U.S. Support for Ukraine in the Midst of U.S. Elections

Commentary by Elizabeth Hoffman

Published October 3, 2024

On September 25, Congress avoided a looming government shutdown by passing a continuing resolution (CR) keeping the federal government open until December 20. The passage of the CR meant that most government programs will carry on at fiscal year 2024 levels. However, the CR failed to extend one crucial provision from the national security supplemental passed earlier this spring-the increase in presidential drawdown authority (PDA), the ability for the administration to transfer weapons from existing U.S. stockpiles, from $100.0 million to $7.8 billion. This will have serious implications for U.S. assistance to Ukraine. The Biden administration will need to take steps if it wants to ensure Ukraine does not lose its current momentum on the battlefield going into the winter months.

The same day the CR was passed, the Department of Defense (DOD) announced a new security assistance package for Ukraine using PDA with an estimated value of $375 million. U.S. president Joe Biden also stated his intent to authorize an additional $5.5 billion in PDA before the end of the fiscal year on September 30 to avoid leaving nearly $6 billion in military equipment transfer authority unutilized. This move has undoubtedly left the DOD scrambling to execute such a massive drawdown in an extremely compressed time frame. It is unclear if another increase in PDA will be in the cards when Congress looks to extend U.S. government funding for the remainder of the fiscal year. While other mechanisms can be employed to ensure a continued flow of military equipment to Ukraine, PDA is often the most expeditious method. This means that the Biden administration should consider a suite of other policy measures to continue support for Ukraine on the battlefield if PDA is significantly reduced going forward.

Short of sending additional materiel, the Biden administration could grant Ukraine the permission to use Western weapons for strikes deeper into Russian territory. In May, the administration granted Ukraine limited authority to strike Russian territory in response to a renewed Russian offensive on Kharkiv. This authority could be expanded to allow Ukraine to strike legitimate military targets deeper inside Russia. Europeans overwhelmingly support this move. However, the Biden administration has held off due to fears of escalation.

Second, the United States can accelerate and expand training programs. The Biden administration is taking steps toward this goal with the $375 million security assistance package announced last week, which instructs the DOD to train an additional 18 Ukrainian pilots by next year. With the first batch of F-16 fighter jets being transferred to Ukraine in August, the country is in desperate need of additional training to ensure F-16s can be used to their full capabilities. Currently, the main task of F-16s deployed in Ukraine is to enhance air defenses and protect civilian populations from Russian missiles and drones. While this is critically important, without additional training, their impact on the battlefield will remain limited.

Third, the United States should allow military contractors to operate in Ukraine to allow for the repair and redeployment of equipment. Over the summer, the Biden administration appeared to be poised to allow U.S. military contractors to enter Ukraine to repair and maintain U.S. weapons systems. However, momentum on this critical policy change appears to have stalled. Ukrainian forces have become highly adept at making repairs themselves-utilizing secure chats and video calls to speak with technicians outside the country. However, more complex maintenance and repair requires equipment to be transported from the front lines to a neighboring country, such as Poland. Reducing the time that equipment is offline by making repairs in the country would allow Ukraine to fight more effectively and efficiently.

Fourth, the United States and its partners should take steps to significantly tighten its sanctions regime against Russia. A website maintained by Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence (GUR) maintains a log of Western components found in Russian weapons recovered in Ukraine. A cursory glance at the website reveals the ample supply of Western components that Russia continues to access. Even if Ukraine's supporters are able to tighten sanctions, countries aligned with Russia, such as China, Iran, and North Korea, will continue to funnel technology and equipment to sustain Putin's war.

Finally, the United States can provide clear and unequivocal moral support to Ukraine. This is perhaps the most challenging task in the midst of a heated electoral season. Assistance to Ukraine has received overwhelming bipartisan support, as evinced by the April national security supplemental vote. However, the controversy surrounding Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy's recent visit to a Pennsylvania munitions factory, which produces 155 mm shells that are critical to Ukraine's fight against Russia, demonstrated the tense political atmosphere hanging over U.S. support for Ukraine. Preventing significant fractures in the bipartisan coalition supporting Ukraine's victory is crucial to deterring Russia, as well as China, Iran, and North Korea.

During his visit to the United States, President Zelenskyy told members of Congress that the ability to strike military targets inside of Russia is more important than additional funds. This gives lawmakers weary of spending additional dollars the opportunity to continue to support Ukraine by pushing for key policy changes. Allowing Ukraine to use Western weapons to strike inside Russia, increasing training opportunities, granting permissions for U.S. military contractors to operate inside Ukraine, tightening sanctions, and continuing to articulate support for Ukraine's victory doesn't come with a price tag. But these moves could be invaluable in ensuring Ukraine wins the war against Russian aggression.

Elizabeth Hoffman is the director of congressional and government affairs and fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Programs & Projects