Trouble Among the Chin of Myanmar

Commentary by Michael Martin

Published November 1, 2024

Trouble is brewing within the Chin resistance movement. Two rival factions have emerged, contending for control of Chin State and the nature of a post-revolutionary government for a future State of Chinland. The rivalry manifests itself in several ways, including conflicting claims over territory, disagreements over governmental representation, and allegations of collaboration with perceived enemies. Underlying the rivalry are long-standing tensions between the various Chin tribes.

The Chin has a long history of opposition to military dictatorships in Myanmar. The Chin National Front (CNF) and its militia, the Chin National Army (CNA), were formed in March 1988 to wage armed resistance against Myanmar's military junta. Following the military coup in February 2021, the people in dozens of towns and villages in Chin State formed local militias, commonly referred to as People's Defense Forces (PDFs). Many of these PDFs subsequently consolidated into township-based military units known as the Chinland Defense Forces (CDFs). Some of the CDFs received military training and supplies from the CNF and CNA.

For about three years, the CNF, the CNA, the CDFs, and the unaffiliated PDFs operated as an informal united front against Myanmar's latest military junta, the State Administrative Council (SAC), with significant success. According to one assessment, Chin resistance forces controlled over 80 percent of Chin State at the beginning of 2024. The most notable exceptions were the capital city of Hakha, which was under SAC control, and Paletwa Township, which was under the authority of the Arakan Army (AA).

The informal united front began to unravel in December 2023. On December 6, 2023, the CNF and its allied CDFs announced the adoption of an interim constitution for Chinland and the formation of the Chinland Council. However, some of the CDFs, particularly those in Falam, Kanpetiet, Matupi, Mindat, and Tedim, objected to some of the provisions of the interim constitution. One of their main objections was the dominant political power of the CNF on the Chinland Council. Despite efforts to resolve their differences, the dissident CDFs announced the formation of the Chin Brotherhood Alliance (CBA) on December 30, 2023.

The objections to the Chinland Council were likely bolstered by a distrust of the CNF among some segments of the Chin community. The CNF was one of the few ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to support Thein Sein's unsuccessful nationwide ceasefire agreement in 2015 despite significant opposition to the proposed agreement with Chin society and among the other major EAOs. For some involved in the Chin resistance movement, the CNF seems willing to negotiate and compromise with the military junta.

The political tensions between the Chinland Council and the CBA were soon expressed in the form of military conflict. In early February 2024, military units supporting the Chinland Council reportedly attacked the Maraland Defense Force, a CBA member. Fighting was reported between the Chinland Council and the CBA in May, June, and August. In late August, the Zoro Reunification Organization held talks in Aizawl, India, between the two rival organizations.

Another source of tension is the alleged relationship of the CBA with the AA. The AA claims that Paletwa Township is Arakan territory, but the Chinland Council says it should remain part of Chinland. According to the Chinland Council, the CBA is willing to accept the transfer of Paletwa Township to the AA in exchange for AA support in liberating Chinland.

The CBA, for its part, alleges that the CNF is providing information to the SAC about the CBA. During an online press conference held on August 15, 2024, CBA officials said that CNF officers were meeting with their SAC counterparts to provide information about the location and deployment of CBA military units. As proof, the CBA presented an alleged SAC lieutenant colonel, who confirmed that the CNF has been providing information to the junta's military forces. The Chinland Council denies that it is sharing information with the SAC.

Underneath the rivalry lies long-standing tensions between the various "tribes" in the Chin community. There are dozens of "tribes" within the Chin community that have distinct cultural traditions and speak different dialects. In recent years, the Hakha have been the most powerful tribe within the Chin community, but in the past, the Falam were more dominant. In general, the Chinland Council is supported by the tribes of central Chin State, while the tribes of northern and southern Chin State back the CBA. However, some villages and towns have one PDF that supports the Chinland Council and one that supports the CBA.

In addition, differences have emerged between the older CNF leaders and the younger generation of CDF and PDF volunteers. Having waged the struggle for Chin rights for decades, the CNF leaders see an opportunity to create the Chinland they envision. The younger generation, however, has a different view of what Chinland should be and wants to have a greater voice in its creation. The desire to have a seat at the table is particularly strong among Chin women.

For now, it appears that the Chinland Council and the CBA have established an informal agreement to focus their military efforts in their respective territories in Chin State. However, if a unified, democratic Chinland is to emerge from the resistance effort, the Chinland Council and the CBA must eventually find a way to settle their political differences.

Michael F. Martin is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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