EU-GCC Cooperation: Interview With Luigi Di Maio, EU Representative for the Gulf

• CommentaryMiddle East and North Africa
  by Aldo Liga and Chiara Lovotti

The first ever EU-GCC Summit will be held on October 16th in Brussels. How did the need to hold this meeting come about and what are the main reasons for both sides to intensify the dialogue?

The EU-GCC Summit of October 16th is the result of a 2-year journey-it is a milestone. It is the first summit at the level of EU-GCC heads of state and government as previously EU-GCC countries have met only at ministerial level, i.e. the foreign ministers. The process leading up to the Summit was initiated by the EU, its member states and the European Parliament in May 2022 when a Joint Communication outlining the Union's new strategy for the Gulf was approved. This strategy, a joint initiative among EU institutions, is an important step forward in relations with the Gulf and demonstrates the EU's desire to work on a strategic partnership with the GCC countries. In addition to enhancing the EU-GCC partnership, for the EU the strategy also aims to address security concerns in the region.

The timing is important; it reminds us that the EU's need for closer partnership with the Gulf pre-dates both the invasion of Ukraine and the war in Gaza. In addition to providing for meetings and thus for the Summit, the strategy has an implementation part too, which is the responsibility of the EU Special Representative for the Gulf-a position I now hold.

The strategy has five pillars: trade and investment, energy (especially renewables), regional security, people-to-people relations (including universities, education, visa facilitation and the like) and institutional partnerships. The ultimate goal of the strategy for the EU is to establish structured channels with the GCC countries that will allow the Union to approach them, elevate our partnership to a strategic level and also address multilateral issues through common exercises.

Over the past year - according to the strategy - we have established three main structured channels: the Structured Security Dialogue at the level of EU-GCC Senior Officials, the High-Level Forum for Security Cooperation, which provides for an annual meeting for Foreign Ministers of EU-GCC countries to discuss key regional issues in a multilateral format, and finally the Young Diplomats Programme, which facilitates joint training of young diplomats from EU and GCC countries. The first session of the Structured Security Dialogue took place in January 2024, while the High-Level Forum for Security Cooperation was held last April in Luxembourg.

There is also an historical format, although this actually pre-dates the strategy. In essence, it is the
annual EU-GCC Joint Council. The latter is a full-fledged ministerial meeting that concludes with formal conclusions and has existed since the partnership agreements of 1989. The last one was held in Oman on October 10th last year and its formal conclusions are public.

Alongside all this is the EU-GCC Summit, which will take place for the first time on October 16th and is one of the key goals of the new strategy. This leader-level format has never existed although we have had a cooperation agreement with the GCC countries since 1989 and it comes at a time that is as pivotal as it is critical, not only for the Middle East and Ukraine but globally. The Summit also includes final conclusions in the form of a joint statement by all the participants. I expect this to have two important parts: a political part and a part referring to the multilateral plan. This renewed partnership is also an important opportunity for the EU to work on multilateral challenges, for instance in regions where the EU is less influential than the GCC. In places like South-East Asia, Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the GCC countries have considerable diplomatic power. We have seen, for example on Russia-Ukraine, the mediating role played by the United Arab Emirates in prisoner exchanges, Qatar's role in the return of children, and Saudi efforts to work toward a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine.

Do you plan to produce a Summit Final Statement, or are there any specific outcomes that you seek?

At present for EU and GCC countries the big challenges are trade and visas, particularly visa liberalization and a trade agreement. In fact, a regional-level trade agreement has been blocked for 35 years. The goal of both sides is to actually work not only on trade liberalization, but on many other issues, such as investment, technology, culture, education and so on. This is why the auspicious is that this Summit will be a kickoff for wider and more tailor made approaches, even at bilateral level, in complementary with the regional Free Trade negotiations.

Do you think that October 7th, and all that ensued (and is continuing to ensue) globally brings Europe and the Gulf countries closer together or further apart?

I believe there has been rapprochement with the Gulf countries. As I said at the beginning, the path of rapprochement pre-existed the war in Gaza. As such, at times during the High-Level Forum in April 2024, as well as at Structured Security Dialogue in January 2024, relevant issues were discussed. For example, one chapter of the Structured Security Dialogue was Maritime Security; after October 7th, the Red Sea became a crisis zone where cooperation on maritime security with the GCC countries is crucial, and this was discussed. At the High-Level Forum, which has a flexible agenda, the Iran-Israel tensions were discussed as the meeting took place a few days after Iran's first direct attack on Israel. Thus, within the strategy, the channels used by the EU and GCC countries to cooperate can focus on truly topical issues.

Second, I think October 7th also brought the EU and GCC closer together because the GCC countries have decided in recent years to invest heavily in economic diversification and so they are very interested in stability, as are we as the EU. The common need for stability is a powerful factor in bringing the geopolitical agendas closer together. Moreover, as Europeans, we have benefited from the GCC countries' influence many times in the past. GCC countries have been important gateways for Afghanistan, Iran, Yemen, and the Horn of Africa. So, it is clear that there were already all the prerequisites for us to get closer pre-October 7th, but even afterwards the common interest in stability and de-escalation has led - and continues to lead - to increased proximity.

How do both Europe and the GCC deal with the Iranian dossier?

Unlike EU countries, the Gulf countries are geographically close to Iran and have approached the dossier differently over the past decade. For them, the last three years have largely been characterized for them by paths of normalization with Tehran. Today only Bahrain, among the six GCCs, does not have normalization, but something seems to be moving forward even there in this regard.

It is clear that these normalization paths do not resolve the most critical issues. However, they do open valuable channels of communication for de-conflicting and de-escalation. In addition, at the margins of the Asia Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Doha, there was the first GCC-Iran meeting at foreign minister level. The discussion was informal, we don't know the topics, but it was in any case a precious opportunity of dialogue for the regional de-escalation. For the EU, during my time in office I have seen a decrease in the level of engagement with Iran. This is basically because Iran has done all the things that were on the "not-to-do" list for the EU. Examples include supplying weapons (and now ballistic missiles) to Russia for use against Ukraine; detaining European citizens; internal repression; and two direct attacks on Israel. Then, there is also the whole issue of the so-called Axis of Resistance p: the Houthis attacking our ships in the Red Sea, Hezbollah firing missiles at Israel and so on. Not to mention, of course, the nuclear issue.

Therefore, our focus today is merely on keeping the channels of communication open with Iran and encouraging and supporting all the processes of de-escalation and thus normalization of GCC-Iran relations, that is, the broader regional normalization processes.

It appears that European and Gulf countries' interests occasionally overlap in third-party conflicts. For example, in Ukraine, with Qatar's efforts in hostage negotiations, and in other cases like Libya and Lebanon, where both sides share an interest in conflict management and resolution. Does this align with your perspective? While there are no formal statements or declarations about Europe-Gulf cooperation in third-party conflicts, this convergence of interests is certainly observable.

There is certainly a convergence of interests between EU and GCC countries in third-party conflict zones. Their diplomacy in particular is very active. This diplomatic activism, 10, 15 years ago, was mainly aimed at addressing existential threats (sometimes ideological, sometimes military). It was crucial to the elimination of the greatest threats to their nations and so primary national interests. The impression I get now is that progressively they have developed a diplomatic strategy to increase their influence at a world level. Saudi Arabia's Expo campaign shows this country's enormous international capabilities. Alternatively, looking at the Free Trade Agreements that have been signed bilaterally in the last year by the UAE with many countries around the world, and at their successful presidency of COP28, it is clear that Abu Dhabi has worked with everyone and has incredible multilateral and bilateral diplomatic reach. Qatar is also very important: it hosted the political leader of Hamas before his death, it still hosts the Afghan Taliban, but it is also home to the largest American base in the region. Lastly, Oman also did valuable work for the Americans in enabling them to talk to Iran about prisoner exchanges.

The diplomatic ability of theirs that I have described is very valuable to us as the EU because of the great influence they have in all those areas where Italy and Europe have an interest but not the same diplomatic clout. I am thinking not only of "crisis management," but also of the investment side. The GCC countries, for example, do a tremendous amount of work in Africa on both raw materials and food security. We, as the European Union, have the Global Gateway on the same continent, so we necessarily work on triangular cooperation in Africa with them, since in several cases the GCC countries have far more access to certain areas and governments than we do.

Is there full awareness of the potential of these triangulations? Or is there resistance in European chancelleries even to recognize this role for the Gulf countries?

It is important to be clear that for EU countries there are two different levels. On some dossiers, the EU has exclusive competence, such as trade, an area where individual member countries are prohibited from entering into bilateral agreements or trade agreements. This division of competencies on different levels between the EU and individual members constitutes a bottleneck, a "constraint" that everyone must respect and on which all members must cooperate. In general, however, I do not see a lack of awareness among member states about how influential the GCC countries are on certain matters. Instead, what I see is that our member states use relations with the GCC countries to act on specific issues; while on others they prefer to cooperate only if the agendas coincide.

In my reports to member states every three months, I continually hear and sense the need to increase the level of partnership with the GCC and to continue what we are already doing. We are on a positive trajectory, driven in part by the need to increase partnerships in response to an increasingly negative international landscape.

Do you plan to repeat the upcoming Summit of October 16th?

It is a decision of the EU and GCC countries, although of course it is not always possible to have annual summits, but I think our goal is to turn this format structural. At present, our view is that following the formulation of a hypothetical Final Statement its implementation is the priority.

Of course, we must not forget that, for some issues, summits can be extraordinary-this depends very much on the EU Presidency. Thus far, President Michel and President Von Der Leyen have been strongly in favor of this Summit, fully recognizing the importance of this moment in time for the Middle East and for everybody. They recognize the importance of the GCC countries.

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