First Circuit Reverses Denial of Class Certification Based on Erroneous Injury Ruling

Whether a class representative has actually been injured can determine the suitability of class certification, as a class with an uninjured representative will not be certified. But as illustrated by the First Circuit in Nightingale v. National Grid USA Service Company, - F.4th --, 2024 WL 3337766 (1st Cir. July 9, 2024), when class certification is denied based on an erroneous interpretation of a class representative's injury, that denial will not stand.

In Nightingale, the plaintiff sued the defendant for violations of Massachusetts statutory law (Chapter 93) arising from repeated calls allegedly made by debt collectors regarding plaintiff's debt. The plaintiff alleged that these calls invaded his privacy, and he sought to certify a class of Massachusetts residents who had received similar calls. In support of certification, plaintiff proposed using the debt collectors' call records, which, according to plaintiff, would be common proof of class-wide injury. Id. at *2. But the district court held that invasion of privacy, standing alone, was not a cognizable injury under Chapter 93, and found instead that the plaintiff would need to demonstrate that he and all class members had claims for common law intrusion upon seclusion. Id. That in turn requires showing an invasion of privacy that is "substantial and unreasonable." Id. Because determining that for each class member would require individualized, fact-specific inquiries, the district court found that individual issues would predominate and denied class certification. Id. The district court then subsequently found that the plaintiff lacked standing and granted the defendant summary judgment. Id. at *3.

On appeal, the First Circuit focused mainly on the district court's injury analysis, which formed the basis of both the class certification denial and the summary judgment ruling. The First Circuit disagreed with the district court's analysis of Massachusetts' Chapter 93, finding that cognizable injuries under Chapter 93 are broader than available under the common law. Id. at *2-4. And that meant that the district court's finding of lack of predominance for class certification purposes was based on an "incorrect legal rule." Id. at 8. The First Circuit therefore vacated the denial of class certification (and the grant of summary judgment to the defendant), and remanded for further proceedings.