Modernizing the Whole Nuclear Enterprise - CSIS PONI fireside chat

MR. CLAYTON SWOPE: Hello, my name is Clayton Swope. I am the Deputy Director of the Airspace Security Project here at CSIS. I want to welcome everyone.

Thank everyone for joining us today in person and online. Today's event is called Sea, Land, Air, and NC3, Modernizing the Whole Nuclear Enterprise. Today we have two parts of the event.

Part one is a conversation with General Anthony Cotton, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, and that is moderated by Kari Bingen, the Director of the Airspace Security Project. The discussion will focus on modernization of U.S. strategic forces and current and future threats facing the United States. Part two is a panel to discuss bringing perspectives from folks who have served in government and industry, moderated by Heather Williams, the Director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS.

This panel will focus on NC3 modernization initiatives and discuss the important role that NC3 plays in the nuclear triad. Finally, before turning the microphone over to Kari, I want to quickly thank the support of Lockheed Martin Space for helping make today's event possible and also point out that we will be taking audience questions for both parts of the event. Questions can be asked through the QR code up here and on the pieces of paper on the chairs for the live audience and also through a link on the event page.

With that, I'll turn it over to Kari.

MS. KARI BINGEN: Great. Thanks, Clayton. Welcome, everybody.

It is such a privilege to welcome General Tony Cotton here today. He is the commander of U.S. Strategic Command. It's rare to have a public dialogue like this with the commander, so we're really honored to have you today here.

Nuclear deterrence is once again in the headlines, but in many ways the challenges before us are different and more complex than during the Cold War. So we'll have a wide-ranging conversation on the changing strategic environment and how STRATCOM is posturing to meet those challenges. When talking about U.S. nuclear forces, we tend to focus on the triad, the submarines, the ICBMs, the bombers, but we'll also focus today on that fourth leg of the triad that's less talked about but equally important, NC3, nuclear command, control, and communications. General Cotton is steep in these issues, and I couldn't envision anyone better to be sitting in the chair that he's in today. From his first assignment in the Air Force as a missile combat crew commander at Minot Air Force Base, he has spent his career working across nuclear space intelligence fields in operations planning and policy development. Prior to STRATCOM, he was the commander of the 20th Air Force, responsible for our nation's ICBMs, the deputy director of the National Reconnaissance Office, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, where he had responsibility for all of the Air Force's nuclear forces, and also commander and president of Air University.

We are fortunate, and I've been fortunate, to see firsthand his leadership, his inquisitiveness, and his thoughtfulness on these issues. Our next generation nuclear scholars here at CSIS have also benefited from General Cotton's mentorship as he's engaged with them. So we'll have about a 30-minute moderated Q&A here.

I would encourage audience questions via the QR code, and then for folks online, you can go to our website where the event page is and click to submit a question, and then I'll shift to audience questions. So, General Cotton, my first question for you really focuses on the strategic environment. Baseline us on the changes in the strategic environment.

You've talked about China's breakout advances, China, Russia developing a whole range of new weapons, they're expanding their nuclear infrastructure. What are both doing and why? What are you watching for, and what are you particularly concerned about?

GEN. ANTHONY COTTON: Yeah, thanks, Kari. I think, you know, I think fundamentally the first thing that we need to kind of set aside is, you know, most folks that have ever heard me speak, they recognize that I hate the term Cold War 2.0. And the reason I hate the term Cold War 2.0, because I think it oversimplifies the geopolitical environment that we're currently in. I think there's an interweaving of not only military power, economic power, financial power, you name it, that's all interwoven into what we're seeing in the geopolitical environment today.

But there is a scattering of influencing that's coming from third-party nations, and we can talk a little bit about that. That may not necessarily be something that's limited to the PRC and or the Russian Federation, right? As we look at the environment today, the environment today that I pay attention to and provide a daily update to the Secretary of Defense is Russian Federation, PRC, Iran, DPRK, and then all others that are happening, because what we're finding is I think days are gone in respect to just seeing things from a global combatant command perspective.

I think whether it's my fellow combatant commanders that are responsible for a regional location, that at the end of the day, all 11 of us play together and have to come together and collaborate on what kind of effects do we want to establish. So you were talking about what's different and what does it look like today. So today I have some bombers that are sitting supporting Eric Kurilla in the CENTCOM AOR.

Today I work hand-in-hand with Admiral Sam Paparo in regarding relationships that we have with the Republic of Korea and the PEN, Japan, as well as understanding what's going on within the PRC in that AOR. And I have relationships in regards of what our bomber forces can do to have extended deterrence with our allies and partners in that AOR. In the UCOM AOR, what's going on with the illegal invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, I have dialogue with General Chris Cavoli, who is SACEUR slash UCOM commander, in regards to not only the Ukrainian conflict but the entire European region, his AOR.

And then a daily relationship with my dear friend, General Greg Guillot, who is the NORTHCOM commander. Why is that important? That's important because my forces and the way I flow forces for STRATCOM, all of my forces are in the homeland.

You know, whether it's the submarines that are coming out of the coasts, or whether it's the bombers that are in Barksdale or Minot, or whether it's our ICBM fuels that are in the northern part of the United States, all that is now, I would say, you have to pay attention because I don't know that we have sanctuary in the continental United States anymore. And how do we think about that differently as opposed to the way we thought about it in the past when I was that second lieutenant that was pulling crew in Minot, North Dakota? So all of that kind of coalesced together.

And absolutely right, we talk about the triad, but I think foundational to the triad is NC3. The ability for me to force direct, the ability for me to be able to have thin, calm communication with the president of the United States as well as my forces are incredibly important, and that is the bastion, to be frank, of not only strategic deterrence and nuclear deterrence, but even the rest of those combatant commanders that I mentioned are relying on those kind of communications with their forces as well.

BINGEN: Well, and I'm struck by everything that you just laid out with all the combatant commands that you're working with on a daily basis. Yes, we're now talking about a Russia and a China that may have or exceed the United States in nuclear parity. You mentioned Iran, North Korea.

So there's a simultaneity of challenges now that you have to deal with. We read the headlines this morning, and there was discussion about how Russia has changed its nuclear doctrine and is lowering its threshold for nuclear use. So there's a lot happening, and this is a very dynamic environment right now.

How is that changing what STRATCOM does, how you approach your mission, your operational tempo? It strikes me that it is very different from before.

COTTON: It is, but it isn't. It's just that people are paying attention now. I think that's fundamentally what's different, and I'd love to be able to maybe even talk about nuclear IQ later if we can.

But the fact of the matter is, guess who gets to play and have actually 51% of a deterrence vote? It's the adversary, right? So what's incredibly important is understanding and being able to, as required, hold adversaries at risk so they understand that today is not the day, right?

It's coercion and compellence. So that's what's incredibly important for us. I think when we had the conversations during the Cold War, and here I am bringing it up, what made that unique and different was a couple of things.

I think the population kind of understood their definition of what an adversary was and what an ally was. I think when you looked and saw the former Soviet Union at that time and the Warsaw Pact at that time, it was pretty easy to kind of understand. But I think the biggest one, Kari, was the decoupling of economic influence from the Warsaw Pact of the Cold War as compared to the interaction of economies across the world to include, like, for example, PRC.

We're the largest. We import a lot of Chinese products, right? So that makes the whole dynamic a little different than it was in the past.

Now, as we look to when we see adversaries and how they behave and what my role is for the secretary is, you know, through my different means of being able to collect, we have a team that makes an analysis in regards of risk to strategic deterrence failure and where we stand. And I provide that to the secretary in person once a week and through other means many other times a week as well as the chairman. So, you know, pretty interesting work and important work that we do.

That's a little different than even other combatant commanders because my responsibility is for the strategic picture, not necessarily a regional one.

BINGEN: Well, and I want to pick up on your comment on nuclear IQ a bit. I do worry fewer policymakers, members of Congress, and even the American public understand the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence to our security. So if I can maybe back up a bit and have you baseline us on why do we even need nuclear weapons?

Why are they important to our security and how do they deter hostile actions?

COTTON: No, I think, you know, so for the United States, nuclear deterrence is actually the baseline strategy of national security for us in which all other national security imperatives, you know, are wrapped around, right? And the fact that adversaries, you know, don't cross thresholds because they understand of, you know, where we are in our abilities and capabilities is a deterrent. What's hard for folks to understand that don't, that haven't participated in strategic deterrence theory conversations in probably over 30 years is the reality that you don't have to use a weapon for it to be a deterrent.

And that's sometimes hard for folks to understand. And then the other piece on the IQ piece is, and you're absolutely right, you know, I often will tell folks to, hey, raise your hand if you've been in government or in the Department of Defense less than 25 years, right? And so by definition, and I see there's some retired folks here, by definition, that's probably all the colonels and below, right?

And then guess what? 95% of them raise their hand. So what does that mean?

That means that they have never worn the uniform when there was active aggression from the former Soviet Union or the Russian Federation before the wall came down. So that means by definition, they have no idea what it is to fight a peer adversary, right? I mean, not their fault, but that's not the world that they grew up in because the world we grew up in was post 9-11 world we grew up in where it was a counterterrorism VEO fight that we were dealing with.

So what's the big difference with that? A heck of a lot of difference. The big difference is the VEO threat and the counterterrorism threat is an existential to our nation.

It could be painful. It was painful, not existential, right? The understanding of, you know, what can a near peer, you know, what are their tactics and procedures as compared to, you know, a VEO threat, you know, air dominance, air superiority, electronic warfare, all of those kind of things.

Was that ever something that anyone in CINCON-AOR even thought about? Probably not. Is it something that this generation of leaders and future generations of leaders will have to think about for decades to come?

Absolutely, right? But foundational to that is the understanding of how do you then integrate and have the conversation knowing that the adversary that you're talking about is also a nuclear peer or near peer, right? So that's a different discussion than trying to figure out what it is to fight against Taliban, ISIS, et cetera.

BINGEN: And I don't think folks realize, to your point, that the strength of our nuclear posture really informs the decisions we make on the conventional front. It absolutely does.

COTTON: It absolutely does, right? So for us, I think there's, you know, when I first took over in December of 22, the first thing I did was wanted to understand the posture and alignment of the current force that we had, knowing that, for example, our modernization programs for the three legs of the triad was based on, you know, to be frank, the world environment of 2010, right? So, you know, when we started talking about the nuclear modernization, that was in a 2010 time frame, finally kind of went, came over the hump in 2016, and we've been working it since about 2016.

But the world has changed since then. So the first thing I had to think about, and what was good was the Nuclear Posture Review gave me an inroad to be able to do that because it specifically said to be able to look to see if there is, you know, where is your posture, and is your posture correct, you know, with the current threats. And so we started looking at that right away, and we're about two years into it, and there are some folks in this room that have been part of helping us understand where we are when it comes in regards to sufficiency in our posture.

BINGEN: Well, and exactly on that, so we have a nuclear force modernization program of record that's been underway for many years, but it's based on assumptions about the strategic environment from 2010. Correct. Fast forward 14 years, as you've described, the world looks different, the challenges are different.

We had a really strong bipartisan, congressionally-directed commission that looked at our strategic forces, and they called for urgent action to modernize our strategic forces and said that that program of record is necessary but not sufficient. So what are your thoughts on that, and then the actions or modifications needed going forward?

COTTON: Yeah, I think the first thing is what was said by the commission, and to be frank, I think the secretary said the same thing. Fundamentally for me, as the one that will receive the forces that will be provided by my components, the program of record has to happen. We have to maintain the program of record.

We have to modernize the three legs of the triad. I'm sorry. I'll say it on behalf of all the men and women who work this mission every single day.

I'm sorry that we didn't think about it 30 years ago to figure out how to phase out modernizing the three legs of the triad. But we did. We made a decision, both sides of the aisle.

That was a political decision that was made. So here we are. That being said, we must do everything in our power to make sure that we can modernize the current forces that we have.

My bigger, not a challenge, but what I pay attention to every single day is understanding that I have a legacy system that can be maintained and sustained until the new modernized systems also come online, because that's just as important. Because I said it earlier, part of deterrence is making sure that I have a safe, secure, reliable, and credible deterrent force. And we do, by the way.

But that being said, Kari, I think one of the things that we need to do that's a little different is part of understanding what does the program of record look like moving forward. We can't think that we can be stagnant in just holding to just that and not having on-ramps and off-ramps to be able to see what the world is bringing us in the next 16 years and figure out how to do things much quicker or have some alternatives to be able to add to be able to produce an effect that my job is, is to be able to produce an effect, offer effects that meets the objectives of a president.

BINGEN: And let's talk then about that fourth leg of the triad, the NC3 modernization piece. And I mentioned in the outset, I think it's easier for people to get their head around the triad, the bombers, the missiles, the submarines. But can you talk to us about NC3?

I mean, the triad doesn't work without those other systems that stitch it all together and allow the president to command the forces. So explain why these are, why they're important, and what's being done on that front.

COTTON: Yes, I mean, you know, there's a decide piece. So NC3, you know, part of the architecture is really being able to feed into a machine, if you will, and what I mean by machine is not a physical machine, but the capacity of being able to have things come for decision-makers, and that's the decide. The direct piece is really important because the direct piece is the ability for me, based off of the decisions that are made from policymakers and senior decision-makers, to reach out to the forces forward, right?

And then that other piece is to be able to make sure that I always, as the person in my role that presents forces to the president of the United States, nuclear forces, have connectivity with the president of the United States at all times, right? So, you know, that's in essence what that is. How do you, you know, I always tell folks there's three things that I want to be able to have nuclear officers be able to do.

Decide when something is valid, decide what that timing is, and also just understand that it's authentic, and then finally understand if, you know, there was a termination message that came and said stop, right? It's pretty much that simple. Know when to shoot, know that that order was authentic, and know when to stop.

And that's what the NC3 does for us. And my God, you know, I thank God for the men and women who were at the forefront of designing a system as robust that we currently have, you know, from decades ago that is still a very robust system. But then understanding that it's time to modernize with some 21st century capabilities to ensure that we can always maintain those three things.

BINGEN: Well, and talk about what that modernization looks like. You know, your predecessor had testified that the NC3 enterprise is composed of something like over 200 individual elements. And I just think from my time in the department, that's spread across services, agencies.

How do you, with your enterprise responsibility, get a hold of all of these different pieces, especially when no one likes to fund integration? So modernization as well as how do you think about the integration of the architecture?

COTTON: Yeah, I think the first part of it, and you're right, it's kind of interesting because you mentioned in my, you know, in my bio that, you know, previous to this job, I was a commander of Global Strike Command. So being a commander of Global Strike Command, guess what? I was responsible for about 68% of the NC3 architecture because about 68% of it lies within the Air Force Service.

What was difficult about it was explaining it. And you're right, and it was, you know, over 205 systems. And being able to kind of articulate what you want it, you know, what it is, what you want it to be midterm and what you want it to be long term, I think that was part of my challenge as a service component that's presenting that force to then Admiral Richard.

And then when I became the commander of STRATCOM, you know, I was able to kind of watch what you asked for by getting a former component commander now being in charge. I understand the frustration, I understood the frustration of the service components. So the first thing we want to do is lay out the current architecture and then build a roadmap on what you want the midterm and future architecture to look like, right?

I mean, it's kind of basic acquisition modeling, right? So that's what we did because that's where we, you know, that's where we kind of faltered in the modernization aspect of how to mature and build out the next generation of NC3. It was really hard to convince folks that, well, wait, it works now, so why do you need to repair it?

Well, what do you need to do to modernize it for tomorrow? Well, it's almost like now it does go back to the other legs of the triad. Those all work too.

But, you know, how many out there own Teslas? I'm in DC area, so I'm pretty sure someone has a Tesla. See, I had one person raise their hand.

Or who has an EV at all? Anybody have an EV? Ah, there we go.

So if you kind of think about it, you know, when I think about the three legs of the triad and the modernization of the triad, you know, one of the things that I always is the men and women who are sustaining that platform every single day, right? So if you own a current EV and all you need is, you know, your big plug in your garage and that's basically all you do, or even if you own an ICE, right, an internal combustion engine car of this generation, you know, guess what you don't do, right? You don't do points, plugs, condenser, because half of you don't even know what a carburetor is, right?

So you don't have to do that kind of work, right? The car automatically, you know, will kind of understand where something's going a little bit wrong, and it's self-diagnosed and it self-heals, you know? A car of the 60s won't do that.

So guess what? A weapon system of the 60s doesn't do that either. And it just puts a lot of burden, you know, on the men and women that sustains those systems every single day.

So that's part of the equation that we always have to pay attention to as well, because I was the organized, trained, and equipped guy, and I know the hours and hours and hours of men and women that are on the bomber side of the house or the ICBM side of the house. And, oh, by the way, as STRATCOM commander, now I get a good sense of what my SSBN forces are doing too. Now, they are incredible men and women.

That makes it so it's still safe, secure, effective, and incredibly credible systems. But I think we can do better, right? And the same can be said when it comes to the NC3 enterprise as well.

BINGEN: So I'm going to start weaving in some questions from the audience because they're touching on subjects that I want to touch on. I do want to ask my staff, though, if you can help me, because I'm not getting all of the questions coming up here on the iPad. We do have one from one of our junior nuclear scholars, Lachlan McKenzie, who asks, how is STRATCOM cooperating with the services, other combat commands and industry to implement NC3 modernization?

And what are those coordination and integration challenges that you face in those areas?

COTTON

Yeah, so, and Kari, I think you were actually part of this. If you recall, one of the first things I did was I wanted to understand the 110 folks who thought they had a vote in NC3 right across the department and actually across government. So, you know, and what I said was, well, I want a summit.

I don't want a conference. I want a summit. Remember that?

And I said, what I want is if you can't be a decision maker for the person that you're representing of all 110 of you, I don't want you here at Omaha because we're going to make decisions on what we're going to do moving forward. So that's when we first introduced the roadmap, if you recall. And one of the things is, you know, being a guy who actually walked the halls of the Pentagon, I immediately knew that part of the problem was it wasn't based on POM, right?

So it wasn't based on five-year epics, which is, that's all the Pentagon thinks about, right, is five-year epics, read that, FIDEP, right? So for a service, they needed to understand, so what are you talking about? Are you talking about we need to fund something to modernize something in this FIDEP, the next FIDEP, or the one after that?

You know, what are you talking about? So we were able to talk in a language and we were collaborated to make sure that we had common vocabulary. Seems strange, but welcome to a bureaucracy.

A common vocabulary in order in which we can then better articulate what the requirements would be. And then I did those in three phases. I wanted the roadmap to talk about near-term.

So basically, what needs to be done to fight tonight? What needs to be done in the next five years? And then, to be frank, anything after that is long-range planning, right, in the eyes of the department, right?

So that's future, that's next-gen type of stuff. The big thing that we incorporated was R&E. And incorporating R&E to work with my NC3 Enterprise Center was key.

And then the other piece that was key was a collaboration that we had with our FFRDCs to make sure that, to kind of grade our homework a little bit. And then finally was, it couldn't just be General Cotton. It had to be General Cotton, it had to be Admiral Aquilino, it had to be General Cavoli, it had to be General Kurilla, because like I said in the opening, it's all about the strategic picture that can actually still drive my response.

But my fellow combatant commanders or geographic commanders and other AORs need to be power brokers and cheerleaders and advocates as well. And so we spent a lot of time doing that. And I think we got there actually.

BINGEN: Yeah, I think you are. Okay, NC3 and AI, artificial intelligence. You talked last month in a speech that AI had a role to play in increasing the safety and resilience of NC3 systems, but emphasized the human would always be in the loop on decision making.

President Biden, President Xi also talked about it this weekend and issued a joint statement. So I'm going to bundle a couple of questions here. One from another one of our CSIS nuclear scholars, Diya Ashkatallah, who says, talk about the role of AI and the nuclear mission overall in NC3 and how you think about balancing AI integration with human decision making.

And it was a similar question from Professor Larafi as well.

COTTON: Yeah, so I'll start with the bottom line up front. The bottom line up front, because I've had some when I spoke even you know, last month that, you know, got some feedback and like, Oh my God, I think I read one where, you know, Cotton, you know, just wants AI to make the decision nuclear. That's absolutely not what I said, but that's how it was interpreted somehow.

But here's what I really mean. If we think that United States Strategic Command can't take advantage of artificial intelligence to preserve the terabytes of data that would otherwise hit the floor and still do things the old fashioned way as far as not decision making, but planning efforts, efficiencies, then we might as well move, I mean, move to move out of the beautiful building we have and just go into something that has rotary phones. I mean, that's what I mean. What I mean is, take advantage of the efficiencies that are gained for the men and women that are nugging it out.

But at the same time, losing the ability to potentially, you know, utilize additional information, because they just don't have the throughput to be able to kind of figure out, you know, how to utilize some of that information. Then, you know, why not at that point, then introduce the data that's validated data that comes from someone that can kind of help us in my planning shop, for example. You know, if I fundamentally just say it this way, I much rather have an opportunity if asked for the, you know, by the president, for example, the president says, well, here's what I want you to do.

I much rather say, well, Mr. President, hold on, I'll get back to you in a couple of hours, and we'll talk about how we can execute that. You know, it would be much nicer for me to be able to kind of go, yes, Mr. President, give me a couple of minutes, and we'll come back to you with some options. That's what I'm talking about.

Right? That is not, and here's my little joke for today. So I think most of you may not recognize this movie.

Anyone watch the movie War Games? Okay. Right.

First of all, Cheyenne Mountain doesn't look like that, but because I was there working for General Kaler. But, you know, in War Games, it has this machine called the WOPR. So the WOPR actually was that AI machine that everyone is scared about.

And guess what? We do not have, you know, a WOPR at STRATCOM headquarters, nor would we ever have a WOPR in STRATCOM headquarters. That's not what I'm talking about.

What I'm talking about is how do I, you know, how do I get and become efficient on ISR products? You know, how do I get, you know, efficient on understanding what's the status of my forces? You know, those are things that AI and machine learning can absolutely help us and really shave a lot of time off on being able to do those type of things.

But it's not about, you know, having a machine present forces to the President of the United States. It's just the opposite of that.

BINGEN: Well, and what I don't think folks fully appreciate is there's so much to your mission beyond, I'll say, the nuclear button.

COTTON: Absolutely.

BINGEN: And there are so many, I'll say, mundane kind of labor-intensive things where having this kind of technology could be so beneficial to your mission and your day-to-day job.

COTTON: Very much more efficient.

BINGEN: But also because of the nuclear responsibility that you have, there is going to be a higher bar assigned to STRATCOM than maybe other combatant commands when it comes to integrating AI into your nuclear mission. So how do you think about the department's broader tenets on responsible AI, some of the legal, ethical test and evaluation kind of dimensions to this?

COTTON: No, I mean, we're right in line with that. Matter of fact, I was one of the first, you know, I think I was probably one of the first combatant commanders to literally write a, you know, a authoritative document describing, you know, what the do's and don'ts are in regards to my command and how we prosecute AI in the future. I mean, it is, and I do not take it lightly that what I'm responsible for is a little different than what other combatant commanders are responsible for.

I absolutely take it incredibly seriously. And so does the men and women of my team understand that we're responsible for crown jewels of this nation in regards to nuclear weapons.

BINGEN: Well, and let me shift here to allies and partners. Can you talk a bit about the how we coordinate with our allies and partners in the field of NC3? And then I'll talk extended deterrence.

COTTON: Yeah, so for NC3, it really is not, the NC3 system itself is not a system that is shared with allies and partners in its current form. What I would tell you about allies and partners and what I think there's some great collaboration and work that's moving forward is our relationship in understanding the conventional nuclear integration aspects of our relationships that we have with allies and partners across the world. I think the NCG, the Nuclear Consultative Group with the Republic of Korea is one aspect of that and that relationship that I have through Indo-PACOM and the Combined Forces Commander slash USFK commander is one that is incredibly key for that extended deterrence relationship.

The same can be said with the Japanese that are there. This, I think when you go to the other AOR in UCOM and SACEUR, the relationship that we have there, I've obviously go through UCOM commanders SACEUR with my relationship with NATO. And I think we have a burgeoning relationship on what is the art of the possible of even non-nuclear nations in supporting some of my mission set, especially when it comes to support apparatus.

The relationship that we have with the United Kingdom, for example, is a very special one. The relationship that we have with Australia, the relationship that we have with France, who is a nuclear power, but understanding that we understand what deterrence means for the French Republic, for example. But that doesn't mean that we can't get assistance from a conventional means from our allies and partners.

And we've been working that for the last two years that I've been there, whether it's T-tails, so that's C-17 equivalents to move things forward, whether it's tankers, et cetera, et cetera. Those are things that a lot of our allies and partners actually can help me and help my mission set in. That is not necessarily having to have a nuclear weapon to be able to help do the mission set that's at hand.

BINGEN: Yeah. And on the point of extended deterrence, another aspect of overall nuclear deterrence that maybe isn't fully appreciated is this concept of extended deterrence and the premise that our allies don't develop their own nuclear arsenals in exchange for us extending our nuclear umbrella to them. But with many of the threats that we've discussed, it has been striking to me to see our allies in Japan and South Korea discussing their nuclear options and even more openly than maybe in the past.

So how do you look at this? Do our allies, do they still have confidence in our nuclear umbrella? What are they sharing with you?

And then if I compare that with a question from Dan Wang at DTRA, so how does STRATCOM engage with our allies to strengthen assurance, but then also prevent proliferation?

COTTON: Yeah. So I'll answer that question first is constant engagement. The relationship we have, LNO from the Republic of Korea that's at STRATCOM, we have an LNO from Japan that's at STRATCOM.

Like I said, I always go back to the relationship of collaboration I have with my Indo-PACOM brother, Admiral Papparo, and the relationship that I have with General LaCamera in regards to that extended deterrence. The Busan port visit was a good example of extended deterrence because that was an assurance and deterrence mission. Our bomber task force, our assurance and deterrence missions, and I think are beneficial and helpful.

I think my counterparts in the Korean Peninsula absolutely understand that we'll be there for them. At least I hope they continue to believe that too because we'll be there for them. But that relationship and being able to have the collaboration between not only the ROK, but combined operations that we're seeing exercises between ROK and Japan has been incredibly beneficial as well.

BINGEN: And then you mentioned the conventional piece, looking at that conventional and nuclear relationship and even I'll say intro war deterrence. So how do you ensure that a conventional conflict doesn't then cross the line into nuclear? How do you see that relationship between conventional nuclear forces, especially in the context of a two-peer challenge?

But then maybe what are some of the lessons that you're learning from Ukraine? We've seen Russia, they saber-rattled back in 2022. They're frankly doing it again now.

Perhaps what they're doing with their space-based nuclear anti-satellite weapon. What do you see as that conventional nuclear relationship?

COTTON: Yeah, so it's incredibly important. So one of the things that we spend a lot of time on is ensuring that, I think gone are the days of, well, we won't think about it because it'll never happen. I think we have two adversaries that have the capacity, whether they're a peer or near peer.

I think nuclear weapons are foundational to their national strategy. You know, we say it's foundational to ours. But what is important for me is to be able to, in the intro war periods, understand how, you know, what do we do conventionally?

Actually one, first, to prevent conflict at all. But two, if not, to make it so it would never go to vertical escalation where it would cross a threshold against peers that are nuclear near peers.

BINGEN: So I have a few questions here on the cost of nuclear modernization writ large.

COTTON: It's a bargain.

BINGEN: Well, and I want you to tease that out for me. I mean, I've seen reports that talk about, you know, we'll be spending $1 trillion over the next 30 years, but let's break it down into what that looks like. Yeah.

I mean, can America afford these modernization programs? And is that $1T taken away from conventional force modernization?

COTTON: Yeah. So from my perspective, it's 4% of the defense budget. And it's 4% of a defense budget that extends 30 years.

So when you think about, and we're not talking about one leg, we're talking the entire three legs of the triad getting modernized. I think when you put it in that perspective, it comes out to be, you know, not cost prohibitive by any stretch of the imagination. You know, like I said earlier is, yeah, you know, should we have, you know, phased out and built out the, and modernized us, you know, modernize the triad in phases?

Absolutely. You know, would it have had less sticker shock? Absolutely.

Are we at a point now where we just, we need to modernize all three legs of the triad? Absolutely. Right.

So I don't want to mess up the quote from former Secretary Mattis, but, you know, I think we can afford survival.

BINGEN: That's well said. Another question here, I'll say from a CSIS junior scholar, Catherine Murphy, how is STRATCOM evaluating the post-Cold War landscape with multiple nuclear capable adversaries regarding the norms and understandings around interference with NC3 systems? I mean, back in the Cold War days, you know, there was this mutual understanding.

You don't touch our warning satellites, our communication satellites. Do you think Beijing would adhere to these principles?

COTTON: Well, at least I would hope they would, right? I would love to have a dialogue with my counterparts in the PRC to have an understanding of, you know, what are some of the lines you don't want to cross. But that being said, one of the things we're also doing, and I failed to mention Tim Hawk, the commander of CyberCom and DERNSA, in regards to the things that, you know, as we talk about NC3, understanding that you have adversaries that would look at it maybe a little differently than the understood, you know, norms of the Cold War that we're building in, being able to, you know, do censoring and monitoring and understanding, you know, if in fact we would have an adversary that tried to do exactly just that.

BINGEN: I'm going to try this question. We'll see what you're able to say. This is from Sarah Salem at the Exchange Monitor.

The Pentagon just sent a report to Congress about the administration's nuclear employment guidance. Will there be a hearing on this unclassified document? And what can you share about it?

What can we expect from this as we look to a new administration?

COTTON: Yeah, so as far as hearings, I have no idea if there will be a hearing on it or not. Will it be something that I'll probably have conversations with with my posture hearings, you know, in the March time frame, if that stays in alignment with what it has in the past? Probably so.

It really is in alignment with what I had mentioned earlier. And that's the fact that the day I took command, we started to look at posture to see if we're sitting in the right spots. I did see the unclassed report and it's pretty much in alignment with the Strategic Posture Commission's reports and the realities that we are going to have to seriously look to see if we can, if we have the sufficiency with the current forces to be able to hold two adversaries, plus third parties at risk.

So I look forward to the conversations during hearing season.

BINGEN: If I can ask two more questions of you. One, when I think about arms control, we have new start that expires in 2026.

COTTON: February. Not that I know.

BINGEN: Yeah, around the corner. China has declined arms control talks with the United States.

So as a combatant commander, how are you preparing for this era without arms control? What does it mean for your intelligence needs and your overall posture and capability requirements?

COTTON: Well, I mean, if you if you look at the Russian Federation, heck, you know, they have over 1500 weapons, if not more that aren't under new start today. So from a operational perspective, you know, we are paying attention to that today. I think at the end of the day, Kerry, what it really means is I take the objectives of the president.

And if those objectives change with the new administration, I take those objectives and I present options on the capabilities to be able to give an effect on those objectives that the president would want me to be able to accomplish. At that point in time, the decision maker will say, well, do we will we accept risk there or not? And if the answer is we don't accept risk, then we'll look at what does the configuration need to look like in regards to be able to hold all those objectives and have the effects that the president is expecting from me.

If they're willing to accept risks, then, you know, then it's my job to then be truthful and kind of go, OK, here's what you're not going to get, you know, Mr. President, if if that's that's what you're wanting to do. And then it's the president's role, obviously, to then say, yep, I'm willing to accept that risk on behalf of the nation.

BINGEN: My last question, I'm going to make it a two parter. One is you've themed this year, your year of action at STRATCOM. So what should we expect to see?

And then last thoughts. I want to go back to where we started, which was really on nuclear IQ. And what do you want young scholars thinking about?

How do we convince them to work in this field? And and what is that strategic thinking you really need out of not just the next generation, but but scholars, practitioners in the field? What do you need out of them?

COTTON: So we'll start and then I'll ask you to repeat the first quiz. Let's start with the last one. What we need is while we are able to kind of dust off, you know, nuclear theorists of the 50s and the 60s, and there's incredible pertinent information that's in there.

What does the new generation, you know, what kind of conversations do we have in that dialogue, in understanding the other nuances that I told you that were a little different than what we saw in third war theory determination. And that is the interweaving of potential adversaries, even in day to day, you know, things that that not only we, but allies and partners, you know, their relationships with with folks, where we didn't even, we just didn't recognize or see that in during the Cold War, because that didn't exist. Right.

You know, I don't think anybody wanted to drive, you know, a Eastern Bloc car, right. So we never had to worry about one getting, you know, being delivered to the United States or anything, there was, there was nothing economically that the Eastern Bloc could offer the West. Right.

But that is not the case today. So then how do you theorize that interweaving of national interests that would be different, even amongst amongst fellow, you know, Western minded folks, right, when there's an economic interweaving, you know, that then drives a national interest that might be different, right, even when they're, even when they're allies and partners. I mean, I think that's a different thinking that is worth looking at very seriously.

Then the first part?

BINGEN: So last words from you, tied to IQ, this is your year of action, year of action.

COTTON: So that was year two was the year of action. The year one was re-baselining, year two was year of action. I'm the kind of guy who I don't like to just, I don't like studying things to death.

You know, I just behave, I think the way we prove things out is we show and then we can kind of do some course corrections if required on certain aspects of things. So that was year of action. The third year is acceleration.

Because the reality is we're in a transition. The administration is going to transition. We're in the middle of that regardless of who the winner was going to be.

You know, I keep telling my folks, to your point, I think there's a lot of folks that don't understand strategic theory and strategic deterrence. So I'm a realist. I'm going to spend six months doing that.

I have one year left. Right? So, but I think it's important enough to, for myself and my organization to spend that six months to get it right.

Right? To make it so decision makers understand what this portfolio is. You know, what, who our adversaries are, especially that have that capability.

And we only get to do that right once. Right? And then after that, I just want to make sure that I leave STRATCOM ready for the next person.

BINGEN: Well, General Cotton, thank you. This has been a really insightful discussion. As you said at the outset, a strong nuclear posture, nuclear forces really is the bedrock of our nation's security.

So thank you for everything that you're doing. Thank you for prioritizing NC3. And we're very much lucky to have you in this job.

So thank you, sir.

COTTON: Thank you so much.

(NOTE: this is a machine-transcribed product)

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