South Caucasus on the edge: How Georgia’s elections could redefine regional stability

• CommentaryRussia Caucasus and Central Asia
  by Simona Scotti

On October 26, Georgian citizens were called to the polls for parliamentary elections, the first to be held under a proportional system. As reported by the OSCE ODIHR election mission, the increasingly authoritarian Georgian Dream party, which obtained 53.94% of the votes, was re-elected in a context marked by electoral fraud, pressure and intimidation. Opposition parties and President Salome Zourabichvili are now calling for peaceful protests on Rustaveli avenue, in front of the Parliament.

Not only is the peculiarity of these elections connected to the future democratic stability of the country, but also to its foreign alignment. Indeed, these are the first elections to be held since Georgia was granted EU candidacy status, and since the adoption of the controversial Law on Foreign Agents, which targets civil society and the media, two events that took place within just six months of each other. Against this backdrop, it is clear why the elections have been labeled as a referendum on the country's European future.

A polarized country

What lies ahead for Georgia remains unclear, as Georgian Dream has promised to outlaw opposition parties, while the pro-European opposition has declared that it will not enter parliament. Protests are threatening to erupt into violence. However, it is certain that the elections have portrayed the image of a highly polarized country, where geopolitics plays a preponderant role in the lives of many citizens, both directly and indirectly.

Since taking power in 2012, Georgian Dream has taken substantial steps to bring Georgia closer to the European path. The adoption of the Association Agreement and the implementation of the visa liberalization, culminating in the granting of EU candidate status, testify to these efforts. However, during its last term, the ruling party has taken an authoritarian turn, leading to the adoption of laws that contradict commitments made towards European integration. Moreover, Georgian Dream has spread news and conspiracy theories about the West, including claims about a so-called Global War Party, an alleged alliance of Western and local forces pushing Georgia toward conflict with Russia. At the same time, Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire oligarch with strong ties to the Kremlin and the de facto leader of Georgian Dream, seems intent on pursuing a foreign policy he defines as pragmatic, avoiding clashes with Moscow. A month before the elections, he declared that Georgia should apologize to the breakaway region of South Ossetia for the 2008 war with Russia, sparking anger among the Georgian population.

These events have resulted in the freezing of the EU accession process, the cancellation of NATO military trainings in Georgia, and the suspension of high-level meetings between EU and Georgia representatives. Brussels threatens to impose further measures if democratic standards deteriorate, such as suspending some provisions of the Free Trade Agreement, stopping the visa liberalization process, and even imposing sanctions. "Georgia is entering yet another political crisis and risks isolation from the West. Georgia's EU integration process is likely to remain suspended until the political crisis is resolved, and the new government is returning to genuine democratization. This is unlikely if the Georgian Dream forms the government, hence a long freeze in EU-Georgian relations is the best plausible expectation one can have for now"¹ comments Irakli Sirbiladze, ReThink.CEE fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

The impact on the region

This situation has the potential to destabilize the entire South Caucasus, a region highly vulnerable to Russian interference. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has never failed to assert and strengthen its influence, often to the detriment of regional stability. Although Moscow's grip on Southern Caucasus had weakened in recent years due to events such as the end of the war in Karabakh, Armenia's Western turn, the energy partnership between Brussels and Baku, and Georgia's European integration projects, recent developments risk isolating the region, providing the Kremlin with the opportunity to reestablish its influence.

Among all the South Caucasus countries, Armenia is the one that risks paying the highest price. Yerevan's rapprochement with the West after 2020 is progressing successfully, as evidenced by the deployment of the European Union Monitoring Mission, the launching of the visa liberalization dialogue, and the economic support to the Armenian Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility. Attempts to differentiate Armenia's foreign policy have been welcomed with enthusiasm by the European Union, but the deterioration of relations with Tbilisi risks hindering a strengthening of relations, if not putting them on hold. Georgia has traditionally maintained the most EU-aligned foreign policy among the Caucasus countries and enjoys more leeway than Armenia. Georgia's failure to integrate into Europe may serve as a deterrent for Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, prompting future leaders to reconsider the Armenian foreign policy's pivot to the West.

On another note, the re-election of Georgian Dream has opened the doors to a possible relocation of NGOs based in Georgia to avoid the detrimental effects of the implementation of the Law on Foreign Agents, thus making Yerevan a new hub of pro-Western civil society. At present, Armenia enjoys the most cordial ties with the West compared to other countries in the region, and its democratic performance potentially makes it a suitable option for relocation. However, for now, the NGOs that have opted to relocate seem to prefer to leave the region, choosing countries such as Estonia for their new headquarter. This might be related to concerns over Armenia's remaining economic and military dependence on Russia, despite the attempts at foreign policy diversification, as well as bureaucratic difficulties.

For Azerbaijan, the situation is more ambivalent, but equally precarious. The end of the Karabakh war and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have brought new dynamics to the South Caucasus. For a time, Russia's role in the region seemed to have faded, with Armenia and Azerbaijan looking at the West as a prime platform for mediation between the two sides. Furthermore, while Russia deployed a peacekeeping force to avert further escalations, it did not prevent the military operation that took place in September 2023, and shortly thereafter the peacekeepers were permanently withdrawn from the region. However, frictions between Baku and Brussels over the past year have further alienated the country's leadership from the West. The Russian side, which is currently dependent on Azerbaijan for the development of the North-South Corridor - a trade route that has become crucial for Moscow after the imposition of sanctions by the West - seeks to exploit this friction by strengthening Azerbaijani-Russian relations.

While on the surface the new situation may not seem to cause immediate concerns for Baku, these developments could be alarming in the long term. According to Giorgi Badridze, Senior Fellow at Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, "Russia was opposed to the formation of viable, sovereign states out of the former Soviet Republics, hoping to keep them under influence and to reinstate its control one day. Azerbaijan's strength was generated from its ability to have access to the international markets and its strategic ally Turkey without Russian control, via a pro-Western Georgia. An openly pro-Russian government in Georgia could challenge that".²

The security dimension

In this context, in a region as volatile as the South Caucasus it is challenging to carry out democratization without first having completed stabilization. In an area where the fear of war is real, citizens will primarily want security guarantees, and this perhaps explains why, beyond the various electoral frauds, a certain percentage of Georgian citizens decided to give their vote to Georgian Dream, and why Ivanishvili's alarmist and anti-Western rhetoric is resonating within the electorate. The efforts made by the West in Georgia in recent decades are notable and have led to major successes, but perhaps not enough focus has been given to the security dimension. While the European Union has guaranteed Georgia military support through the European Peace Facility, evidently this has not been enough to reassure Georgians that there are the prerogatives to continue the European path without reactions from Moscow. And without correcting this shortcoming, the risk of further isolating the Caucasus from the West remains high.