Shifting Tactics at Second Thomas Shoal

Though tensions have been growing between China and the Philippines at Second Thomas Shoal since 2021, shifts in tactics by Chinese coast guard and militia in 2024 have led to more damage being sustained by Philippine vessels, more injuries to Philippine personnel, and a higher risk of escalation.

On June 17, a Philippine resupply mission to the shoal led to chaos when the China Coast Guard, with support from maritime militia and the People's Liberation Army Navy, surrounded, rammed, and boarded a Philippine Navy inflatable boat, using knives and axes to damage the vessel and destroy equipment. Though Manila opted not to invoke the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the incident was the closest yet to qualifying as an armed attack on a Philippine public vessel that would trigger U.S. commitments under the treaty's Article IV.

Recognizing the danger, China and the Philippines in July brokered an agreement to reduce tensions at Second Thomas Shoal. One resupply mission was conducted under the new agreement on July 27 without incident. But even before that mission, Philippine and Chinese officials had already begun to disagree publicly about the terms of the agreement, including whether the Philippines would give notification or submit ships to an inspection prior to delivering supplies to the grounded BRP Sierra Madre. Two recent incidents-the August 10 dropping of flares by Chinese jets in the flight path of a Philippine air force plane near Scarborough Shoal and collisions on August 19 between Chinese and Philippine coast guard near Sabina Shoal-have cast even more doubt on whether the agreement at Second Thomas will survive.

A Study of Force

In light of these developments, AMTI has revisited its January study of resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal since 2021 to examine the use of force by Chinese vessels in disrupting Philippine resupply attempts.

"Use of force" can be difficult to precisely define, especially when considering "non-lethal" or "less-lethal" force employed by law enforcement and, in this context, China's navy and militia. For this study, AMTI defined the use of force at Second Thomas as falling into one of two categories: 1) physical contact between ships, including collisions and ramming; and 2) use of less-lethal devices such as lasers, water cannons, or handheld tools against Philippine vessels or personnel. The details of individual collisions are sometimes difficult to discern but all are included in this catalogue because whether or not physical contact was intentional, in maneuvering to obstruct the navigation of Philippine ships, Chinese vessels knowingly chose to risk collision.

There has not yet been any use of firearms, ship-mounted armaments, or other clearly lethal weapons around Second Thomas.

Since 2021, there have been 10 publicly reported incidents in which China has used force in contesting Philippine resupply missions. This amounts to 26 percent of the total resupply missions identified by AMTI. After China prevented an attempted resupply in November 2021 by blocking and using water cannons on two wooden-hulled civilian supply ships, no instance of force was reported until February 2023, when China Coast Guard (CCG) 5205 directed a laser at the bridge of the Philippine Coast Guard's BRP Malapascua, temporarily blinding the crew. Incidents became more frequent in the second half of 2023, with a total of seven uses of force over the nine months from October 2023 to June 2024.

Despite using force at least 10 times in recent years, Chinese ships have only succeeded in preventing supplies from reaching the BRP Sierra Madre twice, in November 2021 and June 2024.

The Use of Small Craft

Alongside an increased frequency in the use of force, Chinese operations at Second Thomas in 2024 have been characterized by the frequent deployment of small craft including rigid-hulled inflatable boats (RHIBs) and CCG interceptor boats. On May 19, a Philippine resupply via airdrop only partially succeeded, as Chinese personnel on RHIBs were able to retrieve and dump overboard some of the supplies dropped inside the lagoon of Second Thomas. The Philippines reported that China employed eight small craft during the June 17 mission, double the three to four used during other resupply missions this year, which may have contributed to China's success in surrounding and disabling the Philippine Navy RHIBs.

Unlike the Zhaojun-class CCG ships AMTI has commonly tracked on patrol at disputed features, many CCG vessels seen on automatic identification system (AIS) platforms and in Philippine reports and video from Second Thomas have specialized features to support the use of small craft. For example, CCG 21551 and 21555, which have featured regularly in incidents at Second Thomas since fall 2023, are Hulai II-class patrol vessels that feature a fast-launch stern-ramp system allowing them to deploy interceptor boats while underway.

A complete assessment of the trends in Chinese small craft usage at Second Thomas is difficult, as they do not appear on commercial AIS platforms and are accounted for inconsistently in Philippine reporting before 2024. Nevertheless, it seems clear that their involvement, and especially their role in China's evolving applications of force, has had significant impacts on the character and outcomes of resupply missions.

Ship Counts and Reporting Rates

An update to AMTI's dataset on Chinese and Philippine ships deployed during resupply missions reveals that in the first half of 2024, the number of Chinese ships involved decreased from its peak in late 2023.

Chinese maritime militia continued to account for the bulk of ships present during each mission in 2024. Both Philippine and Chinese ship numbers fell dramatically in February 2024 but promptly picked up again in March. This could be because the two sides agreed to reduce tensions during a meeting in Shanghai in January. It could also be related to China's claim that the two sides agreed to a "new model" to de-escalate tensions around the shoal in February 2024. The Chinese Embassy in the Philippines released an unverified transcript of a call with Vice-Admiral Alberto Carlos, then the chief of the Philippines' Western Command, alleging that he agreed the Philippines would use fewer vessels and notify Beijing before conducting resupply missions. China then accused the Philippines of breaking this alleged agreement. The Philippine government and Vice-Admiral Carlos denied reaching any such agreement.

Despite recent criticisms of its efficacy, the Philippines' transparency initiative remained in full swing between January and July 2024. All eight resupply missions observed on AIS were also publicly reported by the Philippines, including the first resupply mission under the current provisional agreement between Manila and Beijing.

Conclusion

The use of force by Chinese ships at Second Thomas Shoal increased in frequency and intensity in 2024, resulting in greater damage to Philippine vessels and injuries to personnel. This shift occurred amid a reduction in the overall number of ships deployed by China to Second Thomas, but an increasing use of small craft to directly engage the Philippine RHIBs used to move supplies and personnel between the BRP Sierra Madre and civilian resupply ships. While the chaos of June 17 has led to an apparent pause in confrontations at Second Thomas, it has not eliminated maritime tensions between the Philippines and China elsewhere in the South China Sea. As confrontations play out in other areas such as Scarborough and Sabina Shoal, China is likely to apply the less-lethal but extremely dangerous tactics developed at Second Thomas to contest Philippine activities in other hot spots.

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