Ukraine’s Narrative War: Combating Russian Disinformation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Commentary by Daniel F. Runde

Published December 17, 2024

While separated by the Atlantic Ocean, the use of modern media, in addition to economic pressure and geopolitical relationships, has narrowed the distance between Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and the Russia-Ukraine war. Through disinformation campaigns, Russia has worked to make itself an ally to LAC countries against the "neocolonial" West, undermine support for NATO, and open avenues for Russian-LAC trade in order to lessen the economic impacts of Western sanctions. These efforts have proven successful, and LAC countries remain hesitant to speak out against Russia in the conflict. As Ukraine looks for support across the LAC region, it must simultaneously counteract Russian disinformation, build upon existing, and, in some cases, invest in new media relationships to broaden its reach and work with local and federal governments to solidify Ukraine's economic, social, and political connections to LAC countries.

Russia's Media Landscape in LAC

Since President Vladimir Putin came into power in 2000, his government has engaged in active media campaigns throughout LAC, with a notable uptick occurring in 2014 (prior to Russia's first invasion of Ukraine) and again in 2022. In 2014, Russia made a conscious effort to broadcast the 2014 FIFA World Cup, which was Russia's substantive entry into LAC. Moscow's appeal to the LAC region was that, similar to Russia itself, LAC has never fully been part of the liberal world order, nor has it been taken seriously by the West, so, therefore, should not be beholden to its rules. This message percolates throughout much of LAC media with relative ease. Russia's two main media outlets in the region, Russia Today (RT) en Español and Sputnik Mundo, reach an audience of approximately 32 million. In 2023, RT en Español ranked second and ninth in Colombia and Chile, respectively, in terms of X (formerly Twitter) influence; in comparison, U.S. Voice of America, the closest affiliate to the U.S. government, did not make the top 100. In addition to RT en Español and Sputnik Mundo, Russia engages with local social media influencers to spread their content across social media platforms and coordinates extensively with LAC state-run media to make their narrative campaigns appear organic to their LAC audiences.

Common narratives include accusing the United States and NATO of planning the war in Ukraine as a proxy war against Russia, claiming that Ukraine is using staged actors to resemble corpses in photos and that Ukraine has manipulated Western media to appear as a victim of war when in "reality" it was Russia who was forced to engage in a "special military operation" to "denazify" Ukraine to protect Russian citizens from the growing Russophobia and corruption that has become commonplace in the country. Immediately following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the hashtag #abolishNATO trended across the region, including in Colombia, a NATO global partner. Russian media outlets have posted propaganda videos of President Putin and clips of U.S. congressmen speaking out against sending support to Ukraine, in addition to conspiracy theories. The low cost and ease of dissemination, in addition to the openness of LAC's media environment, has allowed Russia to permeate its anti-Western and conspiracy theorist views in LAC news outlets.

Other authoritarian actors are also active in the media space in LAC, and their messaging provides Russian misinformation campaigns yet another avenue of integration into the region. While there is no evidence of strategic coordination between Russia and the Chinese media outlets broadcasting in LAC, most notably Xinhua, they both benefit from the "virtuous cycle of disinformation" that is reinforced as they quote and reference the other as a verified source in their own publications. This relationship is particularly noticeable in Argentina, where both RT en Español and Xinhua have large bureaus producing a variety of media in Spanish. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has been careful to market itself as a neutral party while being equally careful not to blame Russia for the war in Ukraine. Russian state media outlets often quote the anti-Western stories published by Xinhua in a bid to strengthen their own arguments, creating a disinformation echo chamber that is intermixed with actual news stories, making it challenging to differentiate from reality. The PRC's state media presence in the region is not as sophisticated as Russia's, instead relying on content-sharing agreements and paid segments in local media outlets to disseminate its messaging. Nevertheless, the synergy between the two powers in the media space shows that Moscow's efforts do not exist in a vacuum and benefit from a global network of authoritarian information operations that increasingly feed off one another to augment their individual influence.

While the 2022 invasion did damage Russia's image, the region has remained hesitant to support Ukraine. A poll conducted in Mexico shortly after the invasion found that 56 percent thought Mexico should not get involved in any way, including humanitarian aid, and while 65 percent of the Argentinian population rejected the war, 25 percent still viewed President Putin favorably. However, Russia views success as Latin America's neutrality, not their full support. Russia does not need the average citizen to believe every piece of disinformation it publishes; however, the path of "active non-alignment" that much of the region has taken since the war illustrates the work Russia has put into streamlining its propaganda campaigns and the successes they have seen in sowing doubt about the Western world order.

Through these efforts, Russia has benefitted from noticeable public omissions. In April 2023, Brazilian president Lula da Silva came under fire for parroting what was viewed as a pro-Russia stance, telling reporters that it was "important that the U.S. stops encouraging war and starts talking about peace" during a visit to China. In a joint statement with President Xi that mentioned the Russia-Ukraine war, neither used the words "invasion" or "war." To add insult to injury, Lula also invited Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov to Brazil, where Brazilian foreign minister Mauro Vieira made comments criticizing sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies on Russia. At the same time, Russia has made direct stands through economic coercion. In February 2024, Ecuador announced that it would no longer be sending weapons to support the Ukrainian war effort through a U.S. assistance exchange after Moscow slammed the decision as "reckless" and threatened to ban the import of some Ecuadoran bananas and flowers valued at $800 million.

Strengthening Ukraine's Footprint in LAC

The "ceaseless and effective" use of disinformation campaigns across the region has been successful in swaying public opinion toward indifference and building reluctance across Latin American governments to provide support to Ukraine. Recognizing the need for increased engagement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine published a specific communication strategy for the region, which outlines both the previous steps the country has taken to bolster its engagement and its 2024-2026 strategic plan. The strategy's main objective is to improve Ukraine's reputation in LAC to encourage governments to vocally condemn Russia's acts of aggression. There is strong reason to believe Latin American governments would do this, given most countries have foreign policy approaches rooted in sovereignty, defense of territorial sovereignty, and upholding international law. Of the 15 "tasks" outlined in the strategy, six of them explicitly aim at countering Russian disinformation and propaganda campaigns. These recommendations range from monitoring the spread of anti-Ukrainian disinformation to communicating to Latin American audiences Ukraine's efforts to hold Russia accountable.

Concrete steps the Ukrainian government can take to increase its digital and physical footprint in LAC include the following:

• Continue to adopt the use of modern technologies, identify disinformation narratives, increase Ukraine's media presence, and work with local communities and influencers to spread Ukraine's messaging. Technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) have enormous potential to lower costs and increase the effectiveness of messaging campaigns throughout the region. Both Ukraine and Russia have utilized AI within their battlefield operations; Ukraine should employ its AI capabilities in the "narrative war" in LAC as well. AI can analyze large quantities of digital content to more effectively identify Russian disinformation narratives. In addition, working with local influencers and media outlets, similar to what Russia is doing, will enable Ukraine to share its messaging on a more granular level. Ukraine can leverage the United States' technical capabilities to create high-quality video content, which can be disseminated via Ukrainian and LAC media outlets.
• Open additional embassies and leverage the Ukrainian diaspora in LAC. Currently, Ukraine has only six diplomatic missions in the region-Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Mexico, and Peru-representing less than 19 percent of the region. None of these embassies have a designated communications officer. It is imperative that, in addition to opening more diplomatic missions in the region, the current missions increase their staff to incorporate public relations specialists. Given the immense funding needs of the reconstruction, these embassies could operate virtually or rent space within a partner country's embassy. While additional embassies and staff are being built out, the government should work to leverage the Ukrainian diaspora in the region. The large diasporas in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay could serve as informal ambassadors working to strengthen community relationships between LAC and Ukraine. As Ukraine is scaling up its diplomatic engagement in the region, working with local governments and organizations will allow them to expand their reach to audiences otherwise overlooked, especially in rural areas where indigenous languages are common.
• Host a Ukraine-Latin America Summit. The Ukrainian government and LAC leaders have discussed the possibility of hosting a Ukraine-Latin America Summit since 2023 as a way to increase Ukraine's presence in LAC. Most recently, President Javier Milei in Argentina has expressed his interest in hosting such a gathering. There is mixed support by LAC countries for such a summit, and plans remain vague as to when, where, and with whom the summit will take place. LAC leaders are increasingly turning away from Ukraine, including at the 2024 Peace Summit in Switzerland, during which Brazil and Mexico refused to sign the declaration, and Colombia canceled its attendance at the last minute. This initiative is an opportunity for leaders to discuss shared security, human rights, and governance priorities, address the proliferation of Russian disinformation, and take a "new step" in their regions' relationship. This summit could be hosted in Argentina, in keeping with its previous declarations and given the large Ukrainian diaspora in the country and support for Ukraine in the war.
• Encourage cultural exchanges between Ukrainian and LAC government officials and media producers. 2022 and 2023 saw significant engagement between Ukraine and LAC countries. Alejandro Giammattei, the former president of Guatemala, visited Ukraine in the summer of 2022-the first Latin American leader to visit the country officially in over a decade-and President Zelenskyy participated in a number of virtual engagements with other LAC leaders. In 2023, President Zelenskyy attended Javier Milei's inauguration ceremony. However, these engagements need to happen on a more frequent basis and incorporate not just heads of state but also ministry leaders, local government officials, and civil society representatives. Over the past two years, CSIS has organized four delegation trips to Ukraine for U.S. congressional members and staffers, which has led to increased communication and strengthened relationships between Ukrainian and U.S. policymakers. By meeting with local and federal Ukrainian officials, U.S. lawmakers had the opportunity to see firsthand the impacts of the war, how U.S. taxpayer dollars are being spent in support of Ukraine's efforts, and the dedication of the Ukrainian people. Similar trips should be organized to take LAC officials and civil society members to Ukraine and vice versa. On-the-ground engagement between Ukraine and LAC countries will strengthen the relationship between the regions, as well as show the unfiltered impacts of the war.
• Uplift and Develop Ukrainian Media within LAC. Similar to Russia's RT et Español and Sputnik Mundo, Ukraine should invest in Spanish and Portuguese language media channels that broadcast throughout the region. Ukraine's media landscape is vast, with varying levels of credibility, published in print, online, or both, and is owned primarily by private individuals. Ukrinform, Ukraine's national news agency and one of the few state-owned news agencies in the country, does have Spanish translation, but there are no international correspondents in LAC. By opening a LAC hub, as well as building out other media outlets in the region, these channels could publish LAC news as well as share Ukraine's story. This effort would work toward achieving the strategic and communication objectives laid out in the 2024-2026 Ukraine-Latin America and the Caribbean Communication Strategy, including strengthening the "perception of Ukraine in Latin American countries" and facilitating "clear and convincing communication of Ukraine's foreign policy initiatives."

Conclusion

As Ukraine works toward bolstering its position in LAC, the region is looking toward the United States for a signal of its continued support for Ukraine. Many countries view waning U.S. support for Ukraine in the war as an excuse to turn toward Russia or to remain on the fence. With Russia's surprisingly resilient and sustained presence in the Global South, Russia seeks not only to undermine Ukraine but also to undermine Western influence. China and other authoritarian actors are increasingly entering this space as well to sway regional support away from Western democratic principles in favor of a multipolar world order. Through continued and predictable support, the United States will signal to LAC that the war is not over and that it remains a steadfast leader in the fight against authoritarianism.

Ukraine is fighting an uphill battle, but it is not a battle the country lacks the tools to win. Modern diplomacy is people oriented. By increasing engagement with local, regional, and federal representatives, journalists, and influencers, Ukraine can work toward countering Russian disinformation and gaining regional support at the local and federal levels.

Daniel F. Runde is a senior vice president, director of the Project on Prosperity and Development, and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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