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20/08/2024 | Press release | Distributed by Public on 20/08/2024 15:35

China’s Antimony Export Restrictions: The Impact on U.S. National Security

China's Antimony Export Restrictions: The Impact on U.S. National Security

Photo: Milan via Adobe Stock

Critical Questions by Gracelin BaskaranandMeredith Schwartz

Published August 20, 2024

On August 14, China announced export restrictions on antimony in the country's latest move to restrict critical mineral shipments globally in the name of national security. Antimony is a critical input for the defense industry, particularly for armor-piercing ammunition, night vision goggles, infrared sensors, bullets, and precision optics, and the electronics industry, including semiconductors, cables, and batteries. This is the latest restriction after a series of export controls in 2023 on graphite, germanium, gallium, and rare earth processing technologies, raising alarms in the semiconductor, electric vehicle, and defense industries that rely on these materials.

China is the world's leading producer of antimony, accounting for 48 percent of global production and 63 percent of U.S. antimony imports. The likelihood of antimony supply disruptions has now increased significantly, necessitating the United States to quickly secure antimony supply chains from non-Chinese sources.

Q1: What is China's latest export restriction?

A1: Commencing September 15, export restrictions will go into effect for six antimony-related products including antimony ore, antimony metals, antimony oxide, and gold-antimony smelting and separation technologies. Anyone wanting to export these materials will have to apply for a license through China's Commerce Ministry. Additionally, the new policy bans gold-antimony smelting and separation technology exports without permission from the ministry. It is not yet clear to what extent exports will be blocked, although the ministry said in a brief statement that the government opposes any country from using exports from China "to engage in activities that undermine China's national sovereignty, security, and development interests." The ministry has not indicated that any one country is the target of these restrictions.

Q2: What is antimony and what is it used for?

A2: The Department of Interior has identified antimony as a critical mineral. It is a critical input for the defense industry. Since World War II, antimony has been key to defense technologies, critical in the creation of tungsten steel and the hardening of lead bullets. Today, antimony is a key material for armor-piercing ammunition, night vision goggles, infrared sensors, and precision optics. Ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have put additional strain on antimony supply chains, as demand for ammunition and defense technologies rises. Sales of U.S. military equipment to foreign governments increased by 16 percent to an unprecedented $238 billion in 2023. Antimony is a necessary material for the U.S. defense industrial base and is therefore critical to national security. However, the United States remains reliant on Chinese imports to meet domestic demand for antimony.

Q3: How does the United States currently source its antimony?

A3: The United States has mined no antimony since the closure of the Sunshine Mine in Idaho in 2001. Today, the United States meets 18 percent of demand through the recycling of lead-acid batteries, but is otherwise import reliant on China (63 percent), Belgium (8 percent), India (6 percent), and Bolivia (4 percent). The United States stockpiles limited antimony of just 1,100 tons compared to the 23,000 tons consumed in 2023.

The United States was not always reliant on foreign sources for antimony. In the mid-twentieth century, domestic mining accounted for over 90 percent of U.S. antimony consumption. However, antimony mining is especially environmentally risky and challenging, as the metal is toxic and carcinogenic. As environmental regulations tightened in the 1970s, domestic antimony production declined. The Stibnite Gold Mine, the largest producer of antimony in the country, ceased operations in 1990s, marking the end of U.S. self-reliance for antimony.

Perpetua Resources has proposed plans to reopen the Stibnite Gold Mine to once again domestically produce antimony-trisulfide for missile and munitions applications. The project has attracted U.S. government attention, with the Department of Defense awarding $24.8 million through its Defense Production Act Investments Program to complete an environmental study and the U.S. Export-Import Bank sending the company a letter of interest for a $1.8 billion loan. However, the project is not scheduled to begin production until 2028 and is still awaiting final permitting. After China announced restrictions on antimony exports, share prices of Perpetua jumped 19 percent-exceeding a three-year high.

The United States will need to look to alternative antimony sources to mitigate antimony export restrictions and potential disruptions as soon as possible.

Q4: What is the global distribution of antimony reserves and current production?

A4: China holds an estimated 32 percent of the world's antimony reserves due to its location along antimony-rich geological formations called metallogenic belts. Antimony ore sourcing is ultimately limited to geology, and reserves are largely concentrated in just a few geographies. After China, Russia holds 17.5 percent of global reserves, meaning two foreign adversaries hold 50 percent of the world's antimony reserves. The remaining reserves can be found in Bolivia (15.5 percent), Kyrgyzstan (13 percent), Australia (7 percent), Burma (7 percent), and Turkey (5 percent). The United States sits on just 3 percent of global reserves.

While Bolivia, Kyrgyzstan, and Australia make up 35.5 percent of global reserves, they only produce 6.4 percent of the world's antimony combined. Rather, Tajikistan was the second-largest producer of antimony after China, accounting for 25 percent of world production in 2023 despite its relatively small reserves. While China has spent decades developing its antimony mining industry as well as the processing and refining infrastructure, the industry remains woefully underdeveloped in other antimony-rich nations. As a result, even antimony that is mined in other countries is primarily exported to China for refining. For example, 78 percent of Tajikistan's antimony exports and 86 percent of Australia's were sent to China. To secure antimony supply chains, the United States will need a strategy that addresses both mining and refining capabilities.

Q5: How will export controls on antimony affect the U.S. market?

A5: Antimony prices are expected to rise sharply following China's announcement of export restrictions. Prices have already doubled since the start of the year, reaching an all-time high of $22,000 per metric ton. Some experts predict that prices could reach as high as $30,000 per metric ton as buyers stockpile and secure supply for future production. China has already been cutting back on antimony exports for years as the country consumes more domestically. In 2018, China accounted for 41 percent of global antimony exports, but by 2022 it accounted for only 23 percent. The latest export restrictions are only expected to widen the antimony market deficit, which was measured at 10,000 tons in May.

As supplies tighten and prices surge, there is no large alternative source of antimony to turn to. The 2023 export restrictions on gallium may provide insight into likely export trends for antimony over the next several months. Following the implementation of gallium restrictions in July 2023, exports flatlined for several months before slowly creeping back up. Still, a year after the export controls were implemented, gallium exports are significantly below pre-restriction levels. Therefore, the U.S. defense industry may need to rely on diversified sourcing of antimony from several smaller producers to meet demand over the next several months.

Q6: How can the United States secure its antimony supply chain?

A6: The United States will not be able to solve its antimony supply chain challenges through domestic production alone, as domestic mining of antimony is at least several years away. Therefore, the country will have to turn to partners abroad to address current supply shortfalls.

As the second-largest producer of antimony, Tajikistan will be a major player in breaking U.S. reliance on Chinese imports. In February of this year, the Department of State held the inaugural C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue, convening the five nations of Central Asia, including Tajikistan, to discuss shared goals of developing a closer critical minerals partnership. The Tajik government has expressed its eagerness to expand global partnerships and attract foreign investment to develop its mining sector. U.S. investor Comsup Commodities has already invested over $300 million in expanding antimony processing in Tajikistan. Further developing these partnerships and finding ways to boost antimony offtake from Tajikistan may be key to fulfilling antimony demand.

Increasing investment in Australia, a close allied partner, may also help to alleviate antimony supply chain challenges. The Hillgrove site in Australia is the 10th-largest antimony project in the world, with high grades and the potential to boost antimony production outside of China. But investments in antimony refineries outside of China may be essential to keeping antimony ore from ending up back in China.

Finally, the United States should continue to invest in new capabilities at home, including the advancement of recycling technologies to increase the amount of antimony that can be recovered domestically.

Unfortunately, there is no one silver bullet to solve the new antimony dilemma. The metal is just the latest to fall victim to Chinese export controls, once again highlighting the national security risks of concentrated critical mineral supply chains.

Gracelin Baskaran is the director of the Project on Critical Minerals Security at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Meredith Schwartz is a research associate for the Project on Critical Minerals Security at CSIS.

Critical Questions is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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Director, Project on Critical Minerals Security and Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program
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Research Associate, Project on Critical Minerals Security