Israel-Hezbollah Escalation

Critical Questions by Jon B. Alterman

Published September 24, 2024

On September 23, Israeli airstrikes killed almost 500 Lebanese in the country's deadliest day of conflict since the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. Hezbollah has been shelling Israel since the day after Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, and tensions have been escalating in the days since Israel targeted Hezbollah's communication tools and several key commanders. In response, Hezbollah fired some of its deepest strikes into Israel since the start of the war, and its top leaders warned that this was "just the beginning."

Q1: How do most Lebanese citizens feel about this recent escalation, and what are their opinions of Hezbollah more generally?

A1: It depends on who you are and where you are. There are a lot of Lebanese who resent the fact that Hezbollah has independence. It is an armed militia that is impervious to rule by the state. There are a lot of Lebanese, whether they're in the north of the country or whether they're Sunnis or Christians, who feel that Hezbollah is undermining the integrity of Lebanon. There are some Shi`a who feel that Hezbollah is a threat, but there are also Shi`a who feel that Hezbollah is a necessary defender of their rights, which have been historically marginalized in Lebanon. There are some Christian factions that are aligned with Hezbollah. The reality is that there are a lot of different Lebanese views. There's also a lot of Lebanese hostility toward Israel, and there's a fear that Lebanon is going to be dragged into conflict, not because of what most Lebanese want, but because that's what Hezbollah wants and that's what Hezbollah thinks Israel wants.

Q2: Why is Israel escalating attacks against Hezbollah? Is Netanyahu trying to intimidate Hezbollah into submission, or are there other political incentives for this escalation?

A2: There are a lot of people in the Israeli defense establishment who feel that it has been too long since Israel dealt Hezbollah a serious blow. They feel that Israel's deterrence has been in remission because the state has been too measured in its response to Hezbollah's shelling of communities in the north of Israel since October 7. A lot of countries would consider it unacceptable if they had an armed militia across the border that was shelling an area and preventing tens of thousands of citizens from living there. From an Israeli perspective, if the government of Lebanon can't control Hezbollah, then Israel will.

Q3: Given that the United States has struggled to constrain Israel's behavior with regard to Gaza, is it expected that the United States or other international actors will be able to deescalate the tensions between Israel and Hezbollah? If so, when?

A3: The U.S. government is deeply sympathetic to Israeli efforts to weaken Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a foreign terrorist organization, and the U.S. government doesn't talk to Hezbollah. As mentioned previously, Hezbollah is a militia that operates with impunity from the rules of the state of Lebanon. From the perspective of the U.S. government, diminishing Hezbollah's capabilities is not a bad thing. Rather, the United States' challenge is ensuring that this escalation does not tip the entire region into war. The region is a tinderbox. There are already issues of increasing violence in the West Bank, there's a war in Gaza, and Iran is certainly involved in many regional activities, including Houthi threats to navigation in the Red Sea.

While the Biden administration is concerned that things could get out of control, there is also a broader context. When Israel has taken military action in the past, the U.S. government has often waited a couple of weeks before trying to roll things back. This week, the president is preoccupied with his address to the UN General Assembly. There's a sense that Israel is still doing necessary-and perhaps from the view of some members of the U.S. government-useful work by knocking Hezbollah back. If the escalation stays within manageable parameters, the United States will likely try to apply pressure on Israel in the next week. From an Israeli perspective, they can act with relative impunity this week. After the pager attack, Hezbollah doesn't trust its communication systems and doesn't seem to be pressing toward war. From an Israeli perspective, Iran doesn't seem to be pressing toward war either, which makes it less risky for Israel to act strongly against Hezbollah. Looking toward the weekend, there will likely be a continued escalation in Israeli actions, although it is unlikely that the situation will tip into an all-out war before then.

Jon B. Alterman is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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