China Suspended Nuclear Arms Control Talks With the US. Here’s Why.

In response to a question during a regular press conference, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian said, "the Chinese side decided to hold off discussion with the US on a new round of consultations on arms control and non-proliferation." Reuters described the decision as "a protest of Washington's arms sales to the democratically governed island of Taiwan." But Lin's full explanation, and the disappointing outcome of governmental and nongovernmental talks between US and Chinese arms control experts, suggest there may be other reasons Chinese leaders suspended the talks.

Lin mentioned US arms sales to Taiwan, but noted, without specifying, there are other US behaviors that make it difficult to establish the mutual trust Lin called a "necessary condition" for constructive bilateral nuclear arms control talks. The past two US administrations defined China as a "strategic competitor," disparaged scientific cooperation, imposed economic tarrifs, and restricted Chinese access to critical technologies, markets and investments. They also stepped up US military activity on China's periphery and encourgaed US allies to do the same. When Lin said the "political atmosphere for continuing the arms control consultations" was "seriously compromised," he wasn't just talking about arms sales to Taiwan.

China's decision to suspend talks followed two important meetings with US counterparts. The first was an official gathering in Washington in November 2023. The Chinese delegation was led by the Foreign Ministry's director-general of arms control, Sun Xiaobo. Mallory Stewart, the assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification, and compliance, led the US group. The two diplomats did not issue a joint statement after the meeting, most likely because the two sides left with different unmet expectations. US participants were hoping for greater transparency about China's present and future nuclear capabilities. A senior US official complained the US government didn't learn anything new. The Chinese side apparently saw no indication the United States would consider abandoning "strategic competition" for the "common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable" approach to security the Chinese government prefers.

The second meeting was held four months later in Shanghai, in the same hotel where President Richard Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai signed the Shanghai-Communique in 1972. Although this was a "Track II" gathering with no governmental representation, the qualifications and professional experience of the participants suggests it was important, especially to the Chinese. Hu Side, a former director of China's nuclear weapons lab who played a leading role in the development of China's nuclear weapons program and continues to advise the Chinese leadership on nuclear weapons and arms control policy, led the Chinese team. Linton Brooks, a former administrator of the US National Nuclear Security Administration who spent most of his career helping develop and implement US nuclear weapons policy, was supposed to head the US delegation but was unable to make the trip. Many of the Chinese and American participants attended similar US-China discussions in the past and know each other well.

The agenda included sessions on crisis management, confidence building measures, nuclear weapons policy and US-China relations. The US organizer, David Santoro, told Reuters the Chinese assured US participants China will never use nuclear weapons first, under any circumstances, even if there is war over Taiwan. Santoro also reported the Chinese said their government's nuclear weapons policy has not changed, that its goal is to maintain a credible ability to retaliate if China is struck first, and that Chinese decision-makers are not pursuing numerical parity with the United States, let alone numerical superiority.

Santoro did not tell Reuters what the US side said to the Chinese, but the overall US message was not well received. One long-term Chinese participant in these nongovernmental dialogues, which have been going on for almost twenty years, told UCS he's "lost heart" in the process. He said, "The window of opportunity for China and the United States to avoid an arms race is closed." And in his view, the fault lies squarely on the US side. "The United States has completed its domestic mobilization against China, and China has yet to realize the seriousness of the consequences." Comments from other Chinese participants were less pessimistic, but not encouraging. The opinions of this elite community of Chinese arms control experts were summarized and passed up to senior Chinese officials. It is highly likely those opinions played a role in the Chinese leadership's decision to suspend official talks.

While things may look dismal in the short term, China seems committed to preparing for a more promising future. The Chinese sent 17 people to the Shanghai talks, as well as a group of young scientists and analysts. The Chinese insisted, despite initial US objections, that the agenda include a 90 minute "young scholars forum" where the next generation of Chinese arms control experts could gain valuable experience. It was an undeniably hopeful Chinese investment in the long-term future of nuclear arms control negotiations, which should prompt US officials who accuse China of bad faith to reconsider their negative assessments of Chinese intentions.