NPT Second Preparatory Committee EU Statement on Cluster II

European Union

EU Statement on Cluster II (nuclear non-proliferation)

Second Preparatory Committee for the 11th Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Geneva, 22 July - 2 August 2024

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The candidate countries North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova[1]as well as the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

The multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament framework is under unprecedented pressure due to current geopolitical challenges, such as Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East. In view of Iran's alarming expansion of its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the DPRK's continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, we must strengthen our collective efforts to uphold and preserve the NPT, the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, together with the Additional Protocol, represent the current IAEA verification standard under Article III of the NPT.The EU continues to promote their universalisation and calls upon States, which have not yet done so, to conclude and bring into force these indispensable instruments before the next NPT Review Conference.

We call on concerned States to amend or rescind their Small Quantities Protocols (SQP) without delay, especially those countries that are already in the process of building a nuclear power plant or research reactor. We note with concern that the Agency will no longer be able to draw safeguards conclusions for States with the outdated protocol.

Mr. Chair,

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine is posing multiple grave threats to global security. It seriously affects nuclear safety and security. The situation remains particularly precarious at Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant that Russia has illegally seized. Moreover, Russia's continued reckless attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure pose serious threats to the safety and security of Ukraine's other nuclear facilities.

Russia must withdraw its troops, military equipment and all other Russian personnel from the entire territory of Ukraine, and fully respect Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.

Under these unprecedented circumstances, the work of the IAEA is of utmost importance. We thank the Agency and its courageous staff for their crucial work in very difficult circumstances. The IAEA's seven pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security in armed conflicts and the five principles established for the protection of the ZNPP must be respected. The IAEA Support and Assistance Missions at the ZNPP must have access to all requested locations, information and personnel. The EU and its member States have granted crucial technical and financial support to the activities of the Agency in that regard.

The EU welcomes that despite the very challenging circumstances the IAEA was able to continue to implement safeguards and undertake in-field verification activities, necessary to draw the safeguards conclusion for Ukraine for 2023. It is a key issue for the NPT that safeguards continue to be implemented pursuant to Ukraine's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.

Mr. Chair,

It is a key security priority for the EU to ensure that Iran will never acquire a nuclear weapon. We recall Iran's commitments in that respect and its international obligations under the NPT. The EU remains committed to a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. We call on all countries to support the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). We regret that Iran has not made the necessary decisions to return to its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, to which the EU remains committed.

The EU remains deeply concerned by the continued alarming expansion of Iran's nuclear programme and by Iran' s lack of cooperation with the Agency. Iran's actions carry very significant proliferation-related risks and have no credible civilian justification. In this context, we fully share the concerns of the IAEA's Director General on public statements made in Iran about its capability to produce nuclear weapons. We urge Iran to return to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol and to resume implementation of all JCPOA-related monitoring and verification measures. We call on Iran to take concrete positive measures in accordance with the March 2023 Joint Statement and on the basis of the Agency's latest concrete proposals.

The EU is gravely concerned that the Agency could not confirm the correctness and completeness of Iran's declarations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement, and that safeguards issues remain outstanding. Iran needs to resolve these issues stemming from its legally binding obligations under its NPT-required Safeguards Agreement. We urge Iran to work with the IAEA swiftly and substantially towards full compliance with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement obligations, as called for in a number of Board of Governors resolutions, most recently the one adopted in June. We urge Iran to co-operate immediately and in full with the IAEA in order for the Agency to be in a position to provide the required assurances that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

The EU urges the DPRK to cease all unlawful and destabilising actions that undermine regional and international peace and security, and comply with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The DPRK must take concrete steps in dismantling its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missile and existing nuclear programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. The DPRK will never be accepted as nuclear weapon state in any international forum. Its continuous violations of UN Security Council resolutions cannot and will not be accepted.

We urge the DPRK to return to compliance with the NPT and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and to bring into force an Additional Protocol to that Agreement. We also urge the DPRK to refrain from testing nuclear weapons, to reaffirm the moratorium on long-range ballistic missile testing and nuclear tests and to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, without further delay nor precondition. The EU is ready to work with all relevant partners in promoting a meaningful diplomatic process aimed at building the basis for sustainable peace and security and take steps aimed at pursuing the complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula.

It is critical that sanctions that target the DPRK's illegal weapon programmes, remain in place as long as these programmes exist. The EU recalls the obligation of all UN Member States to fully implement all UN Security Council resolutions. We are seriously concerned bythe expanding military cooperation between the DPRK and Russia, which undermines the global non-proliferation regime and represents a flagrant violation of multiple UNSC Resolutions. We strongly condemn the arms transfers, in particular of ballistic missiles, and military support of the DPRK to Russia. We also condemn Iran's military cooperation with Russia. Were Iran to proceed with providing ballistic missiles or related technology to Russia, we are prepared to respond swiftly and in a coordinated manner including with new and significant measures against Iran.

The EU deeply regrets that Syria still needs to remedy its longstanding non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement under the NPT. The EU supports the IAEA's efforts to address this situation. We take note of the new engagement agreed between the IAEA and Syria during the DG's visit to Damascus on 19 March and urge Syria to seize this opportunity to constructively engage with the Agency on the outstanding issues. Moreover, in order to rebuild confidence in its nuclear programme, we call on Syria to bring into force an Additional Protocol to its NPT Safeguards Agreement without further delay, in line with the IAEA Board of Governors resolution of June 2011.

Mr. Chair,

The IAEA safeguards system remains a fundamental component of the NPT. The EU attaches great importance to the IAEA's mandate and its impartial, independent and objective role. The close cooperation between EURATOM and the IAEA contributes to the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards in EURATOM Member States.

The EU recalls the importance of effective export controls, in accordance with Article III of the NPT, and in compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887 and 2325. We invite all States to adhere to the guidelines of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. We reiterate that export control regimes allow States to ensure that proliferation concerns are addressed and thus facilitate the development of peaceful uses of nuclear technology. We support the participation of all EU Member States therein.

The proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic missiles and missile technology is a destabilizing factor and remains a matter of grave concern to the EU. The EU calls on all states that have not yet done so, to join The Hague Code of Conduct, the only multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument aimed at bolstering efforts to curb ballistic missile proliferation. The EU has been a tireless advocate for its universalisation and the effective implementation.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[1]North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

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