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12/10/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 12/10/2024 16:18

Base Development in Mali Indicates Continued Russian Involvement

Base Development in Mali Indicates Continued Russian Involvement

Photo: OUSMANE MAKAVELI/AFP via Getty Images

Commentary by Alexander Palmer, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Jennifer Jun

Published December 10, 2024

Russian forces in Mali have continued to develop their base in Bamako after the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, who spearheaded Russia's expansion into the country. Despite major military setbacks in 2024 that have begun to tarnish Russia's reputation in Mali, Moscow currently seems committed to maintaining or even increasing its military presence amidst an increasingly complex internal conflict, although the collapse of the Russia-backed Assad regime in Syria could further erode Malians' confidence in the government's partnership with Moscow.

The Wagner Base in Bamako

CSIS has monitored Wagner-linked construction at the Bamako airport since Wagner's arrival in the country in 2021. The base is located at Bamako's Mobido Keita International Airport near Airbase 101, a Malian Air Force installation. The Russian base has continued to expand through the disruptions associated with Prigozhin's mutiny and death.

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Fellow, Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program
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Senior Fellow for Imagery Analysis, iDeas Lab and Korea Chair
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Associate Fellow and Project Manager for Imagery Analysis, iDeas Lab and Korea Chair
Remote Visualization
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The civilian airport north of the base is also undergoing construction, although it is for civilian infrastructure and no evidence links it to the Russian presence.

New Construction

Remote Visualization

The base has continued to develop during the 15 months since Prigozhin's death. New structures to the north of the base have been completed, and development has continued on the headquarters and administration areas at the base's center. The most dramatic change is the ongoing development of a large revetted construction on the south side of the base. ICEYE synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery shows variation in surface texture due to ongoing excavation, soil disturbances, and variance in soil moisture.

Remote Visualization

The ultimate purpose of the site is unclear, but the area is likely intended for storage. The area may be used to store and protect valuable military equipment. The five large barracks-type buildings suggest that the base has the potential capacity to house 400-500 troops and support personnel.

Development of the southern part of the base also includes the construction of a guard position in the southwest corner of the base and the establishment of a more formal southern entrance, complete with guard positions and a serpentine approach similar to the original northern entrance.

Implications

Continued construction supports CSIS's 2023 assessment that Russia intends to maintain and even expand its presence in Bamako. The disruptions the Wagner Group suffered during 2023 did little to change Russia's presence in Africa, although organizational shifts have occurred over the past 15 months.

Russia's continued presence at the Bamako base is particularly significant given increasingly bold attacks by Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist organization. The group conducted a major attack in Bamako in September 2024, striking both a military training center and the airport itself. The incident is one of several indicators pointing to a lack of improvement in the country's security environment since Russia's entry into the conflict and the end of the French and UN missions in the country.

JNIM did not seem to target the Russian base in its September attack, but Russia faced a major setback in July when a convoy including Wagner fighters was ambushed in northeast Mali by a combination of Tuareg separatist and JNIM fighters. The separatists have denied coordinating with JNIM, but the final collapse of the Algiers Accord-the 2015 peace agreement that ended the separatist conflict in northern Mali-in December 2023 has increased the size and complexity of the conflict in the country.

The strategic significance of the battle remains unclear: nothing suggests that Russia intends to reduce its involvement in Mali. But Malians' hopes that the 2020 coup and ensuing shift towards Russia as Bamako's main military partner would improve the security situation in the country have been undermined by the attacks in northern Mali and Bamako. But the July ambush was not the last highly lethal attack against Russian forces in Mali, suggesting that it may have been an outlier in size but was not an isolated incident. If Russian casualties continue to mount amid a worsening security situation, popular narratives about Wagner's military prowess could erode, making Russia's military presence in the country more tenuous. Confidence in Russian support may also decrease following the collapse of the Moscow-backed Assad government in Syria, pushing Mali's leaders to at least consider alternative security partners. For now, though, it appears that Russia is in Bamako to stay.

Alexander Palmer is a fellow with the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is a senior fellow for imagery analysis with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at CSIS. Jennifer Jun is a project manager and associate fellow for satellite imagery analysis with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at CSIS.

Special thanks to William Taylor from the CSIS iDeas Lab for imagery markup design and to Madison Bruno for editing and publication support.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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