No Major Activity Observed at Punggye-ri Amid Increased Tension

Key Findings

• Last month, South Korea's Director of National Security Shin Won-sik stated there is "a high possibility" that North Korea's seventh nuclear test "will happen around the time of the U.S. Presidential election." The following weeks saw a rapid escalation of tensions, with North Korea alleging South Korean drone infiltration over Pyongyang and ordering its border artillery units to "get fully ready to open fire."
• A satellite image of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Testing Facility acquired on October 4, 2024, a few days before the rapid escalation of tension, shows that the facility continues to be well maintained. While no new dramatic activity is observable at the test site, the actual timing between a decision to test and the test itself may be relatively short as most preparations have already been completed and those that aren't can easily be accomplished at night or under periods of inclement weather that would obscure satellite imagery.
• The decision to conduct the seventh nuclear test remains entirely in the hands of Kim Jong-un. There may be no significant indications prior to a new test unless Kim wishes to provide such indications.
• CSIS studies have found a correlation between increased North Korean testing of missiles and nuclear devices and U.S. presidential and mid-term election years. Both the Trump and Obama administrations, for example, experienced North Korean nuclear tests shortly after being elected.

Overview

Last month, South Korea's Director of National Security Shin Won-sik stated that "there is a high possibility that" North Korea's seventh nuclear test "will happen around the time of the U.S. Presidential election." He shared that the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Facility continued to be "maintained to allow for nuclear testing," iterating that "Kim Jong-un can do it anytime he decides to do so."¹

In the following weeks, Kim Jong-un made two speeches justifying its use of nuclear weapons. On October 4, during a visit to a special operations forces training base, Kim emphasized that if the ROK-U.S. alliance "attempt to use armed forces encroaching upon the sovereignty of the DPRK…the DPRK would use without hesitation all offensive forces…including nuclear weapons."² Kim added that should North Korea use their weapons, "the permanent existence of Seoul and the Republic of Korea would be impossible," and that "this is a realistic prediction of the physical destructive power…not a rhetoric threat."³ The speech was assessed to have been in response to South Korea's recent military parade and announcement of the establishment of a new Strategic Command to oversee the country's responses to North Korean nuclear threats.⁴

Four days later, during a visit to Kim Jong Un National Defense University, Kim de-escalated his rhetoric, emphasizing that "all that it [South Korea] needs to do to guarantee its security is not provoking us into using our military strength," and that "to be honest, we have no intention of attacking the Republic of Korea" unless provoked.⁵

However, tension between the two countries only escalated further in recent days after North Korea accused South Korea of infiltrating Pyongyang's airspace with drones that allegedly released anti-regime leaflets in the city.⁶ Kim Jong-un's sister, Kim Yo-jong, berated Seoul and threatened "a horrible disaster" if another South Korean drone is discovered in Pyongyang's skies.⁷ South Korea has denied the allegations.

North Korea heightened tensions on October 13, when it shared that "the combined artillery units along the border" were ordered to "get fully ready to open fire."⁸ On the same day, South Korea's Ministry of National Defense released a statement declaring that if its people are endangered, it will "be the end of the North Korean regime."⁹

Imagery Analysis

A satellite image of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Testing Facility (often identified by North Korea as the Northern Nuclear Testing Site) on October 4, 2024, taken a few days before the rapid escalation of tension, shows only very minor changes since our last report. The only significant change has been the razing of the engineering and support building immediately outside the new portal to Tunnel No. 3 (South Portal), which occurred sometime between April and June this year. The facility remains active, as indicated by the well-maintained roads and active gardening at the Yongam-dong Command Center.

Nothing observed in the recently acquired image suggests imminent preparations for a seventh nuclear test. The decision to conduct this test remains entirely in the hands of Kim Jong-un. It will likely be undertaken to maximize his perceived political objectives. The actual timing between a decision to test and the test itself may be relatively shorter than many believe as most of the preparations have already been completed and those that aren't can easily be accomplished at night or under periods of inclement weather.

Tunnel No. 3

The satellite image collected on October 4, 2024, shows that the road leading up the valley to the Northern Testing Area is in good condition after repair of damages (i.e., washed away bridges, small landslides, etc.) caused by heavy rains earlier this year. There are no significant changes in the area of the new portal to Tunnel No. 3 (South Portal) except for the razing of the engineering and support building immediately outside the new portal to Tunnel No. 3, which occurred sometime between April and June this year. No vehicles or personnel are readily observed.

Main Administration and Support Area

As with our previous report, no vehicle, personnel, or recent ground activity is observed within the main administration and support area or the adjacent buildings.

Tunnels No. 2 and No. 4

No changes or activity is observed along the rebuilt road leading north from the main Administrative and Support Area to the collapsed portal for Tunnel No. 4 (West Portal). This rebuilt road, if ever extended, would continue onto the collapsed portal for Tunnel No. 2 (North Portal). Both portals generally remain as they have been since at least April 2023. The bare ground on the north and west sides of the collapsed portal for Tunnel No. 2 does show some evidence of erosion, likely caused by the heavy rains earlier this year.

Tunnel No. 1

As expected, the October 4, 2024, image shows no activity at or around the portal and spoil pile at Tunnel No. 1 (East Portal). This area has been abandoned since shortly after being used for North Korea's first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, and the portal is believed to have collapsed.

Yongam-dong Command Center

As with the Northern Testing Area, the Yongam-dong Command Center, located 6 kilometers south of the Northern Test Area, is in good condition, and any damage caused by heavy rains earlier this year has been repaired. No vehicles or personnel are readily observed at the former guard barracks or the command center compound. The gardens in the command center support area are being maintained, indicating the regular presence of personnel.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is a Senior Fellow for Imagery Analysis with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Victor Cha is President of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Jennifer Jun is Project Manager and Research Associate for Imagery Analysis with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Headline image Copyright © Airbus DS 2024.
Special thanks to HanLim Ryu for research support.

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