions in areas it controls, the fall of the Assad regime has caused major disruptions. It is unclear who refugees can turn to if they face problems with housing or property rights after returning and if the transition government will be able to provide basic services.

Syria's political future is also uncertain. A power struggle seems likely, with Turkish-backed groups fighting Kurdish-led groups in the north, exiled political leaders returning, and HTS trying to strengthen its control. Many Syrians fear what HTS rule would mean. While HTS has attempted to assure minorities that they won't be targeted, many Syrians are skeptical about their promises, given HTS's Al-Qaeda roots and record of authoritarian rule in northwest Syria.

The shifting geopolitical balance in Syria could lead to more violence as different international states compete to shape Syria's post-Assad trajectory. Iran has lost influence in Syria, while Russia has pulled back most of its forces. Turkey, however, has become more powerful in the region and is determined to limit Kurdish autonomy in the northeast. The future of the U.S. presence in the area is unclear, especially since the president-elect Donald Trump has said the United States should "not get involved" in Syria.

With so much uncertainty, sending refugees back prematurely will backfire. If the first refugees return only to face problems, their stories will deter others from following. But even more importantly, flooding Syrians back makes the odds of a successful transition in Syria even longer. If too many refugees return at once, it would increase pressure on strained public services, exacerbate social tensions, and undermine the already slim prospects of a successful transition. The consequences would not be limited to Syria. Total state collapse in Syria would force Syrians to flee yet again and put even more strain on neighboring countries, who would likely allow refugees to travel on to Europe.

To avoid this scenario, European states should temper their rhetoric about refugee returns and incentivize host governments in the Middle East to temper their expectations for sudden repatriation. They should work with humanitarian groups to formulate a credible plan for Syrians to return safely and provide adequate funding to help them return to their homes. Although donor fatigue has set in, a surge of support to host communities and refugees now would be an effective way of avoiding the worst-case scenario, which would require a much larger humanitarian response. It would reassure host governments in the region that relief is on the way while protecting Syrian refugees during a time of great uncertainty.

Will Todman is the deputy director and senior fellow in the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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