Seizing Middle East Opportunities

Commentary by Jon B. Alterman

Published September 30, 2024

Events in the Middle East are not going the way the Biden administration had hoped. A year ago, the administration had embarked on a strategy that would stabilize the region by improving Israeli-Arab ties. Hamas's October 7 attacks were aimed at stopping that process, and they did. And while Iran has embarked on a campaign to improve its ties with the rest of the world in recent months, the Israeli assault on Hezbollah will stop that. The Biden White House remains at the center of much of the region's diplomacy, but its sway in the region is limited-and the challenges are likely to grow more sharply in the coming weeks.

As much as its original plans have been scuttled, Hassan Nasrallah's assassination provides an opportunity for the Biden team to recalibrate its policy and inject some greater long-range thinking into regional events. Israel's stunning ability to strike at the heart of Hezbollah, and Iran's inability to either arrest the free fall or respond immediately, creates a vacuum in regional affairs. Like every crisis, this one contains opportunity, and the Biden administration needs to seize it.

The Biden administration came into office with plans to implement a Middle East strategy long on diplomacy and economic statecraft rather than military intervention, and Israel-Saudi rapprochement became a big part of the plan. Hamas was already alarmed by the so-called Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, and it saw a widening Israeli-Arab rapprochement that didn't deal squarely with Palestinian national ambitions as an existential threat, not only to Hamas, but to the Palestinian national movement more generally. The October 7 attack ended that rapprochement for years, if not decades, and it served Hamas's interests by helping ensure that the Israeli response increased Israel's global isolation.

Some argued that Iran was directly involved in the October 7 attacks, but the evidence is shaky. While Iran was certainly gratified that one of its proxy groups had demonstrated a capacity to act, the Iranian leadership was reportedly as surprised as the Israelis at the shape and timing of the assault. In addition, Israeli intelligence likely would have picked up information about Iranian involvement. Under the late president Raisi, Iran had turned away from seeking Western approval, and it sought to deepen its ties in Asia, improve its regional relations, and boost the so-called Axis of Resistance that aimed to push back against Western hegemony. For a while, it seemed to be going well.

But domestically, Iran had begun to fray. The economy was worsening, the government's abuses against the population were growing offensive, and the regime's legitimacy was crumbling. Masoud Pezeskhian took office as president in July after Raisi died in a May helicopter crash, and he sought to send a different message than his predecessors. The regime only allowed a small fraction of the potential candidates to run, and Pezeshkian was the only reformist. He has argued that Iran needs to turn inward and heal itself, and not be dragged into conflict. He has called for engagement with international actors over Iran's nuclear program. He has argued for turning down the temperature in the region.

Whether Pezeskhian is sincere is an open question. So is the question of whether he has any ability to implement the policies he calls for. True power in Iran rests with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the organs under him, and while Khamenei and his forces surely approved of Pezeskhian's victory, whether it is a smokescreen for continued hostility, a tentative exploration of what a different policy might yield, or a genuine shift in the Iranian approach remains unclear.

Whatever it is, the unprecedented Israeli assault on Hezbollah will block any Iranian effort at global engagement. That was part of the point. The Israeli leadership sees Iran at the core of all of the malign regional efforts that threaten Israel. It sees Iran as an implacable foe, and one that must be continually reminded of Israeli capacity and resolve.

For Hezbollah, there are no good choices. It retains an impressive arsenal of rockets and missiles that can hit much of Israel, but it is not clear how many are still operational, and Israel has demonstrated a willingness to impose massive damage on Lebanon in retribution. Hezbollah has already been humiliated by the pager strike and by any number of other Israeli actions that demonstrate the country's penetration of Hezbollah's organization. Backing down after such an impressive show of Israeli capability and Hezbollah weakness would be devastating.

The challenge is even more difficult for Iran, whose strategy just a week ago seemed to be working. Having a president at the UN meetings in New York preaching moderation and dialogue at least held out the prospect of regional de-escalation without dismantling the myriad organizations Iran has been supporting to boost its regional footprint. Now, all of those organizations will look to see what Iran does to protect what is by far the most important of its regional proxies, Hezbollah. Abandoning the resistance at its time of maximum need will have a chilling effect on its regional network. Strong efforts to support Hezbollah will undermine any effort to improve Iran's global ties and ease pressures on the Iranian economy.

Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is in the driver's seat for much of this, and the U.S. administration's influence with him, never strong, seems to be waning. Netanyahu has repeatedly frustrated efforts to shape Israeli policy in Gaza, and he seems to have blown by U.S. cautions about starting a regional war. One concern the White House must have is the moral hazard at work here: Netanyahu's assurance that the United States will stand by Israel in any circumstance emboldens Israel to take more risks than it otherwise would. But the White House must also worry that a sustained inability to make diplomatic progress weakens U.S. influence in the Middle East and around the world.

There is an opportunity for U.S. diplomacy here. Despite beginning to array troops on the Lebanon border, Israel surely does not seek a ground war in Lebanon, which has ended disastrously for Israel in the past. And Hezbollah and Iran will surely seek some off-ramp in order to preserve options. The United States should be working now to amass a large coalition that includes European, Asian, and Arab partners to engage with all parties to this conflict to stop the fighting and lock in gains for Lebanon's national government at Hezbollah's expense. Israel can argue that it has deterred Hezbollah. Hezbollah can argue that it has not surrendered. And all parties can agree that the region's countries need to devote more energy to looking at their internal challenges and less to regional conflict.

Netanyahu is the architect of much of what is happening in the Middle East today. His strategy to manage Gaza contributed to the October 7 attacks, and his strategy to decapitate Hezbollah will block Iranian rapprochement with the world for the foreseeable future. All wars are much easier to start than end, though, and it is not clear whether Netanyahu, his sharply divided cabinet, or his ruling coalition have any idea how they might do that. He will need a broad, U.S.-led coalition to push him, and it needs to start coming together now.

Jon B. Alterman is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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