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11/19/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 11/19/2024 10:50

A Military Strategy for Negotiations in Ukraine

A Military Strategy for Negotiations in Ukraine

Photo: Artem Hvozdkov/Getty Images

Commentary by Benjamin Jensen

Published November 19, 2024

With talks of negotiations emerging, the United States needs a clear military strategy that supports the process and ensures Kyiv negotiates from a position of strength. This strategy should build on the recent, partial removal of long-range strike restrictions and drop outdated restrictions that limit weapons transfers that could actually save the U.S. taxpayer money and support continued economic growth.

First, there is a need to align weapons release authorities with the battlefield reality of the ongoing, multi-front, Russian ground offensive in Kursk and Eastern Ukraine. Russia is assuming significant risk to force and mission in an increasingly desperate race to seize more territory before the new year and inauguration in Washington. Battlefield casualties continue to make records despite an economy in free fall. In addition, North Korea has entered the fight, and Pyongyang is deploying additional long-range artillery to support the campaign alongside promises of up to 100,000 additional soldiers. There are also reports China is making lethal drones to support this final push. Russian glide bombs continue to batter trenches along the front line while drone and missile salvos saturate the skies over Ukrainian cities, targeting critical infrastructure.

The only way to counter these developments is by ensuring Ukraine has the ability to strike deep into Russia. Washington must allow Kyiv to strike targets in Russia beyond Kursk while persuading reluctant European partners like Germany to release their current prohibitions and convincing South Korea to send weapons to Ukraine, including long-range missiles. Ukraine needs the ability to hold Russian forces, and supply depots, at risk to disrupt Moscow's operational reach. With its own forces increasingly strained, Kyiv needs to replace man power with firepower as it fights a series of delaying actions and defensive campaigns on multiple fronts designed to attrite Russian forces until winter sets in. While the Biden administration has expressed concerns about escalation, by further expanding Ukraine's ability to strike deep now they can actually give the Trump team more leverage in any negotiation. President Biden owns the risk to free Ukraine to defend itself and create an option on the table for any ceasefire talks.

Second, Ukraine offers an opportunity for the Trump administration to test key aspects of its policy agenda: (1) creating a smaller, more efficient government, (2) countering China and Iran, and (3) getting allies and partners to pay more for their fair share for common security interests.

To date, the Biden administration has resisted sending key weapons systems Ukraine asked for while doing little to reform overly restrictive export International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). These regulations are managed by the Department of State and control what defense items can be shared with foreign partners. Used correctly these regulations protect U.S. military secrets. Used ineptly, they create strategic risk by denying key partners access to even legacy weapon systems they need to defend their sovereign territory. For example, Ukraine has yet to receive key systems like MQ-9s or emerging capabilities that could turn the tide in drone warfare like high-powered microwaves.

Yet, the war in Ukraine offers a once-in-a-generation opportunity to both offload retiring equipment, which saves the U.S. taxpayer money and to test new capabilities that will prove crucial to countering China and Iran. By sending Ukraine both MQ-9s, as well as other drones currently being retired including U.S. Army Shadow and U.S. Marine Corps Blackjack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the incoming Trump team can show how they turning sunk costs into battlefield gains prior to negotiations. In addition, these systems can play a key role in monitoring any post-conflict demilitarized zone and defending key terrain. These are the types of security guarantees both Kyiv and Washington will need to make any talks with Moscow meaningful and not just appeasement theater.

By waiving outdated ITAR regulations, including restrictions on transferring high-powered microwaves, the Trump team can also battle test key capabilities that will be required in future wars in the Middle East and Asia. These systems offer the best chance to counter drones, and swarming drone attacks are here to stay. The sooner Washington helps Ukraine come up with novel ways of defeating small UAVs, the better placed it will be to deter Tehran and Beijing over the next four years.

Third, the Trump team can use the existing multinational capability coalitions-which are predominantly led by European partners-to create a more equitable balance of support for Ukraine that actually creates American jobs. There are multiple, creative ways the incoming administration can use frozen Russian assets, including loans, to fund these coalitions and find ways to reduce U.S. support to a more manageable level that continues to support U.S. workers. The more U.S. weapons European-led capability coalitions buy, the better it is for the U.S. defense industrial base and economy. The fact is, U.S. military assistance to Ukraine actually supports high-paying jobs across the United States while providing an impetus to rebuild the arsenal of democracy needed to deter a larger war. A more inward-looking United States still needs a military that has the capability and capacity to make authoritarians in Moscow, Tehran, Pyongyang, and Beijing think twice.

Benjamin Jensen is a senior fellow for Futures Lab in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and the Frank E. Petersen Chair of Emerging Technology and professor of strategic studies at the Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting. The views expressed are his own as a private citizen.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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Senior Fellow, Futures Lab, International Security Program

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