Beyond “Trump-Proofing”: NATO’s Real Adversaries

Commentary by Sean Monaghan

Published July 18, 2024

NATO is "Trump-proofing" itself. This was a common refrain before and after last week's historic 75th-anniversary summit of allied leaders in Washington. But the idea of "Trump-proofing" NATO is misleading: the biggest threat to the alliance is Vladimir Putin, not Donald Trump. The effort of allies to "Putin-proof" Ukraine and NATO was the main deliverable of the Washington summit. Allies also announced measures to deal with the growing threat to their security from Beijing.

Beyond Trump-Proofing

To be clear, Trump is a factor in NATO's future. If he returns to office in November, his "America-First" policies may undo much of the Biden administration's efforts to strengthen transatlantic security in the wake of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Trump has threatened to shrink U.S. troop presence in Europe, reduce intelligence sharing with NATO allies, make a deal with Russia over Ukraine's head, and even downgrade NATO's keystone Article 5 security guarantee for those who fail to pay their "bills."

Whether or not Trump would follow through with any of these measures is highly uncertain given how unpredictable he is. President Trump made similar threats during his first term in office, but in practice, his policies strengthened America's deterrence in Europe. As senior Republicans have advised NATO leaders: take Trump seriously, not literally.

Either way, scholars have long agreed that while domestic factors-such as elections and leaders' views-influence international politics, they are far from determinative. External factors also affect states and their leaders to shape their environment and decisions. These include "structural" effects-such as the balance of power-interdependence, or identity and culture. For example, the Cold War was driven by ideology (e.g., communism vs. capitalism), the balance of power (and terror), and the complex unwinding of global empires.

Such factors will shape NATO's future more than Trump. The most important is the return of Russian revanchism. This is driven by a potent, Thucydian combination of fear, honor, and interest which takes the form of Vladimir Putin's irrepressible appetite to restore Russia's sphere of influence in its near abroad. Putin views Ukraine as the centerpiece of this mission and its European integration as an existential threat to Russia: "It would not be an exaggeration to say that the path of forced assimilation . . . is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us."

Putin's view led to his attempted conquest of Ukraine in 2022 after many failed attempts over the years to keep Kyiv in Moscow's orbit. This resulted in the first large-scale war in Europe since 1945. The stakes of this war are most evident for the people of Ukraine, but many doubt Putin would stop in Kyiv were he to gain victory there. Even with Russian forces bogged down in Ukraine, European leaders and NATO defense chiefs are warning that Moscow may be ready to attack them in three to five years. Meanwhile, Russia's "hybrid war" on NATO allies is intensifying, including sabotage, hacking, and disinformation.

Putin-Proofing NATO

So how did the Washington summit help "Putin-proof" NATO? First, allies agreed to a new package of support for Ukraine which comprised three elements: membership, mission, and money. On membership, allies agreed that Ukraine was now on an "irreversible path." To manage this journey, allies agreed on a new mission to manage their support for Ukraine from within NATO structures. This has three parts: a new command based in Germany to coordinate aid and training, a new center for practical NATO-Ukraine cooperation in Poland, and a new NATO senior envoy in Ukraine, Patrick Turner.

To fund the mission, allies agreed to a long-term pledge of security assistance to Ukraine to ensure current funding levels are maintained (at least $43 billion annually, divided proportionately among allies) and remain sustainable. Several short-term aid packages were also announced, including "dozens" of air defense systems, the delivery of F-16 aircraft by the summer, and other pledges by Canada, the United Kingdom, and others.

Although some analysts thought the summit could have gone further, Andriy Yermak, Zelensky's chief of staff, said: "We can see that the alliance made the real steps forward. I think that the next stop is [that] Ukraine needs to receive the invitation." The mission and the money ensure that the "bridge" to membership mentioned in the declaration is more than a metaphor. They will boost Ukraine's military and interoperability so that when the political time comes, Ukraine's forces can seamlessly integrate into NATO-just like Finland and Sweden did. The Ukraine Compact, agreed to by 30 allies (Hungary and Turkey did not sign) plus Japan and the European Union, adds another layer of long-term commitment that goes beyond the war to convince Putin his strategy of outlasting them in Ukraine will not succeed.

Second, the Washington Summit helped reinforce NATO's own deterrence and defense. Strengthening these helps Ukraine, too, allowing allies to support Kyiv without fear of Russian reprisal. Allied leaders first agreed to overhaul their deterrence and defense two years ago in Madrid to deliver their new strategic concept. In Washington, NATO leaders took stock of their progress to deliver "the biggest reinforcement of our collective defense in a generation."

The summit yielded progress in four areas critical to strengthening NATO's deterrence and defense, particularly among European allies: cash, combat power, capabilities, and cooperation. Allies noted that investment by non-U.S. allies increased by 18 percent this year-the biggest annual rise in decades-and agreed to spend more, but avoided committing to a new target above the 2 percent of GDP figure agreed to in 2014. To boost combat power, allies agreed to a range of measures, including resourcing new defense plans, more frequent collective defense drills, enhanced logistics, and a NATO presence in new member, Finland. They also agreed on new initiatives to address capability gaps in battle-decisive munitions, air and missile defense, and long-range strikes. Many of these were collaborative projects. For example, NATO announced new projects on space surveillance, cloud computing, and Nordic airspace cooperation, while France, Germany, Italy, and Poland agreed to develop a new long-range missile. Increasing cooperation was also a central feature of the NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge agreed at the summit.

The summit also complemented conventional deterrence with civil defense and resilience measures to combat growing hybrid threats. "It's not only about military effects," as Royal Netherlands navy admiral Rob Bauer, chair of NATO's Military Committee, put it. "It's also about hybrid warfare. It's about energy. It's about migration. It's about food. All these things have been used by Putin [and] will be used again by Putin."

The Indo-Pacific Comes to the North Atlantic

Beyond Europe, the most significant structural shift in global power is the rise of China. Under President Xi, China is turning its meteoric rise in economic power into military might. As China has become more assertive on the world stage, it has also become harder for NATO allies to ignore. NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept was the first to mention China but remained vague, suggesting its "stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security, and values." According to the concept, allies are concerned about China's "coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance," as well as its partnership with Russia.

These concerns were laid bare in Washington. The declaration opens a new chapter in NATO-China relations, starting by calling out China as a "decisive enabler" of Russia's war in Ukraine. The logical implication is that Russia's war would not be viable without China's help. This is a serious escalation in rhetoric, but it remains to be seen what practical measures NATO might take-and whether these would change China's behavior.

The declaration also gets specific by citing China's "sustained malicious cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation." To help counter these threats, NATO allies agreed to cooperate with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea on cyber defense, counterdisinformation, and emerging technology. The leaders of those four countries attended their third summit, while Chinese forces undertook symbolic military drills in Belarus just 5 km from the border of Poland, a NATO ally. These events suggest that while NATO might not be going to the Indo-Pacific-the clue is in the name of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-the Indo-Pacific is at least coming to NATO.

The rise of China also poses a challenge to NATO from within. It moves the focus of its largest ally, the United States, away from Europe and toward the Indo-Pacific. This is not breaking news: the United States has been pivoting to Asia for at least two decades and four administrations. Neither does it mean that the United States will pull back from Europe-the Biden administration has continued to increase U.S. forces there since Russia's invasion, adding to this last week by committing to deploy long-range missiles in Germany for the first time since the Cold War. However, in practice, Washington's focus on China-and the growing possibility of coordinated action between Moscow and Beijing-will make it harder for the United States to commit resources to Europe in peace or war. This leaves European allies with no option but to continue building up the European pillar of NATO.

Future-Proofing NATO

NATO allies did not meet in Washington to "Trump-proof" their alliance. They gathered to future-proof NATO at a significant moment-not just 75 years after the Washington Treaty was signed, but also at the dawn of a dangerous new era. NATO faces new challenges ahead that were not present in its first 75 years: a large-scale Russian war in Europe and an aggressive China with global clout and ambition (not to mention accelerating climate change).

Structural shifts like these will drive NATO's adaptation to a dangerous and uncertain world more than national elections. Yet elections are also the secret to NATO's success as "the longest-lasting Alliance in history," as noted by NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg. Fears that recent European elections might undermine the summit proved wrong when France avoided a hard right turn and the new United Kingdom's new government committed to a "NATO first" defense review led by Lord Robertson - a former NATO Secretary General. As Lord Robertson has experienced firsthand, the fact NATO is an alliance of liberal democracies makes it unique in history-and likely to endure whatever the future has in store.

Sean Monaghan is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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