Middle East Challenges Will Vex Not Only the First 100 Days, but the First 1,000

Commentary by Jon B. Alterman

Published September 26, 2024

This commentary is part of a report from the CSIS Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department entitled The Global Impact of the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election. The report features a set of essays assessing the meaning of the election for Europe, Russia, Eurasia, the Indo-Pacific, the Americas, Africa, and the Middle East.

Middle Eastern states have grown used to being a focus of U.S. strategy-and some even seem to view it as an entitlement. Intense U.S. diplomacy following the outbreak of the Gaza war a year ago ended, at least temporarily, a drumbeat of local complaints that the United States was leaving the region. Even so, Middle Eastern states face deep uncertainty about the direction of U.S. policy after November's presidential election.

The common view is that because the two presidential candidates are so profoundly different in their worldview, their Middle East policies will be similarly divergent. Indeed, early on, the Biden administration sought to differentiate itself sharply from the Trump administration that preceded it. Over time, however, events have narrowed the range of choices available to U.S. policy, and policymakers have come to clearer understandings of both the power and limits of U.S. influence in the region.

On the three main regional policy challenges facing the next president in the Middle East, the clearest difference relates to Iran. On two other issues-the war in Gaza and U.S. relations with Gulf Arab states that seek simultaneously to advance security and autonomy-differences are likely to be narrower than many predict. In truth, though, precisely how the U.S. government will act come January is both unknown and profoundly consequential. Equally unclear is whether different U.S. policies will yield different results.

The new administration will need to establish its approach to Iran in the first weeks of the presidency, in part because Iran is likely to test the new president. Since the United States reneged on the Iran nuclear agreement in 2018, Iranian policy has grown more challenging in many respects. Iranian nuclear enrichment has increased, and Iran's regional proxies-including but not limited to Hamas, Yemen's Houthis, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and several Iraqi militias-have increased operations against U.S. allies and interests.

Those close to the former Trump administration, many of whom hope to serve in a future Trump administration, argue that Iran is the thread that runs through all of the challenges to U.S. interests in the Middle East, that their policy of "maximum pressure" on Iran was the correct one, and that the reason it did not work is because it was abandoned too soon. They argue strenuously for tightening enforcement of sanctions on Iran, responding vigorously to the actions of Iranian proxies, and demonstrating a willingness to use force against Iran and its assets around the Middle East. Critics of that approach argue that the Trump policy fractured an international coalition that was trying to shape Iranian behavior and freed Iran from any constraints over its nuclear program, leaving Iran much more dangerous than it would have been. The return to a policy of straight coercion, they argue, will have scarcely different results.

Despite the fact that Iran elected reformist Masoud Pezeshkian as president in July, and despite his declared intention to reduce tensions with the West, the next administration will have only a poor set of options. In part, it is unclear whether Pezeshkian has the ability to change the direction of Iranian policy-not only on nuclear issues, but also on issues of Iran's support for regional proxies and terrorist groups. Powerful groups aligned with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the clerical establishment argue that the United States and its allies are determined to overthrow the Islamic Republic. In addition, even pro-engagement Iranians will look much more skeptically at any proposed U.S. deal. Iranians complain that they never got the promised benefits of the nuclear agreement from the Obama administration, but they also note that any future president could simply walk away from an agreement, as the Trump administration did in 2018. Also, rising great power competition has made it much more difficult to resurrect a broad international coalition against Iranian proliferation.

For several years, Iran has deprioritized efforts to build better relations with the United States, focusing instead on efforts to reduce tensions with Arab Gulf states and warming its ties with Asian consumers. In addition, Russian and Iranian interests have grown strategically aligned since the outbreak of the Ukraine war. But close observers note that while Iran's regional prospects are waxing, its domestic prospects are waning. An ailing economy, an increasingly disaffected young population, and tattered legitimacy, combined with an 85-year-old supreme leader with no obvious successor, creates uncertainty about the country's future, whatever the future of U.S. policy. The next president may seek a clear victory but will be unlikely to achieve one.

Elsewhere in the region, the war in Gaza continues to smolder, and the shape of resolution is increasingly difficult to discern. The Israeli government continues to argue that it will not agree to a ceasefire until Hamas has been destroyed, and Arab states are growing increasingly adamant that serious progress toward the creation of a Palestinian state is a prerequisite to their participation in peacemaking. Nearly four out of five Jewish Israelis tell pollsters that peaceful coexistence with a Palestinian state is not possible, fearful that it will mean a government with homicidal-or genocidal-intent against Israel will take root on their borders, and Israel will have fewer tools to fight it.

President Joe Biden's strategy to influence Israeli decisionmaking by warmly embracing Netanyahu right after October 7 seems not to have paid off. Netanyahu has continually demonstrated his resistance to Biden's entreaties, for both political and strategic reasons. While Biden has had some influence on Israeli policy, most notably slowing an attack on the Rafah crossing, many suggest that he has gotten the worst of both worlds: Some critics blame him for supporting an ineffective Israeli campaign that has led to tens of thousands of unnecessary civilian casualties, while others blame him for hobbling an ally battling terrorism. Many see him as a diminished figure, unable or unwilling to wield the full power of the United States to shape policy outcomes.

Some argue that Netanyahu is seeking to wait out Biden, in hopes that a Trump presidency would create fewer pressures for concessions to Palestinian national aspirations. Some even charge that Netanyahu is doing what he can to create that outcome. Yet, if Netanyahu is relying on Trump to support drawing out the war, it is a riskier bet than many assume. Trump has his own fraught history with Netanyahu, and his few comments on the war have shown impatience with the pace of the Israeli war effort.

A Harris administration would likely follow the broad contours of Biden's policy, albeit without being buttressed by Biden's 40-year relationship with Netanyahu and his almost reflexive pro-Israeli impulses. Harris, instead, would reflect an increasingly diverse Democratic Party. It is more polarized on Israel, many minority voters identify to some extent with Palestinians, and most younger voters cannot imagine Israel as an underdog. While a Harris administration would be unlikely to shift the direction of U.S. policy sharply, its tone would be different. The core of the problem is this: The outcome of this war is existential to both Israeli and Palestinian antagonists, but not to the United States. The new president will face loud calls to precipitate an end to the war, but the war is unlikely to end soon.

The third set of issues is related to the other two. The Arab Gulf states have hewn closely to the United States for a half-century, since the United Kingdom pulled back from more than a century dominating the region. In a world that operated on oil, the states were vital Cold War allies and important consumers of billions of dollars in U.S. military equipment every year. As these states vigorously embrace economic diversification in the face of the coming energy transition, they simultaneously are seeking security from the United States alongside strategic autonomy. That is to say, they profess to see no contradiction in pursuing mutual defense agreements with the United States while deepening technological, defense, and economic ties with China and Russia.

For the United States, whose defensive strategy is increasingly oriented around great power competition and advanced by strong alliances, the Gulf's approach is perplexing. The United States sees itself as the creator and protector of a rules-based order that has brought security and prosperity to billions of people, not least those in the Gulf. The United States has invested trillions of dollars in energy security, which has benefited Gulf energy producers and global consumers alike. Yet, to Gulf states that have come to doubt both U.S. wisdom and commitment, surrendering their own agency seems reckless. Much better, they argue, is to seek close ties with all.

Arguably, they have had some success with such an approach. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) helped negotiate the exchange of Russian and Ukrainian prisoners, and Qatar has been a mediator between the United States and both the Taliban and Hamas. Yet, alarm bells went off in Washington when China seemed to begin to build a military base in the UAE, when Russian capital flooded to Dubai in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and when Saudi Arabia opened its doors to Chinese investment in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and surveillance equipment.

The Gulf states have billions of dollars in deployable capital, considerable regional weight, and a growing bias for action on regional affairs. They have long been content to reflexively support U.S. policy. Increasingly, the leaderships see such an approach as surrendering their leverage. While it would be overstating matters to suggest that they are the linchpin of the United States' regional strategy, finding ways to reinvigorate partnerships and enlist them in U.S. efforts on Iran and Gaza would contribute significantly to U.S. policy success. While a more transactional Trump administration might seem obviously favorable to their interests, the reality is more complicated. Trump has also spoken loudly of the folly of sustained U.S. military engagement in the Middle East, and he has called for U.S. "energy dominance," which would presumably undermine their efforts to shape markets. In addition, the Gulf states have grown warier of U.S. military action against Iran, where they are likely to bear the brunt of a response.

As in many countries, Middle Eastern governments are accustomed to the fact that while the U.S. president has a strong influence on their security, they have no influence on who the president is, and only rarely have much influence with the president at all. This is true of allies and adversaries alike, of which there are many in the region, and it often creates a combination of fatalism and exasperation. Among both rulers and citizens in the Middle East, U.S. presidents are much more often unpopular than they are popular, and complaints run rife that presidents simply do not understand the region.

If there is a single difference between the region's leaders and U.S. policymakers, it is this: all of the region's leaders believe that they will outlast whomever is elected in November, and probably that candidate's successor as well. They see themselves as taking a long-term view of the region's challenges, and they see part of their wisdom as appreciating that many of the region's problems can only be managed, not solved. U.S. presidents enter with the urgency of a four-year term and a public that is impatient for solutions. The U.S. public is increasingly skeptical of U.S. engagement in the Middle East while being eager for better results. Whatever the election's outcome, hard choices will face the next president and the region's governments alike.

Jon B. Alterman is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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