A Question of Staying Power: Is the Maduro Regime’s Repression Sustainable

Commentary by Ryan C. BergandChristopher Hernandez-Roy

Published August 21, 2024

In response to protests against its brazen election theft, the Maduro regime in Venezuela has unleashed a wave of violent repression. While the exact numbers vary, credible human rights organizations have logged nearly 2,000 arrests, some even of minors and young children, and more than two dozen people killed. Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro bragged that more than 2,200 arrests had been made and that prisons repurposed to house new political prisoners would feature "reeducation" and "hard labor" camps.

Meanwhile, reports from low-income barrios around Caracas convey that regime intelligence services have marked homes of protestors with a black "X." Rather than hiding repression, the regime has launched a public campaign called Operación Tun Tun (Operation Knock Knock) meant to instill maximum fear by arbitrarily knocking on doors. The regime has filmed security forces breaking into protestors' homes and arresting them and openly publicized videos of arbitrary arrests-one of them set to the popular Christmas song "Carol of The Bells." In myriad arrests, Venezuelans have reported the police showing them videos of themselves at protests rather than actual arrest warrants. Maduro has repurposed a mobile app, VenApp, originally launched in 2022 to allow citizens to communicate with the government about lack of services in communities, to encourage citizens to snitch on one another instead. Venezuelans have reported deleting their social media histories, removing the popular messaging app WhatsApp, or simply leaving their phones locked away at home, fearful of getting stopped by the police and having to hand over their phone to the security services.

The regime aims to use its terror campaign to keep Venezuelans fearful, sow distrust, atomize society, prevent collective action, and eventually subjugate Venezuelan society. The next phase of this campaign has started with the recent passage of the NGO law through the regime-controlled National Assembly, which seeks to dismantle elements of civil society that receive foreign funds. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights accused the Maduro regime of committing "state terror" against Venezuelans. Both opposition leader Maria Corina Machado and presidential candidate and election winner Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia are in hiding.

Thus, Maduro appears intent on proving the old adage that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." The Venezuelan people, guided by Machado's calls for non-violent protest, are proving that, as Hannah Arendt wrote many years ago, power is the capacity to act in concert for a public purpose and is never the possession of a single person or small group, but reserved for a larger collective.

The question remains: Can the Maduro regime repress its way out of the current crisis, or will the regime's wellspring eventually run out of repressive capacity? Repression is more costly for Maduro than many admit, and there may be a time when the regime's repressive capacity may cease or become significantly limited.

The Past Is Prologue?

Maduro is likely calculating that he can rely on his tried and tested system of repression, which has quashed previous rounds of intense protest. In 2014, protests erupted due to the deteriorating economic and political situation in the country, and at least 43 people died in connection with those demonstrations. The much larger protests the regime faced in 2017 lasted several months and were triggered when the Maduro-controlled Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ)-Venezuela's supreme court-abrogated to itself the powers of the National Assembly in an apparent coup against the opposition-controlled legislature. Between April 1 and July 31, 2017, there were 6,729 protests, during which at least 131 protesters were killed by the colectivos-regime-aligned community groups turned armed enforcers-and the state's security apparatus. The total number of injuries reached 15,000, with 5,400 arrests and nearly 800 individuals brought before military tribunals. The number of political prisoners held by the Bolivarian Intelligence Service at such notorious prisons as El Helicoide (named for the helical shape of the former commercial center) or La Tumba (the Tomb) reached a peak in August 2017 at just over 600.

During many of these past demonstrations, protesters actively organized against the security forces, donning helmets, shields, and masks to face government armored vehicles equipped with water cannons, as well as the tear gas, rubber bullets, and live rounds fired by the regime. At least 35 people were murdered in protests in January 2019 after the president of the National Assembly, and later interim president of Venezuela, Juan Guaidó asked Venezuelans to mobilize in support of restoring constitutional order. Maduro survived all three waves of protests-and, in some cases, emerged stronger. Given that as of August 18 there have been 1,503 verified arrests connected to the protests, fewer than in past protests, Maduro is certainly wagering that he has more room and capacity to repress. Support from global authoritarians and the survival of authoritarian regimes in Nicaragua and Cuba may be providing him with more succor.

Maduro may suffer from a false sense of confidence, however. Since earlier protests, the cloud of illegitimacy over Maduro's head has grown exponentially, and his resources to feed the security apparatus have become scarcer under U.S. and international sanctions. Perhaps most ominously, while the political base for Chavismo, the political movement started by former president Hugo Chavez in the 1990s, remained loyal during earlier periods, erstwhile Chavistas came out in droves to vote for the opposition in this election cycle. Therefore, the protests in 2024 have taken place in an entirely different context. Machado has asked that entire families show their support. She has also been conscious not to expose protests to constant danger and regime retribution, calling for protests on weekends and only periodically, wary of exhausting the Venezuelan people. If Machado's commitment to peaceful protest continues, it becomes morally more perilous for the average security personnel deployed to the streets to repress peaceful demonstrators with whom they share the economic hardships created and maintained by the regime.

Maduro can count on the regimes' colectivos and the civilian and military intelligence services-whose leaders the United Nations has accused of committing crimes against humanity-and the thoroughly corrupted higher echelons of the army. But will he be able to count on the Bolivarian National Guard foot soldier, or on the lower officer ranks of the army if it is called to the streets, who each earn around $10 per day? The Maduro regime's fabrication of an electoral result at midnight on election day has made it more difficult for the the army brass saluting him as the constitutional president of the republic. Despite proceeding too slowly, the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has an active criminal investigation against Venezuela, may yet publicly call for Maduro's arrest. The ICC released a brief statement in the context of the protests to reassure that the institution has been observing the regime's behavior. While this will not deter him or his inner circle, it may yet have an impact on those further down the chain of command whom Maduro depends on for his survival.

Changing Patterns of Repression

The Maduro regime has always leveraged targeted forms of repression to remain in power. This has been especially true as the kleptocratic nature of the Bolivarian regime has been exposed by prominent defections, the work of investigative journalism, and legal cases. Likewise, the "revolutionary" nature of the regime increasingly rings hollow. Since Maduro's rise to power, Cuban agents have embedded themselves in many Venezuelan state institutions, assisting intelligence collection and sharpening the repressive state apparatus.

A shift in repression techniques after the July 28 elections is rapidly underway, taking on a broader and more limitless character. For one, the targets of repression are far more likely to be residents of poor, peripheral neighborhoods like Petare than in the past. To the regime's great surprise, many of the occupants of these barrios spurned Chavismo, participated in the opposition's primary, and proceeded to vote for Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia in the general election, lending Maduro's post-electoral repression a vengeful character. Second, the regime is leaning more heavily on colectivos. In the past, these groups would bathe themselves in revolutionary rhetoric, patrol other neighborhoods, and return to their communities to a hero's welcome. Now, the Maduro regime expects members of colectivos to police their own communities and assist in identifying dissidents for repression. When nearly every house in the barrios has been marked with a large black "X" for having participated in protests, policing one's own community exposes one to potential retribution or social ostracism.

Furthermore, Machado's message of returning the security services to their constitutional functions and the importance of providing their members with dignified work have made an impact. After all, the regime tasked the army with securing the voter tabulation sheets from each voting station after polls closed; however, the opposition is in possession of more than 80 percent of the voter tabulations, collected by their volunteer network of accredited and committed election witnesses, indicating a broader breakdown of order within the armed forces and a willingness to ignore at least some of the Maduro regime's orders.

The Limits of Maduro's Repression

There is no guarantee that Machado's strategy of sustaining boisterous and peaceful street protests to aid negotiation efforts or hasten a split within the regime will succeed. On the other hand, in dictatorships like Maduro's, repression is often a costly tactic. In fact, dictators incur significant costs to pursue repressive measures, and it is possible that Maduro's security forces may be exhausted if Machado can sustain long-term, large-scale protests for many months-to put it in Machado's terms, hasta el final (until the end). The indignation of the Venezuelan people at not having their vote counted on July 28 will serve to bolster the strength, size, and potential duration of these protests.

Furthermore, dictatorships often do not know how much repression must be deployed to quell protests because they lack effective feedback mechanisms about their true (un)popularity. This is certainly the case for Maduro, who has not faced a competitive election since acceding to the presidency in 2013. Given that the regime attempted to commit the "mother of all electoral frauds," Maduro is acting like a man who cannot afford to loosen his grip-not even a little. This could accelerate the depletion of the regime's repressive capacity. Importantly, Venezuelans have sent a message to the regime by chanting publicly and defiantly at protests: "We are not afraid!"

Maduro lacks some of the salient ingredients for committing long-term, sustained repression. Institutionally, Maduro is increasingly reliant on colectivos and the Bolivarian National Guard, as he seeks to keep the army insulated from the nasty business of repression. The Special Action Forces (FAES), a paramilitary group whose actions-including thousands of summary executions in poor barrios-helped land the Maduro regime in the ICC in the first place, has been disbanded. By most accounts, its successor organization, the Directorate of Strategic and Tactical Actions, has similar functions and modus operandi as the FAES, but is less active and capable than the FAES at the peak of its repressive capacity.

Lastly, given Maduro's international isolation, there is little prospect to reignite Venezuela's moribund economy under his leadership. In fact, it is likely that U.S. sanctions relief on the oil sector, granted to Maduro as the principal carrot for freer and fairer elections, will soon be altered and tightened.

What could hasten the end of Maduro's ability to repress? Three important factors are worth considering when analyzing the depletion of Maduro's resources for repression:

1. The Security Services and the Regime Itself

There are early indications that Maduro is spending precious resources repressing dissidents within the regime and those considered insufficiently loyal. Last week, as Machado called for and led protests worldwide, five generals within the army were dismissed on grounds of disloyalty and, purportedly, their unwillingness to repress. A larger dismissal could threaten the cohesion of the regime's security forces. To be sure, helping Maduro to snuff out any hint of disloyalty within the armed forces is the Cuban-built General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence, a superstructure that sits above the armed forces. Even so, at some point Maduro may have to call on the army to reinforce the work being done by colectivos and the Bolivarian National Guard, exposing an otherwise cloistered institution to the barbarity of his street violence.

There have also been reports of magistrates and judges facing reprisals for their refusal to carry out trumped up charges against protestors. Indeed, the regime's "expert review" of the electoral ballots, currently taking place at the TSJ, is proceeding slowly and with more caution than expected. While there is still little doubt how the regime-controlled TSJ will rule in the end, the delays could be a product of the regime's fear of a fragmentation or a conscientious objection from the bench. More broadly, as the regime's strategy seeks to use "autocratic legalism" to bring a legal façade to its various maneuvers, there may be more and more defections.

2. U.S. Policy

There are several things the United States could do to hasten the depletion of Maduro's ability to repress. Perhaps most importantly, it should issue the strongest warning-publicly and forcefully-that there would be major consequences if the regime attempted to arrest Machado or Gonzalez Urrutia. At present, the regime is still making money selling oil under individual licenses granted to companies after the "snapback" of sanctions in April 2024-money that feeds the regime's kleptocratic and repressive machinery. The United States could revoke these individual licenses to operate. While some have been reticent to do so due to energy security concerns, Venezuela is producing roughly 800,000 barrels of oil per day, an infinitesimal amount on the global stage. Removing individual licenses would have the effect of reducing the number of resources available to maintain the loyalty of key regime officials and to feed the regime's repressive security apparatus.

3. The International Community, Latin America, and the Caribbean

So far, Maduro's neighbors have been mostly unwilling to recognize his "victory." Even Maduro's leftist allies, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, have demanded greater transparency. Last week's Santo Domingo Declaration, a regional statement from 22 countries plus the European Union, is a promising start for wider regional diplomacy and the ability to speak with a more unified voice. The regime's legitimacy crisis-something this election was meant to overcome-has been exacerbated by its large-scale, brutal repression. For the region's diplomacy to be successful, however, it will have to increase its ambition and discard its hesitancy in terms of building a much larger coalition of countries pressuring Maduro.

Although there is no guarantee, a reduction in the Maduro regime's ability to repress may follow Ernest Hemingway's famous description of bankruptcy: "Gradually, then suddenly." Dictators like Maduro always seem mighty-until they fall like a house of cards. With Machado promising a continuation of energetic and nonviolent protests, policy should be aimed at hastening the depletion of Maduro's resources to repress.

Ryan C. Berg is director of the Americas Program and head of the Future of Venezuela Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Christopher Hernandez-Roy is deputy director and senior fellow with the Americas Program at CSIS.

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