Changes at Tumangang Khasan Rail Crossing as DPRK Russia Alliance Evolves

Approximate count of railcars at Tumangang and Khasan shows the high level of activity at the Russia-North Korea railroad crossing reported to be involved in export of Russian coal through North Korea over the past four months.

Key Findings

• Beyond Parallel reviewed satellite imagery of the Russia-North Korea border at the Tumangang-Khasan railroad crossing from early February to mid-July 2024, a few months before and a few weeks after Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to North Korea on June 18.
• Imagery analysis shows a new railcar traffic pattern compared to the previous two years, with more ore and tank cars and fewer boxcars. This suggests an increase in the transfer of coal and oil into North Korea and a decrease in the movement of other goods between the two countries by rail.
• Notably, the facilities saw the greatest railcar presence on the eve of Putin's visit to North Korea. On June 17, Beyond Parallel observed approximately 175 ore cars, 14 box cars, 66 tank cars, 6 locomotives, and 3 Maintenance-of-Way (MoW) rail cars at Tumangang and approximately 112 ore cars, 4 box cars, 33 tank cars, and 1 passenger car at Khasan.
• These changes in activity and the high number of railcars at the Tumangang -Khasan rail crossing suggest some promise of "summit deliverables" on the occasion of Putin's visit and also speak to the high volume of energy and other economic resources flowing from Russia into North Korea. This increased economic activity is likely related to Russian payments for North Korean munitions for the war in Ukraine.

Background

As the Russia-North Korea alliance continues to strengthen, satellite images from the past few months show an increase in activity at the Tumangang-Khasan railroad crossing-the sole railway border crossing between the two countries. This activity was brought to public attention in late 2022 when the White House released images identifying the movement of five Russian railcars from Khasan, Russia, to Tumangang, North Korea, to pick up arms and munitions for delivery to Russia. A few weeks after Kim Jong-un's visit to Russia to meet Vladimir Putin in September 2023, satellite images showed an unprecedented number of freight railcars at the Tumangang Rail Facility. Concurrently, vessels transferring munitions by sea between the two countries started to increase.

By April 2024, coincidentally the month the UN Panel of Experts disbanded following Russia's veto, imagery showed that the two countries expanded their transfers to include both munitions and coal. The once-minimal coal pile at the Russian state-operated pier at North Korea's Najin (Rajin) Port-where munitions transfers were also taking place-started to increase in early April 2024.¹

Najin Port wasn't the only location involved in this transfer. A UK market intelligence firm assessed Russia to have "supplied about 132,000 tons" via rail bridge between April and May, after "Russian coal sellers in April started to ship coal to the North Korean port of Rajin through the Khasan-Rajin overland border crossing."² By using the Tumangang-Khasan rail border crossing, also known as the Khasan-Rajin border crossing, Russia is shipping coal to the port of Najin, where it is then exported to other countries. The observed activity at the pier indicated a resumption of such coal exports after four years.³

The use of the "Russia-DPRK Rajin-Khasan port and rail project solely to export Russia-original coal" by the Russian state-owned company RasonConTrans is permitted by the UN if it is properly notified by Russia in advance. There has been no public confirmation on whether Russia is adhering to this reporting requirement. Regardless, the resumption of coal exports provides North Korea an opportunity to export its own coal under the guise of being Russian.⁴

As the Tumangang-Khasan border crossing's role in supporting the growing Russia-North Korea alliance was becoming evident, Vladimir Putin visited North Korea for the first time in 24 years.⁵

Overview

Given the increase in rail traffic after the 2023 Kim-Putin summit, Beyond Parallel reviewed satellite imagery of the Tumangang-Khasan railroad crossing from early February to mid-July 2024, a few months before and a few weeks after Putin's visit to North Korea in June. This research studied whether recent railcar activity at the railroad crossing reflects the two countries' strengthening alliance.

Although limitations in resolution and cloud coverage in imagery can often make the identification of the railcar type challenging, Beyond Parallel studied high and medium resolution satellite images acquired between February 1, and July 9, 2024, that covered both the Tumangang Rail Facility in North Korea and Khasan Rail Facility in Russia.^vi From the high-resolution images, we produced approximate counts of various types of railcars observed at both facilities.

Analysis between February and July 2024 shows a new railcar traffic pattern compared to the previous two years, with more ore and tank cars and fewer boxcars. Notably, the rail facilities saw the greatest railcar presence on the eve of Putin's visit to North Korea in June. These changes in activity and the high number of railcars at Tumangang and Khasan reflect the evolving and expanded nature of rail trade between North Korea and Russia.

Types of Railcars

To better understand the significance of the observed activity, it is necessary to detail the types of railcars identified in the reviewed imagery:

• Ore cars: Railroad freight cars used to transport crushed ore and similar materials, including coal and other mineral ores. The ore cars observed at both Tumangang and Khasan rail facilities are open-topped and used to transport coal ore.

• Tank cars: Cylindrical railroad freight cars used to transport bulk liquid products. The tank cars observed at these two rail facilities appear to have been used almost exclusively to transport refined petroleum products from Russia to the petroleum products storage facility at Tumangang. From here, these products are forwarded to locations elsewhere in North Korea.

• Flat cars: As the name implies, railroad freight cars consisting of a large open deck with no sides typically used to transport various types of large or bulk items. Flat cars were only observed at Tumangang and appear to have been used to transport building materials and bulk items associated with both building construction and rail maintenance work.

• Boxcars: Enclosed rail freight car with large access doors on both sides that are used to transport-in a weather-resistant manner-an almost endless variety of goods, materials, and equipment.

• Locomotives: Sometimes called "engines," cars used to provide the motive power to move "consists" (an organized collection of railcars) along the rail network. Depending upon nation and rail networks, locomotives are powered by diesel, electric, or diesel/electric power plants. The locomotives observed at Khasan were exclusively diesel-powered, while those observed at Tumangang were a mixed variety of all three types.

• Maintenance-of-Way (MoW): A wide diversity of specialized rail cars (e.g., cranes, tampers, etc.) of various sizes and capabilities used to undertake the maintenance and repair of rail tracks, the right-of-way along which the tracks are laid, and a variety of rail-related infrastructure.

• Miscellaneous: Other cars such as passenger, gondola, centerbeam, intermodal, and work crew cars were observed in the studied images.

Types of rail cars observed at Tumangang and Khasan on July 10, 2024. (Copyright © Airbus DS 2024). Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact [email protected].

Analysis of Railcar Activity

In December 2022, a review of satellite imagery of the Tumangang and Khasan rail facilities showed that rail traffic at the two facilities had increased slowly and reached a generally stable mix of rail car types by the end of the year. At that time, a significantly larger number of rail cars were present at Khasan than at Tumangang-the latter rarely had more than 25 rail cars present.

By June 2023, the number of box cars present at Tumangang increased significantly, reaching a high of approximately 50 in November, ore cars increased to approximately 35, and tank cars less than 10. Similarly, changes in rail car numbers and types were also observed at the Khasan facility during this period. However, the nature of the rail trade between the two countries has dramatically changed since then.

As shown in Table 1, a recent review of high-resolution satellite imagery acquired between April 10 and July 9, 2024, shows that a newer railcar traffic pattern has emerged with a high number of ore and tank rail cars, accompanied by a significant decrease in box cars.

The ore cars used to transport coal from Russia into North Korea were observed in all reviewed images of the Tumangang facility between April 10 and July 9, 2024. At Tumangang, an average of 95 ore cars were present during the studied period, with a low of 57 and a high of 175. At Khasan, the number of ore cars present averaged 99, with a low of 42 and a high of 161.

Similarly, the tank cars that are used to transport refined petroleum products from Russia into North Korea were observed in all images of the Tumangang facility. At Tumangang, an average of 76 tank cars were present, with a low of 58 and a high of 91. During the same period, the number of tanks cars present at the Khasan facility averaged 44, with a low of 5 and a high of 109.

Notably, among the studied dates, the Tumangang and Khasan rail facilities were the busiest on the eve of Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to North Korea: on June 17, approximately 175 ore cars, 14 box cars, 66 tank cars, 6 locomotives, and 3 MoWs rail cars at Tumangang and approximately 112 ore cars, 4 box cars, 33 tank cars, and 1 passenger car at Khasan.

Approximate count of railcars at Tumangang and Khasan shows the high level of activity at the Russia-North Korea railroad crossing reported to be involved in export of Russian coal through North Korea over the past four months.

The reasons for the changing size and composition of rail cars present at the two facilities are unclear. However, they are likely a combination of:

• The evolving and expanding nature of rail trade between North Korea and Russia;

• Russia's payment for North Korean arms and munitions;

• The reactivation of what is believed to be the RasonConTrans coal transfer, which was temporarily suspended due to COVID.⁶ This transfer, permitted under the current UN resolutions, provides for the transfer of coal through the Tumangang rail facility to the port of Najin for onward export. Such transfers, in order to fall within UN sanctions, require proper UN notification in advance;⁷

• The increased presence of tank cars carrying refined petroleum products likely reflects North Korea's chronic need for such products. It is unclear if and how these shipments will be affected by the shipment of refined petroleum products by sea;⁸

• and excluding the transshipment of Russian coal, the observed trade is a blatant example of Russia's increasing disregard for international sanctions.

It is unclear how the North Korea-Russia trade through the Tumangang-Khasan rail crossing will develop during the next few years. If the recent revival of plans to build a road bridge across the Tuman River and North Korean development activities are any indications, it is likely that it will continue to expand in size and character.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is an internationally recognized analyst, award-winning author, and lecturer on North Korean defense and intelligence affairs and ballistic missile development in developing countries. He is concurrently senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS); and senior adviser and imagery analyst for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). Formerly, he has served as founder and CEO of KPA Associates, LLC, publisher and editor of KPA Journal, senior imagery analyst for 38 North, chief analytics officer and co-founder of AllSource Analysis, Inc., and senior all-source analyst for DigitalGlobe's Analysis Center.
Victor Cha is senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair and the inaugural holder of the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Jennifer Jun is project manager and research associate with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Headline image Copyright © Airbus DS 2024.
Special thanks to HanLim Ryu for research support.

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