Why Iran Will Escalate

Commentary by Alexander Palmer

Published August 8, 2024

The killing of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31 has pushed Iran's leaders into a dangerous corner. Tehran has few options but to escalate the conflict, as it did with its attack against Israel in April. That attack led to a chorus of statements labeling Iran's actions as "destabilizing," arguing that it was part of a malign regional strategy, and calling for a punitive Israeli counterattack. Policymakers should not see in Tehran's inevitable response an intent to escalate or further destabilize the region but rather an imperfect attempt to restore the status quo. Such an interpretation risks turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy, contributing to a march toward a regional war that few want.

Iran will feel the need to respond to Israel's attack for both international and domestic political reasons. Its response will have to be more impactful than its April 13 missile and drone attack to satisfy domestic hardliners and Iran's strategic need to deter further Israeli attacks in its territory. But Iran also wants to avoid a wider war, which leaves it with a nearly impossible task: to respond without kicking off an escalatory spiral.

Iran has five main response options. It could do nothing, undertake low-profile actions like cyberattacks, execute one or more targeted killings, launch indirect fire attacks, or direct its proxies to conduct ground incursions into Israel. The first two options are nonstarters. Iran's supreme leader has already put his reputation on the line, and anything perceived as a nonresponse would be politically unacceptable. Targeted killings against Israelis would be the least escalatory option, but Iran faces both political and practical obstacles. Iran could also conduct indirect fire attacks through its non-state partners like Hezbollah, in conjunction with them, or alone. Finally, Iran could push its proxies to conduct more conventional ground incursions into Israel. This is the most escalatory option possible given memories of October 7, and Iran will not order such incursions if it is serious about avoiding war.

Escalation occurs when one or more parties to a crisis increase the intensity or expand the scope of their efforts, violating the unwritten rules of a conflict. In April, for example, Israel escalated (probably unintentionally) by killing several high-level Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force personnel in Damascus-an unusual attack given both the rank of those killed and the fact that it targeted a diplomatic facility. Iran escalated in response, launching an unprecedented drone and missile attack against Israeli territory. Israel managed to resolve the crisis without further escalating the situation, but doing so required a highly calibrated strike that conveyed a threat without violating the unwritten rules that have governed Israel and Iran's conflict for the past several decades.

Targeted killings against a Haniyeh-like figure in Israel would probably provide a response without dramatic escalation, but such a figure does not exist. Israel lacks the kind of non-state proxies that would give Tehran a target closely resembling Haniyeh, so Tehran would probably have to escalate the conflict by targeting Israeli political or military officials. Iran also faces practical problems with such an attack-there is no evidence of covert Iranian infrastructure in Israel comparable to what was required to kill Haniyah. Iran could attack Israeli government figures outside of Israel, as Iran and its non-state partners have repeatedly done over the past several decades. But such attacks also risk escalating the conflict by spreading it to new geographical theaters and face practical problems of their own: a targeted killing or bombing of an embassy would probably take time to plan, weakening the deterrent signal that Iran will seek to send.

Iran is more likely to respond with indirect fire attacks somewhat comparable to April's missile and drone attack. But Iran lacks options that do not risk dramatic escalation. Iran's proxies are already engaged in a gradually intensifying campaign of attacks against Israel, so a response would have to involve an increase in effort to send the desired deterrent signal-thereby continuing the cycle of escalation, possibly even to a catastrophic Israel-Hezbollah war. A direct conventional attack from Iranian forces would also send a clear signal, but Israel's April attack against Isfahan carried an implicit threat of airstrikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Israel might carry out that threat in response to another Iranian attack against Israel itself, which would constitute another major escalation and step toward wider war.

Iran could direct its non-state partners in Syria or Lebanon to conduct ground incursions into Israel itself. Any ground assault's resemblance to October 7 would make it the most escalatory option available. Ordering a ground incursion would be the option most likely to spark a wider war. Such a decision would suggest that Iran no longer desired a return to the status quo and instead sought escalation to war.

Preventing a wider war requires recognizing the pressures that Iran's leaders are currently under. Sending a deterrent signal while avoiding escalation will require extreme creativity, and Iranian efforts to calibrate a response will probably fail unless Tehran possesses capabilities it has not yet revealed to Israel and the world. If they do, many will conclude that an escalatory Iranian response is continued evidence of destabilizing intent, even if Iran's intention were to restore the status quo rather than escalate the conflict.

None of this is to say that Iran is a benign regime. Its support for non-state groups has destabilized the region and contributed to the horrors of October 7, 2023. Its repression of its own population has been odious. Intelligence agencies will be looking for evidence that Iran is preparing for war, but Iran's response is extremely unlikely to provide such evidence. Staving off a wider war in the Middle East requires an accurate assessment of the constraints on Iranian behavior, not assumptions that escalatory behavior means escalatory intent. The United States and Israel should respond accordingly, seeking to minimize the damage from Iran's response and refraining from their own escalatory responses.

Alexander Palmer is an associate fellow in the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

Special thanks to Kelsey Hartman and Madison Bruno for editing and publication support.

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