Beyond Burning

Summary

The disturbing use of incendiary weapons in four armed conflicts over the past year underscores the humanitarian concerns that these weapons raise. At the same time, increased momentum at the international level to address their consequences shows the potential to achieve stronger protections for civilians.

Incendiary weapons cause excruciating burns and other injuries that can result in lifelong suffering. They also set fires that can destroy homes, civilian infrastructure, and agricultural areas. Protocol III to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) governs these weapons, but it has failed to adequately protect civilians due to two loopholes. First, its definition excludes multipurpose munitions, notably white phosphorus, that are not "primarily designed" to set fires and burn people. Second, the protocol has weaker regulations for ground-launched than air-dropped incendiary weapons, perhaps reflecting concerns that existed during the negotiations of Protocol III 40 years ago but are not relevant to contemporary practice.

Since October 2023, Human Rights Watch has documented the Israeli military's most-recent use of airburst, ground-launched white phosphorus munitions in populated areas of southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territory. These attacks show that white phosphorus is a tool of modern warfare that should be covered by the definition of incendiary weapons. In addition, over the past year, ground-launched and air-dropped incendiary weapons were used in Ukraine, and ground-launched ones were used in Syria, according to Human Rights Watch research.

Collectively, the effects of this use reflect the breadth of harm caused by incendiary weapons, including white phosphorus, which ranges from physical and psychological injuries to socioeconomic impacts and environmental damage.

During the CCW's Meeting of High Contracting Parties in November 2023, more states than ever expressed concerns about the use of incendiary weapons and called for action. Specifically, they sought dedicated discussions of the status of Protocol III, the problems raised by incendiary weapons, and ways to address them. The reliance of CCW meetings on consensus-based decision-making, however, meant that the adoption of these states' proposals was blocked.

The recent use of incendiary weapons should motivate states to take action. States should urgently initiate discussions with the goal of strengthening international law to reduce the human costs of this cruel weapon.

Recommendations

To improve humanitarian protections from incendiary weapons, Human Rights Watch urges states to:

• Agree at the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties in November 2024 to hold informal consultations to assess the adequacy of Protocol III and develop views on ways to address the serious problems of incendiary weapons;
• Hold discussions outside the CCW to consider national and international measures that can be taken to address the grave concerns raised by incendiary weapons. The discussions should also examine ways to create stronger international standards;
• Condemn the use of incendiary weapons, including in the final report of the next CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties, and raise awareness about the harm they cause; and
• Express their support for strengthening the law on incendiary weapons in order to close Protocol III's loopholes and further stigmatize the use of incendiary weapons. A complete ban on incendiary weapons would have the greatest humanitarian benefits.

Incendiary Weapons and the Harm They Cause

Incendiary weapons are notorious for their horrific human cost. They contain different chemical compounds, such as napalm or thermite, that ignite and inflict short and long-term harm. The extreme heat produced by incendiary weapons can cause fourth-degree or even fifth-degree burns. The heat and smoke of incendiary weapons can seriously affect the respiratory system, causing respiratory or organ failure, poisoning, and other pulmonary complications. Those who survive the immediate harm face a lifetime of physical and psychological scars.

Incendiary weapons also have socioeconomic consequences. The injuries they inflict may prevent survivors from returning to work or lead to their exclusion from society. The destruction of homes and businesses can cause displacement and a loss of income. The burning or contamination of agricultural land can ruin livelihoods; there may be no crops to harvest and, even when there are, people may be reluctant to buy them due to fears over contamination.

Although primarily designed to produce smokescreens or signal troops and thus arguably not covered by CCW Protocol III's definition of incendiary weapons (see further discussion below), white phosphorus munitions operate in the same manner and produce the same effects as other incendiary weapons. When white phosphorus comes into contact with skin, it inflicts intense and persistent burns, sometimes to the bone. Because white phosphorus burns on contact with oxygen, treated wounds can re-ignite when bandages are removed. White phosphorus causes additional effects comparable to other incendiary weapons including respiratory damage, psychological harm, destruction of civilian structures and agriculture, displacement, and adverse environmental impacts.

International Law Governing Incendiary Weapons

Adopted in 1980, CCW Protocol III is the only international treaty dedicated to governing the use of incendiary weapons.^[3] The protocol had 117 high contracting parties as of October 2024. (See Annex I for the text of protocol and Annex II for a list of high contracting parties.) Protocol III has failed to provide adequate protection for civilians due to two loopholes that have undermined its humanitarian effectiveness.

First, Protocol III's definition does not encompass multipurpose munitions, such as those containing white phosphorous, that are designed to create smokescreens or signal troops yet produce the same effects as traditional incendiary weapons. Article 1 only encompasses munitions that are "primarily designed" to set fires or cause burn injuries. Second, Article 2 of Protocol III prohibits the use of air-dropped incendiary weapons in populated areas ("concentrations of civilians") yet permits the use of ground-launched versions of incendiary weapons in populated areas under certain circumstances. This arbitrary distinction ignores the fact that incendiary weapons cause the same kind of harm regardless of how they are delivered.

States should immediately open discussions concerning how to strengthen the law on incendiary weapons, including white phosphorus. Over the past decade, Human Rights Watch has documented the use of incendiary weapons in Afghanistan, Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen. That research has shown how these weapons endanger civilians.^[4] States could address the shortcomings of Protocol III by amending the protocol or following an alternative route. A complete ban on incendiary weapons would have the greatest humanitarian benefits.

Use of White Phosphorus: Lebanon and Gaza

The current use of white phosphorus by the Israeli military in Lebanon, which Human Rights Watch has examined through interviews and open-source research, exemplifies the ongoing problem of white phosphorus and the breadth of the munitions' effects, which parallel those caused by other incendiary weapons. The Israeli military has also used white phosphorus during hostilities in Gaza since October 2023 and during previous hostilities in 2009. These cases underscore that stronger international law that clearly encompasses white phosphorus is needed.

Lebanon: Extent and Nature of Use by the Israeli Military

Human Rights Watch verified the use of white phosphorus munitions by the Israeli military in at least 17 municipalities across south Lebanon between October 2023 and June 2024. In at least five municipalities, the munitions were used in populated areas. In those five villages, Human Rights Watch documented through photographs and video evidence that white phosphorus landed on the roofs of residential buildings. The 155mm white phosphorus artillery projectiles were airburst, meaning they spread their payload of burning felt wedges impregnated with the substance over an area between 125 and 250 meters in diameter, magnifying the risks posed to civilians. The villages, all located near the southern Lebanese border with Israel, were Kafr Kila, Mays al-Jabal, Boustane, Markaba, and Aita al-Chaab.

Human Rights Watch researchers reviewed and verified more than 100 photos and videos posted on social media and shared by journalists, news agencies, and residents of southern Lebanon, in addition to footage shared directly with researchers. Researchers identified use of white phosphorus munitions in 47 of these photographs and videos, then geolocated them to confirm their locations and, when possible, to identify the precise area where the burst felt wedges impregnated with white phosphorus had landed.

Other credible sources have also reported on the use of white phosphorus. For example, Amnesty International found that an October 16, 2023, attack on the Lebanese border village of Dhayra using white phosphorus munitions was an "indiscriminate attack that injured at least nine civilians and damaged civilian objects." The attack included use of US-supplied white phosphorus munitions, according to the Washington Post, which carried out its own investigation.

Artillery-fired white phosphorus munitions were used in the southern Lebanon attacks, which raises concerns about both of the normative loopholes created by CCW Protocol III: the protocol's definition, which excludes white phosphorus, and its arbitrarily weaker regulations of ground-launched, compared to air-dropped, incendiary weapons. Lebanon is a high contracting party to CCW Protocol III; Israel is not.

In Lebanon, Israel's use of airburst white phosphorus munitions in populated areas was unlawful under international humanitarian law. It constituted an indiscriminate attack and demonstrated Israel's failure to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians. As will be discussed below, while this use can be found unlawful under existing international law, more specific law dedicated to incendiary weapons would create stronger obligations and norms.

On May 22, 2024, Human Rights Watch sent a letter with findings and questions concerning the use of white phosphorus to the Israeli military but had not received a response as of October 2024. In a statement to the media, an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson said most of the IDF's smokescreen shells do not contain white phosphorus. The spokesperson continued:

Like many Western militaries, the IDF also possess smoke-screen shells that include white phosphorus that are legal under international law. These shells are used by the IDF for creating smokescreens and not for targeting or causing fires and are not defined under law as incendiary weapons.

Lebanon addressed the attacks during the October 2024 debate of the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee on Disarmament and International Security. Its representative said,

Israel targets agricultural lands and civilian facilities adjacent to the borders in Lebanese villages and towns with white phosphorus munitions, the use of which is prohibited against civilian targets. This has led to widespread fires in agricultural lands and forests and led to soil pollution. This is a violation of international humanitarian law, in particular Article 55 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977.

Although Israel is not a party to Additional Protocol I, Article 55 is considered reflective of customary international humanitarian law.

Lebanon: Effects of White Phosphorus Use by the Israeli Military

Physical Harm

Human Rights Watch documented the harm that this use of white phosphorus in Lebanon caused to civilians. Its researchers spoke to nine residents of southern Lebanon, including the head of the Union of Agricultural Workers in southern Lebanon, a schoolteacher, two photographers working in the region, the head of the environmental organization Green Southerners, a rescue worker with the Lebanese Civil Defense, and the mayors of Kafr Kila, Mays al-Jabal, and Boustane. Human Rights Watch also spoke to a medical toxicologist in Beirut and an academic based in the Netherlands who is tracking and documenting use in Lebanon of white phosphorus.

Although Human Rights Watch did not obtain evidence of burn injuries from the use of white phosphorus munitions in the cases documented in this report, it gathered accounts of respiratory damage, another adverse impact of incendiary weapons. The "most severe effects of white phosphorus" are deep burns, said Dr. Tharwat Zahran, a medical toxicologist and assistant professor of emergency medicine at the American University of Beirut. She continued:

Exposure to white phosphorus smoke could lead to acute upper respiratory damages including shortness of breath, fast breathing, [and] coughing, but it could also have delayed effects, [including] chemical pneumonitis, which might require hospitalization and respiratory support through a machine.

A photographer told Human Rights Watch in May 2024 that after inhaling smoke from white phosphorus munitions used in an attack in Kafr Kila, he stayed in bed, sleeping for two days. "To this day, my wife tells me I still have a cough," he said. Describing his initial exposure, the man said:

At one point I had to get closer to the white phosphorus smoke to get out of the village because the phosphorus was on the outskirts. I had my windows open while driving, and the smoke went into the car. I'm not sure what happened, but I'm sure that I inhaled.... I felt my stomach turning. My throat, lungs, and stomach felt awful. I got diarrhea that night. After that I couldn't eat for a while, for about five days or so.

Ramiz Dallah, another photographer from southern Lebanon, shared footage he took of white phosphorus attacks on the village of Shebaa, which Human Rights Watch independently verified. He said that after one attack in December the smoke from the projectiles covered portions of the Shebaa valley and the village itself: "I've smelled and inhaled white phosphorus when they struck Shebaa. All this smoke inside my body, I don't know what its effects are going to be in the long term."

Dr. Zahran, the medical toxicologist, said that doctors found in some cases that "people who went to check on their houses had secondary exposure where they experienced respiratory symptoms due to inhalation of white phosphorus that was still burning and present in the impacted area."

Government officials placed these accounts in a larger context. The mayor of Boustane said that two civilians-a municipal worker and a farmer-who were in their homes in the village had to be rushed to the hospital as a result of asphyxiation from inhaling white phosphorus smoke following the attack on October 15, 2023. The mayor of the village of Mays al-Jabal, Abdelmonem Choucair, said that "around 25 people, all civilians, were sent to hospitals because of white phosphorus during the first months of the war." Human Rights Watch verified photographs and videos posted on social media on November 12 and December 5, 2023 showing white phosphorus munitions being used in Mays al-Jabal. Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health said that, as of May 28, 2024, exposure to white phosphorus had injured at least 173 people since October 2023. Human Rights Watch did not independently confirm those numbers.

Socioeconomic and Environmental Consequences

The use of white phosphorus munitions has also had serious socioeconomic and environmental consequences, demonstrating the ripple effects of incendiary weapons. Farms and other local agricultural sites, which were often located close to residential homes, were hit particularly hard. Interviewees reported damage to various crops (especially olives and tobacco), bees, chickens, and livestock. A UN Development Programme (UNDP) study of the socioeconomic and environmental impacts of the war on Lebanon, published in December 2023, reinforces the accounts gathered by Human Rights Watch.

In some cases, farmers experienced economic harm due to direct damage to their crops. According to Choucair, the mayor of Mays al-Jabal, "There were thousands of trees just in Mays al-Jabal [that] were burnt from the white phosphorus. I saw it myself…. Whole fields, agricultural tents, gardens were burnt because of the [white] phosphorus shelling." According to UNDP, the problem occurred in other villages, too: "[F]ires have impacted various agricultural areas, affecting olive groves, citrus farms, banana farms, and pasture lands."

The direct effects on agricultural extended beyond the burning caused by white phosphorus. "In Mays al-Jabal, we saw 400 bee hives were impacted by white phosphorus smoke, and the bees were killed," Hisham Younes, the head of Green Southerners, an environmental organization in southern Lebanon, told Human Rights Watch. "But these hives also … need water near them so when people abandoned their villages, particularly after white phosphorus was used, bee hives were impacted."

In addition, the inability of farmers to access their farms after the use of white phosphorus interfered with the harvesting of existing crops and the planting of new ones. As discussed below, the use of white phosphorus munitions, sometimes combined with other weapons, contributed to displacement. Therefore, farmers, especially those who grew olives or vegetables, were unable to return to their farms to harvest what they had grown, which led to a major economic loss. According to the head of the Union of Agricultural Workers Union in southern Lebanon, "In agriculture, if you don't pick up the fruit or crop at the right time, it's done." The union official added that loss of access or contamination of land due to the use of white phosphorus prevented tobacco farmers from planting new crops. The 2023 hostilities in Lebanon took place between October and December, a "critical period" for harvesting and planting in that region.

Fear of the effects of contamination by white phosphorus munitions further affected farmers. "[T]he contamination of crops, surface and ground water [posed] threats to livestock and human health," the UNDP stated. As a result, "many people started getting scared of buying anything from the village or from the south because they're afraid it may have been hit with [white] phosphorus," Dallah, the photographer, said. "People didn't want to buy produce from our village." A farmer in Rmeish said white phosphorus left behind "white powder deposits," so he decided not to cultivate his olives until rain had fallen and the powder was washed off.

In its 2023 report on white phosphorus in Lebanon, the UNDP described other threats to the environment posed by these weapons. For example, the incendiary substance can not only burn crops but also ignite forest fires that harm, kill, or displace wildlife and destroy habitats. Fires can have a devastating impact on soil and water quality, burning soil organic matter, disrupting the nutrient cycle, and accelerating rates of erosion. In addition, fires can generate large volumes of smoke, harmful air pollutants, and greenhouse gases, which can cause acute and chronic health effects and adversely affect climate change. When exposed to air, white phosphorus ignites and normally oxidizes, rendering it less toxic. Depending on the location and conditions, however, elemental white phosphorus can remain, especially in damp soil or in water, and pose an exposure risk to people and wildlife. Contamination, which has killed waterfowl, has been recorded on military ranges where white phosphorus munitions have been fired. Elevated total phosphorus levels in soil can also constrain plant growth, and present a risk to water resources from eutrophication, that is, an overgrowth of aquatic plants.

Younes highlighted the extent of the problem. In October 2023, the Green Southerners began to track white phosphorus attacks and assess their impact on the environment. "On October 10, 2023, we saw that white phosphorus was being used," Younes said. "We thought that this was a one-off incident but then we started seeing it in other areas … and in forest lands, such as Labbouneh."

Displacement

The use of white phosphorus munitions contributed to the widespread displacement of civilians from southern Lebanon since October 2023. Displacement, in turn, disrupted civilians' traditional means of livelihood. For example, the head of the Union of Agricultural Workers Union in southern Lebanon, said: "All [the farmers'] sources of income are gone, and so these families' economic situation has deteriorated. The priorities of the families changed. They started prioritizing what to eat and consume."

Reflecting on the broader trend, the mayor of Boustane said that nearly all residents were still living in the village when it was attacked with white phosphorus on October 15, 2023. "During the first week of the war almost all 900 residents of Boustane were still in the village," he said. "After two weeks, almost 700 people were left…. Then we had only around 14 families…. Gradually they kept decreasing, and now there are only four people left." Data collected by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) for the period between October 10 to 15 indicates that displacement from the village was minimal until the date of the attack with white phosphorus. Human Rights Watch did not determine what other weapons may have also been used that week.

Abdelmonem Choucair, the Mays al-Jabal mayor, described his village as the most affected by white phosphorus. He said, "The use of the white phosphorus munitions in Mays al-Jabal pushed people out of the village and turned it into a military zone."

Gaza: Use of White Phosphorus by the Israeli Military

The Israeli military used white phosphorus in Gaza shortly after they began their bombardment of the area, following the Hamas-led attacks in southern Israel on October 7, 2023. Human Rights Watch verified the use of airburst white phosphorus on Gaza City port on October 11, 2023, through video and photograph analysis and phone interviews with witnesses.

As discussed in the next section, by airbursting white phosphorus munitions over a populated area, Israel violated customary international humanitarian law on distinction and precaution, yet its actions fell within the loophole of CCW Protocol III. (Israel is not party to Protocol III, but Palestine has joined it.) The attacks in Gaza also appear to contradict a position the Israeli government presented in an Israeli court after it struck several civilian areas of Gaza in 2009. In 2013, in response to a petition to Israel's High Court of Justice regarding those attacks, the Israeli military stated that it would no longer use white phosphorus in populated areas except in two narrow situations that it revealed only to the justices. In the court's ruling, Justice Edna Arbel said that the conditions would "render use of white phosphorous an extreme exception in highly particular circumstances." Although this ruling did not represent an official change in policy, Justice Arbel called on the Israeli military to conduct a "thorough and comprehensive examination" and adopt a permanent military directive.

Legal Analysis

Israel's use of airburst white phosphorus in populated areas in Lebanon and Gaza in 2023 and 2024 violated international humanitarian law and shows the need for stronger law that specifically governs incendiary weapons. Irrespective of the specific legal provisions on incendiary weapons under Protocol III, the use of airburst white phosphorus has a wide area effect and is therefore unlawfully indiscriminate in populated areas. The use also does not meet the legal requirement to take all feasible precautions to avoid civilian harm. As discussed above, the humanitarian consequences can be significant and wide ranging. In addition, less-harmful alternative smoke shells are available, such as the M150 smoke projectile, which the Israeli military has used as an obscurant, a means of hindering the visibility of its forces. Such alternatives can have the same effect and dramatically reduce the harm to civilians.

While the attacks with white phosphorus in Lebanon and Gaza constitute unlawful use of these weapons under existing international humanitarian law protections for civilians, they also highlight the need to strengthen the law dedicated to incendiary weapons. A more robust and comprehensive legal regime, which, at a minimum, explicitly encompasses white phosphorus and does not discriminate between incendiary weapons with different delivery systems, would eliminate any debate about what the law requires. It would also create stronger norms that, precedent shows, could influence not only states that have signed on, but also other states and non-state actors.

Other Incendiary Weapons Use: Ukraine and Syria

Ukraine

Visual evidence reviewed by Human Rights Watch shows that there were at least 157 attacks in Ukraine using surface-fired incendiary weapons between February 2022 and August 2024. Human Rights Watch reviewed and tracked videos posted to social media that showed incendiary weapon attacks in process. Remnants of two types of unguided 122mm Grad incendiary rockets have also been positively identified. It has not been possible for Human Rights Watch to attribute responsibility for these attacks, but Russia and Ukraine both possess 122mm Grad rockets that deliver incendiary weapons. Both countries are party to CCW Protocol III.

Both countries have recently developed and used armed drones to deliver incendiary munitions on the battlefield. The design and components of this capability have been shown in production and demonstrated in attacks captured visually and posted to social media. One such drone capable of delivering incendiary weapons has been colloquially termed a "Dragon Drone." This drone, which comes in multiple configurations, has been designed to ignite an incendiary munition carried by it. The drone then flies over the target area dispersing thermite or a similar incendiary compound to the ground below. Since the first week of September 2024, the Geoconfirmed platform verified at least 20 incidents, which were later confirmed by Human Rights Watch, across the entire front line in Ukraine, as well as in the Kursk region of Russia. Thermite payloads, which can have a wide area effect, burn at exceptionally high temperatures and can spray sparks or hot gas after ignition.

In many videos, the Dragon Drones appear to set fire to trees, burning forests in their wake, raising environmental concerns. There do not appear to be concentrations of civilians in the forests, and it is not clear if military targets were present in this area, but such use of incendiary weapons is nonetheless a disturbing development that deserves scrutiny and analysis under international law.

CCW Protocol III prohibits "mak[ing] forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military objectives." International humanitarian law provides additional protections. For example, armed forces should consider environmental harm when weighing the proportionality of an attack and determining whether they have taken all feasible precautions to protect civilians. The rules of proportionality and precaution were applied specifically to the environment in the recently developed Principles on the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict. The International Law Commission drafted the principles with state and civil society input, and UN General Assembly welcomed them in December 2022.

Syria

Syrian government forces launched incendiary weapon attacks in opposition-controlled northwest Syria in October 2023, using ground-launched Grad-series incendiary rockets, akin to ones used in Ukraine. Human Rights Watch verified the attacks through information provided by victims and first responders, audiovisual identification of the remnants of the carrier rockets, and identification of the unique hexagonal-shaped capsules that contain the incendiary substance.

On October 18, 2023, an incendiary rocket struck a house in the mid-size village of Darat Izzah, killing a 13-year-old girl, Mariam al-Helou, and injuring her 11-year-old sister, who suffered burns to her arm, leg, and back. On October 6, 7, and 8, 2023, other attacks with incendiary Grad rockets on the towns and villages of al- Abzimo, al-Atarib, Darat Izzah, and Jisr-al-Shughur caused no deaths, according to the Syria Civil Defence. In one strike on the village of al-Abzimo, Syria Civil Defence recorded injuries to three civilians, though none included burns. Given the inaccuracy of Grad rockets, this use of incendiary weapons with wide area effects is likely unlawfully indiscriminate under international humanitarian law.

The cases illustrate the threat posed by the use of ground-launched incendiary weapons in populated areas. Although Syria is not a party to Protocol III, such use is more weakly regulated under that protocol than the use of air-dropped incendiary weapons.

State Positions

Absent any clear alternative at this point, Meetings of High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Conventional Weapons have served as the primary forum in which states have respond to the problem of incendiary weapons. Since 2010, CCW high contracting parties have used their annual meetings to raise concerns about the human cost of the weapons and the limitations of Protocol III. Momentum to address these issues has grown, and at the annual CCW meeting in November 2023, a record number of high contracting parties criticized the humanitarian consequences of incendiary weapons and called for states to initiate discussions on how to deal with them.

At that meeting, more than 100 states parties expressed alarm and called for action through national and joint statements as well as working papers. States individually or in groups submitted seven working papers that raised issues related to incendiary weapons. Joint statements from a group of 8, a group of 63, the Arab Group, the European Union, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) showed that countries were uniting around policy positions. Fifteen states spoke in their national capacity, reinforcing that a range of countries recognize the importance of addressing incendiary weapons. At least 10 states endorsed joint statements implicitly embracing those statements' positions on incendiary weapons. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and six nongovernmental organizations also expressed concern and called for discussions.

Expressions of Concern

All the working papers and joint statements and some national statements highlighted the cruel effects of incendiary weapons. In their working paper and their statement delivered by Ireland, the group of 8-Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland-described incendiary weapons as "among the most inhumane in warfare." The countries explained that incendiary weapons "can inflict excruciating burns, respiratory damage for which specialized medical attention is generally unavailable in armed conflict, [and] cause profound psychological trauma." They also noted that the socioeconomic harm from the burning of civilian homes, infrastructure, and crops can cause a "long-lasting legacy [of] suffering," and that the weapons would likely cause unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury to combatants as well.

The evidence of harm led many high contracting parties to criticize recent use. Some, like Australia, spoke in general terms, while others named specific conflicts. Ireland, for example, said it was "deeply concerned by reported use" in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Ukraine. The group of 63 and NAM, in statements and working papers, expressed "alarm" at reports of use of white phosphorus by Israel in Gaza and Lebanon.

Many states explicitly mentioned the harm caused by "weapons with incendiary effects" in order to encompass white phosphorus munitions. In doing so, states seemed to acknowledge the need to address the gap in Protocol III's definition, which excludes multipurpose munitions that cause the same incendiary effects as those that are "primarily designed" to set fires and burn people. For example, in noting its concern about weapons with incendiary effects in its working paper, Australia wrote, "It is imperative that obscurants and illuminates are used in a way that complies with IHL." The working paper of the group of 8 declares that the "reported use of weapons with incendiary effects … is of direct relevance" to the CCW. The working paper goes on to say that the inability to "consider these serious manners in a structured manner … undermines the effectiveness of the Convention as a whole."

Calls for Discussions and Other Actions

Recognizing the humanitarian imperative to act, many of the states that spoke on incendiary weapons at the 2023 CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties also called for dedicated time to seriously discuss incendiary weapons and Protocol III. Some called generally for a forum for discussion without commenting on its format. According to Australia, "It is vital for the health of the CCW that high contracting parties can discuss implementation of all protocols including Protocol III."

Other high contracting parties presented specific proposals. The group of 8 renewed its call from 2022 for the annual meeting's president to hold informal intersessional consultations "on the implementation and universalisation of Protocol III" and to report back to the 2024 meeting of high contracting parties under a separate agenda item. The United Kingdom explicitly endorsed that proposal, while other high contracting parties focused on establishing the agenda item. Mexico not only supported the group of 8 in its national capacity but also called for states to "negotiate additional legally binding instruments to strengthen international humanitarian law."

There were also calls to universalize and comply with Protocol III. The European Union and Albania, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Ukraine called on all states not yet party to join Protocol III and urged full compliance with its provisions.

Some speakers noted the importance of reinserting language on incendiary weapons in the meeting's final report. From 2011 to 2021, the final report included language that reflected high contracting parties' concerns about incendiary weapons and the discussions about Protocol III during the meeting. The language was removed in 2022 due to the opposition of one state-Russia. The group of 8, ICRC, and civil society all called for the language to be included in the 2023 report.

Results of the Meeting

Despite the grave concern about incendiary weapons, the widespread calls for CCW high contracting parties to initiate a concrete response did not succeed in 2023. The CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties operates by consensus, and the proposals of the vast majority of high contracting parties were again blocked by Russia. As a result, informal consultations did not take place in the intersessional period, and the 2023 final report does not include language on Protocol III.

Multiple high contracting parties objected to such use of consensus. Austria, for example, said that it was "concerned that the misuse of the rules of procedure by one delegation prevents this meeting from functioning according to its mandate," and that it saw "an urgent need for further discussions" on Protocol III.^[70] While these expressions of protest could not change the results of the 2023 CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties, the statements made, including joint ones, indicated that momentum toward improving protection for civilians from these incendiary weapons is growing.

Human Rights Watch calls on high contracting parties and other countries to continue not only to highlight the humanitarian consequences of these weapons but also to consider what forum is best suited to take effective action, including by initiating discussions outside the CCW framework.

Acknowledgments

This report was researched and written by Bonnie Docherty, senior arms advisor in the Crisis, Conflict and Arms Division of Human Rights Watch. Significant additional research and review were provided by Ramzi Kaiss, Lebanon researcher in the Middle East and North Africa Division.

Mary Wareham, deputy director of the Crisis, Conflict and Arms Division, edited the report. James Ross, legal and policy director, and Sari Bashi, program director, provided legal and programmatic reviews respectively.

Specialist reviews were provided by Ida Sawyer, director of the Crisis, Conflict and Arms Division; Mark Hiznay, associate director in the Crisis, Conflict and Arms Division; Rachel Denber, deputy director of the Europe and Central Asia Division; Yulia Gorbunova, senior researcher in the Europe and Central Asia Division; Adam Coogle, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa Division; and Milena Ansari, Israel and Palestine assistant researcher in the Middle East and North Africa Division.

Production assistance was provided by Mennah Abdelwahab, arms associate in the Crisis, Conflict and Arms Division. The report was prepared for publication by Travis Carr, publications officer. Kathleen Rose, senior editor, reviewed the press release accompanying the report.

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